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Abstract 
 
Non-epistemic interests (e.g., financial interests, political interests) sometimes influence 
scientific decisions (e.g., hypothesis acceptance, theory choice). For instance, 
pharmaceutical giant Merck manipulated clinical trial data in order to make sure that 
these data confirmed the safety of one of its products (Vioxx), as this served the 
company’s short-term commercial interests. The latter is obviously unacceptable. But 
why exactly is it unacceptable? One way to account for this is on the basis of the full 
ideal of purity. According to this ideal, scientific decision-making should be pure, i.e. 
unaffected by non-epistemic interests. Although this ideal is questionable in light of 
earlier philosophical work, some philosophers of science still hold on to it, or to a less 
strict version of it. In part 1 of this dissertation, it is argued that it is better to fully 
abandon the ideal of purity. In part 2, an alternative ideal to assess interest influences in 
science is proposed: the ideal of epistemic integrity. A new concept of epistemic 
integrity is spelled out and systematically defended. Furthermore, the new concept is 
not only used to analyze the Vioxx debacle, but also to identify unacceptable interest 
influences in aerospace science and climate science, and to explain why exactly these 
interest influences are unacceptable. 
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Preface 
A few years ago, I read a renowned article written by Justin Bekelman, Yan Li, and 
Cary Gross, called ‘Scope and impact of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical 
research: A systematic review’. The article reveals a statistically significant correlation 
between industry sponsorship of biomedical research and pro-industry conclusions 
(Bekelman, Li & Gross 2003). I started wondering where this correlation comes from. A 
first, obvious explanation was that pharmaceutical companies manipulate research 
and/or its results in order to arrive at favorable conclusions, that is, conclusions that 
can help them sell their products and make a profit. In that case, we should seriously 
worry about the fact that the financial interests of pharmaceutical companies 
increasingly permeate biomedical science (e.g., Bekelman, Li & Gross (2003) report that 
industry’s share of total investments in biomedical research grew from 32% in 1980 to 
62% in 2000). 
But it is also possible that the correlation is due to pharmaceutical companies being 
better than government-funded agencies at detecting in early stages of research the 
most promising drugs for treating a certain condition. Pharmaceutical companies would 
then be better than government-funded agencies at avoiding expensive clinical trials 
for inferior drugs, and they would mainly conduct research on drugs that will turn out 
to be most effective and safe. This is an alternative explanation for the finding that 
industry-sponsored research is more likely to draw favorable conclusions. If this would 
be the right explanation, then the growing influence of industry and its financial 
interests on biomedical research would not be a problem. On the contrary: it would 
make the biomedical enterprise more efficient, as it would be able to deliver better 
medicines for less money (due to resources being primarily allocated to research on the 
most valuable drugs). 
Depending on which explanation we accept, the conclusion is different. In fact, the 
two explanations lead to opposite conclusions: ‘financial interests corrupt biomedical 
science’ versus ‘financial interests advance biomedical science’. I considered the tension 
between these two conclusions to be an instance of a more general tension: the tension 
between the idea that science should not be affected by financial interests, political 
 vi 
interests, career interests, etc. on the one hand, and the idea that such interests play a 
valuable role in science on the other hand. 
Aroused by the desire to develop a more advanced, consistent picture of interests in 
science, I started thinking about a number of questions relating to this topic. How do 
different kinds of interests influence different kinds of decisions in science? Which of 
these influences are valuable and why? Do interests in science cause certain problems, 
and if so, which problems exactly? What are the best ways to deal with these problems? 
Because financial interests become more and more important in science, and also 
because our dependence on scientists’ expertise increases, these questions are today 
more relevant than ever. Therefore, I have searched for answers to these questions in 
the past five years. The main results of that quest are presented in this dissertation. 
Before I start, I would like to add a word of thanks to all those who have contributed. 
Firstly, I am grateful to the Research Foundation – Flanders for financially supporting 
my research, first through research project 3G003109 (from January to September 2009), 
and from October 2009 to September 2013 through a Ph.D. fellowship. Secondly, I owe 
special thanks to the supervisor of my doctoral research, Erik Weber, and the co-
supervisor, Jeroen Van Bouwel, for the opportunities they gave me, for guiding me 
through my research, and for their useful advice and valuable comments on this 
dissertation. Thirdly, I want to thank all others who have offered helpful comments on 
earlier versions of (parts of) this dissertation: Rogier De Langhe, Dries De Winter, Laszlo 
Kosolosky, Bert Leuridan, Hans Radder, Julian Reiss, Sigrid Sterckx, Maarten Van Dyck, 
and several anonymous reviewers of journals. Also thanks to several people at 
conferences and workshops for suggestions and discussions. For the design of this 
dissertation, I thank Gitte Callaert. Finally, I want to thank the members of the reading 
committee: Tom Claes, Rogier De Langhe, Hans Radder, Julian Reiss, and Maarten Van 
Dyck. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Conceptual framework 
1.1.1 The concept of interests 
A first thing to be done in a dissertation on interests in science, is a clarification of 
the term ‘interests’. What does this term stand for? Let me propose a characterization of 
interests that is taken for granted throughout this dissertation. 
An interest can be thought of as a relation between an agent (which could be an 
individual, a social group, an institution, etc.) and a potential state or circumstance, 
more specifically, the following relation: the realization of the potential state is by the 
agent regarded as beneficial in one way or another. For instance, when I speak of the 
health interests of a patient, I refer to potential health states that the patient considers 
beneficial. When I speak of the financial interests of a company, I refer to potential 
financial circumstances that the company considers beneficial. An action serves an 
interest if it contributes to the realization of the potential state that is regarded as 
beneficial. 
Note that interests differ from goals. In fact, goals form a subcategory of interests; all 
goals are interests, but not vice versa. A goal requires that there is a potential state or 
circumstance of which the realization is regarded as beneficial in one way or another, 
and therefore it is an interest. But more is required: for an interest to be a goal, effort 
must be directed towards the realization of the potential state or circumstance. Hence, 
not all interests are goals in my terminology. If no effort is made to realize the relevant 
state or circumstance, then this is not considered a goal. 
A category of interests that is especially relevant for the sciences is the category of 
interests in knowledge, or epistemic interests. An epistemic interest is here understood 
as an interest concerning the potential state of knowing something, which is regarded 
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as beneficial in one way or another. These are interests that usually (partly or fully) 
motivate scientific inquiry: someone wants to know something – whether it is out of 
sheer intellectual curiosity or because such knowledge will serve other (i.e. non-
epistemic) interests – and this causes him to pursue a certain line of research. The 
results of the research are supposed to serve the person’s epistemic interest; they are 
supposed to contribute to the realization of the potential state of knowledge wished for. 
Of course, scientific research could also have unexpected results. It may not deliver 
the knowledge wished for, but instead, say, the finding that such knowledge cannot be 
attained as easily as initially expected. In that case, the research does not serve the 
epistemic goal that motivated it. This does, however, not mean that the research does 
not serve any epistemic interests. If the unexpected result (i.e. the finding that the 
desired knowledge cannot be attained as easily as initially expected) is considered 
valuable knowledge as well, then the research serves one’s interest in such knowledge, 
even though serving this interest is not what the research originally aimed at. The 
interest served is then a post factum interest, that is, an interest which is recognized 
after it is served. 
The distinction I draw between epistemic and non-epistemic interests does not entail 
that they can always be strictly separated. My framework allows epistemic interests to 
be closely connected to non-epistemic interests. This is in line with a point made by 
Philip Kitcher. As Kitcher has indicated, scientists do not just aim at discovering plain 
truth: 
 
Nobody should be beguiled by the idea that the aim of inquiry is merely to discover 
truth, for, as numerous philosophers have recognized, there are vast numbers of true 
statements it would be utterly pointless to ascertain. The sciences are surely directed 
at finding significant truths. (Kitcher 2001, p. 65) 
 
Kitcher distinguishes two kinds of significance: practical and theoretical significance.1 A 
true statement is practically significant if knowing it increases the probability of 
attaining practical goals. A true statement is theoretically significant if knowing it is 
intrinsically valuable (Kitcher 2001, p. 65). So the sciences are, in Kitcher’s view, 
directed at generating knowledge that is either useful for practical goals, or intrinsically 
valuable, or both. In my terminology: in the sciences, there is an epistemic interest in 
knowledge that is either useful for non-epistemic interests, or intrinsically valuable, or 
both. 
 
                                                     
1 Kitcher also uses the term ‘epistemic significance’ as a synonym for ‘theoretical significance’ (see Kitcher 
2001, p. 65). 
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This points at a potential connection between epistemic and non-epistemic interests. 
Certain kinds of knowledge may be considered valuable – and are therefore pursued in 
the sciences – (partly) because of their usefulness for non-epistemic interests. Hence, 
the epistemic interest in such knowledge may (partly) stem from the non-epistemic 
interests that such knowledge would serve. 
I should note that not only the public non-epistemic goals that most people consider 
acceptable in science, such as the aim to promote public health, may motivate epistemic 
interests in science, but also more controversial non-epistemic interests, such as the 
financial interests of a company, or political interests. Such interests are often served by 
particular kinds of knowledge – for instance, the financial interests of a pharmaceutical 
firm are served by scientific evidence suggesting that one of its products is safer or 
more efficient than competing drugs – and this may cause the potential beneficiary to 
be interested in such knowledge (= epistemic interest). 
1.1.2 The concept of values 
A second concept that I have to delineate is the concept of values. This is because I 
will use the existing literature on values in science in order to reveal certain interest 
influences in science. The concept of values is closely related to the concept of interests, 
but the two are not the same. Let me offer a characterization of values that I take for 
granted throughout this dissertation. 
Values differ from interests in that they are not relations between agents and states, 
but properties of entities. More specifically, a property is a value for an entity of a 
certain kind when it is regarded as beneficial that an entity of that kind has the 
property. For instance, speed is a value for a race car since it is regarded as beneficial 
that a race car is fast. Fairness is a value for society if we regard it as beneficial that 
society is fair. Empirical adequacy is a value for a theory if we consider it beneficial that 
a theory is empirically adequate.2 I start from this characterization of values because (1) 
I think it captures quite well what is meant by this concept in the philosophical 
literature that I will use, and (2) it is appropriate for my purposes. It is inspired by a 
characterization offered by Ernan McMullin: “A property or set of properties may count 
 
                                                     
2 Note that this characterization involves a relation between agents and properties: an agent regards it as 
beneficial that an entity of a certain kind has the relevant property. But that does not mean that a value is a 
relation between an agent and a property. The relevant property is the value, not the relation between the 
property and the agent. For example, if Peter regards it as beneficial that a race car is fast, then speed is the 
value in this case, and Peter holds this value. The value is not the relation between Peter and speed. 
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as a value in an entity of a particular kind because it is desirable for an entity of that 
kind” (McMullin 1983, p. 5). 
It should be remarked that people can disagree on whether or not a certain property 
is a value for a certain kind of entity; people can hold different values. For instance, 
while one person may consider diversity a value for society, someone else may prefer a 
homogeneous society. 
A second remark is that entities can often have a certain property to a higher or 
lower degree. Speed, fairness, empirical adequacy, and diversity are all properties that 
come in degrees; a race car can be faster or slower, a society can be more fair or less fair, 
and more diverse or less diverse, and a theory can be more empirically adequate or less 
empirically adequate. Usually, when properties that come in degrees are accepted as 
values for the relevant kinds of entities, then it is regarded as beneficial that the entities 
have the properties to a degree that is as high as possible, and the higher the degree, the 
better. 
If we take the example of the race car, one may have the following objection: as a 
race car gets faster, it becomes harder to control, and so a faster race car is not 
necessarily a better one. This objection does, however, not imply that it is not regarded 
as beneficial that a race car is as fast as possible, but only that the value of speed can 
conflict with other values, such as the controllability of the car. If scoring higher on the 
value of speed would not imply scoring lower on the value of controllability, then the 
faster race car would be considered the better one. So when I say that usually it is 
regarded as beneficial that an entity has a value to a degree that is as high as possible, 
then I mean: usually it is regarded as beneficial that an entity has a value to a degree 
that is as high as possible, all other things being equal. 
The reason why I say ‘usually’, is that this is not necessarily always the case. For 
instance, someone can (consistently) consider diversity a value for society, and at the 
same prefer moderate diversity over extreme diversity, all other things being equal. As 
the person prefers a society with a degree of diversity above a certain threshold degree, 
over a society with a degree of diversity below this threshold, he holds the value of 
diversity, even though he does not consider it beneficial that a moderately diverse 
society becomes even more diverse. 
What can we now, in light of my conceptual framework, say about the potential 
relations between values and interests? Firstly, values can give rise to certain interests. 
When we consider certain properties valuable for a certain kind of entity, then this may 
lead to an interest in adjusting an entity of this kind so that it acquires the valuable 
properties. Or we may want to replace an entity that doesn’t manifest certain values by 
one that does. For instance, if we think that a race car is too slow (that is, it does not 
sufficiently manifest the value of speed), we may want to tune the car in order to make 
it faster, or replace it by another one which is faster (that is, we want to realize the state 
in which we have a race car that sufficiently manifests the value of speed). It is clear 
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that interests such as these depend on what we value; if we would not consider speed a 
value for race cars, we would not be interested in tuning or replacing our race car in 
order to have a faster one. 
Secondly, values can depend on interests. For example, racing drivers value speed for 
race cars because they want to win races, and in order to satisfy that interest, their car 
needs to be as quick as possible. A car manufacturer may value speed because building a 
fast race car serves its commercial interests: if it can develop a race car that is 
remarkably fast, then more people will be prepared to buy this car, or other cars from 
the same manufacturer. If fast race cars would not serve these interests (e.g., because all 
racing drivers would have to use the same car, and potential buyers would not be 
affected by speed), and if speed would not serve any other interests, then the relevant 
agents would probably not consider speed a valuable property for race cars. 
It should be noted that the influence of interests on values could be conscious as well 
as unconscious. If someone’s valuing a certain property for a certain kind of entity is 
due to the fact that certain interests are better served by entities with the relevant 
property, then he may be aware of this; he may even refer to these interests in justifying 
why he considers the property valuable. But it is also possible that the influence of 
certain interests is more obscure. Suppose, for instance, that a car manufacturer thinks 
that it regards speed as valuable for race cars only because speed is needed to win races 
and that its commercial interests have nothing to do with this. Still, it is possible that 
the manufacturer’s commercial interests are causally relevant for the fact that it 
considers speed a value for race cars; it is possible that once fast cars stop serving these 
interests (say, because speed or winning races doesn’t sell anymore), the manufacturer 
stops holding the value of speed, or that, had these interests not been served by fast 
race cars from the beginning, the manufacturer would never have started valuing speed 
in the first place. 
1.2 Main assumptions 
1.2.1 Science serves non-epistemic interests 
Now that I have spelled out a conceptual framework for this dissertation, I should 
turn to its main assumptions. A first assumption is that the sciences do not only serve 
epistemic interests, but also a variety of non-epistemic interests. Let me explain this 
assumption on the basis of several examples. 
Research in the health sciences has delivered products and treatments that help us 
tackle various diseases. These innovations have had a major impact on human health, 
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and still have. Due to the health sciences and its products (e.g., new medicines, new 
ways to diagnose disease), we can cure diseases that were incurable before, recovery 
processes can be accelerated, the development of certain health conditions can be 
prevented more effectively, and so on. This has contributed to an increase of life 
expectancy. It is obvious that these achievements would not have been possible, or at 
least not to the same degree, without the health research that preceded them (Bush 
1945; Lichtenberg 2003). This means that health research has served certain non-
epistemic interests, namely, people’s interest to live a long and healthy life. (Living a 
long and healthy life is the potential state that they regard as beneficial; cf. section 
1.1.1.) 
Research in the agricultural sciences has delivered techniques to substantially 
increase food production, ranging from the use of water, machinery, fertilizers, and 
insecticides, to genetic engineering. Recently, attention has also been drawn to some 
alternative approaches in the agricultural sciences, which fall under the name 
‘agroecology’, and which enable us to not only increase food production, but also to 
alleviate rural poverty and mitigate climate change (De Schutter 2011). So research in 
the agricultural sciences serves certain non-epistemic interests: the interest to increase 
food production, to alleviate rural poverty, and to mitigate climate change. (Increased 
food production, less rural poverty, and mitigated climate change are potential states 
that are regarded as beneficial.) 
Social benefits such as better public health, increased life expectancy, and having 
sufficient food to feed the population are often used to justify public funding of science: 
because science delivers these benefits, the government should support it (see, for 
instance, Vannevar Bush’s (1945) famous report to U.S. President Harry S. Truman, in 
which he indicates how and why the government should support science). Another 
interest that is often used to justify public funding of science is national security. 
Science enables us to develop weapons and techniques that are very useful to protect 
the nation from enemy attacks, and this is a reason to allocate government resources to 
such research (Bush 1945). 
Serving social interests is not limited to the health sciences, the agricultural sciences, 
and military science; other sciences serve certain social interests as well. Think, for 
instance, of sociology, which enables us to predict and anticipate the social 
consequences of certain conditions or social measures, meteorology, which delivers 
more or less accurate weather forecasts, or seismology, which offers estimates of the 
probability of an earthquake at a particular location at a particular time. All these things 
are considered valuable to society. 
One may have the impression that this very brief overview of some of the fruits of 
science only concerns the applied sciences, that is, sciences that aim at solving practical 
problems in medicine, agriculture, engineering, etc., but not the fundamental sciences, 
that is, sciences that aim at the advancement of knowledge without the prospect of an 
Introduction 
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immediate practical use (e.g., biology, chemistry, physics). However, the latter sciences 
serve a variety of non-epistemic interests as well. They could contribute to the 
aforementioned social benefits by delivering knowledge that is used in applied research. 
Applied research often builds on the knowledge generated in the fundamental sciences, 
and as such, the latter indirectly serve the social interests that applied research serves 
(better public health, national security, etc.). 
An example of fundamental research that was (partly) justified on the basis of social 
interests is the Human Genome Project, which aims at mapping and sequencing the 
genome of our species. This project would bring improvements in diagnostic testing and 
partial gains in coping with certain diseases, and by enhancing understanding of basic 
biology, it would possibly contribute to significant breakthroughs in the treatment or 
prevention of diseases in a distant future. These potential medical benefits were 
emphasized in public defense of the Human Genome Project (Kitcher 2001, pp. 4-5). 
Scientific research also serves private interests of those involved in it. Research and 
development (R&D) of commercial products delivers profits to the private companies 
that have invested in it. Nowadays, universities, too, can make money from commercial 
research. Several countries have enacted legislation that permit universities to obtain 
patents on products that are developed using government funding (Siepmann 2004; 
Mowery & Sampat 2005, p. 123), and these patents enable them to demand 
compensations from anyone who wants to use the patented products. Hence, R&D of 
commercial products can serve not only the financial interests of private companies, 
but also of universities. Another private interest that research serves, is the objective of 
universities and researchers to maintain/obtain government funding in the future. 
Research delivers products such as publications in scientific journals and academic 
prizes, and these can be used to claim future research funding from the government. 
Researchers also pursue such products in order to be eligible for a promotion or tenure. 
1.2.2 Interests influence science 
A second assumption of this dissertation is that serving interests is not just an ad hoc 
aspect of science, something which happens at the end of the research process by 
accident. I assume that from the beginning of the scientific process, serving certain 
interests is anticipated by those supporting and performing the research. I have already 
mentioned that Vannevar Bush referred to social interests in justifying public funding 
for science. This justification was the basis of the establishment of the National Science 
Foundation, a U.S. government agency that supports fundamental research. Hence, the 
prospect that research would serve certain interests is what motivated the government 
to allocate resources to it. Private companies, too, fund research because they expect it 
to serve certain interests, typically, the financial interests of their owners or 
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shareholders. They invest in research because they believe this will deliver financial 
rewards that exceed their investments in research, so that profits can be made. 
Researchers themselves are driven by interests as well – whether it is sheer intellectual 
curiosity, the desire to make a difference in the world, or the desire to gain status; most, 
if not all of them, perform research because of the interests they hope it to serve. 
Interests do not only influence decisions on whether or not to support or perform 
research, but also decisions on which research is supported/performed. Private 
companies select the research that they expect to meet consumer wishes and deliver 
the highest profits (and thus serve their financial interests best), non-governmental 
organizations select the research that they expect to contribute most to the realization 
of the organization’s goals, and academic researchers’ decisions on which research to 
pursue are based on, e.g., which topics they are most curious about, which lines of 
research they expect to deliver the results that are most beneficial to society or most 
interesting to the academic community, or which research they expect to contribute 
most to the advancement of their careers. 
Once the research has started, interests continue to play an important role. Epistemic 
and non-epistemic interests affect reasoning processes within scientific research. They 
play in decisions on whether or not to accept a certain hypothesis, in the process of 
choosing between rival theories, and in the construction and evaluation of explanations. 
I admit that this claim may be more controversial than my claims on the role of 
interests in the phases preceding research (see above): while most people will accept 
that non-epistemic interests play an important role before research (in decisions 
concerning the allocation of resources), the claim that they also play an important role 
during research may be more controversial. The idea that scientific inquiry is, or at least 
should be pure, in the sense of being independent of factors such as the ideological or 
financial interests of the researcher(s), seems deeply rooted in the minds of a lot of 
people (Proctor 1991, pp. 3-4). Because my view conflicts with this idea, I support my 
view in part 1 of this dissertation. As such, I hope to eradicate the idea that scientific 
research should be free from non-epistemic interests. I will come back to this in section 
2.3, where I present the aims of this dissertation. 
Now consider the phases after research. Once research is finished, the results are 
usually communicated to others. Interests influence which results are communicated to 
whom. An example is when academic researchers communicate their findings to the 
academic community (typically by publishing articles in academic journals) but not to 
the broader public because the former contributes to their status in the academic 
community and serves their career interests, while informing the broader public does 
not serve these interests, or at least not to the same degree. Not only the interests of the 
knowledge providers have an influence on who is informed, but also the interests of 
potential audiences. Suppose there is a question that only a small community of 
scientists is curious about – maybe outsiders do not even understand the question – and 
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that a member of this community develops an answer to this question. The fact that 
only the members of the community are interested in such an answer, and that the 
answer does not serve the interests of outsiders, at least not directly, can then be a 
reason to only inform the former group. So who is informed and who is not depends on 
the interests of the informer and/or his potential audiences. But interests can also cause 
someone to actively keep the results of one’s research hidden for certain groups. Trade 
secrets are a well-known example: companies keep a certain design or process secret 
(typically by having their employees sign an agreement that they will not inform 
outsiders of the design or process) in order to have a competitive advantage over rival 
companies. 
Finally, consider the application of scientific research results. Here, the story is more 
or less similar to the selection of research projects: private companies select the 
applications that they expect to meet consumer wishes and deliver the highest profits, 
non-governmental organizations select the applications that they expect to contribute 
most to the realization of the organization’s goals, and governments apply research 
results in ways that they think will serve the interests of their citizens best, or of the 
specific groups they represent, or they choose certain applications because they expect 
these to serve their own interests best (e.g., by attracting the most potential voters). 
1.2.3 Troublesome interest influences 
So interests can play in different phases of the scientific process. While this is often 
acceptable or even desirable, there are also cases in which a particular interest 
influence is troublesome. This is a third assumption of this dissertation. I borrow an 
example from Biddle (2007) to illustrate this. 
When pharmaceutical giant Merck reported the results of research on the painkiller 
Vioxx, it didn’t mention all cardiovascular events in the groups taking Vioxx. Take, for 
instance, the large VIGOR study (Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research), in which 
Vioxx was compared with naproxen with respect to gastrointestinal outcomes. A paper 
on this study was published in the New England Journal of Medicine. The paper 
mentioned 17 heart attacks in the Vioxx group. But later, it turned out that data 
relevant to cardiovascular risks had been deleted from the final draft of the VIGOR 
study. Among these data were three additional heart attacks that occurred in the Vioxx 
group (so actually, there were 20 heart attacks in the Vioxx group). At least two of the 
authors of the paper were aware of the three additional heart attacks before the paper 
was submitted to the New England Journal of Medicine (Biddle 2007, p. 28). 
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A similar problem occurred with respect to another study on Vioxx, known as 
‘Advantage’. In the Advantage study, Vioxx was also compared with naproxen. A paper 
on this study that was written by Merck employees3 and published in Annals of 
Medicine, stated that five patients suffered from heart attack or sudden cardiac death in 
the Vioxx group, as compared to one in the naproxen group. This difference was not 
statistically significant. But at least one, and possibly three more deaths in the Vioxx 
group resulted from cardiovascular problems. If one of these deaths had been classified 
as resulting from cardiovascular problems, then the difference in cardiovascular events 
in the Vioxx group and the naproxen group would have been statistically significant 
(Biddle 2007, p. 29). 
Biddle attributes the inadequacies in Merck’s characterization and reporting of data 
to its short-term financial interests (Biddle 2007, p. 30). Merck was the owner of Vioxx. 
If research would show that there were significant cardiovascular risks attached to 
Vioxx, this would damage the sales of this drug, and thus Merck’s revenues from it. To 
make sure that this would not happen, the data on cardiovascular events occurring in 
Vioxx groups were altered. In that way, Merck’s (short-term) financial interests were 
protected. 
The particular influence that interests had in this case on research/communication is 
clearly troublesome. The data should not have been altered in order not to jeopardize 
the sales of Vioxx. Merck’s short-term financial interests caused these illegitimate 
alterations of data, and so the influence of these interests is problematic. 
1.3 Two challenges for philosophy of science 
My conceptual framework and assumptions present two challenges for philosophy of 
science. A first challenge is to describe and analyze the different roles that different 
kinds of interests play in science. We have seen that there are various interest 
influences in the scientific process. Philosophers of science should study these 
influences and make them explicit. This is the first challenge for philosophy of science. 
In part 1 of this dissertation, I will contribute to meeting this challenge. More 
specifically, part 1 discusses the roles of interests in reasoning processes within 
scientific research (and so it doesn’t concern the phases before and after research). It 
 
                                                     
3 Jeffrey R. Lisse of the University of Arizona is the lead author of the paper, but he was paid to put his name 
on it (Biddle 2007, p. 29). 
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shows how different kinds of interests affect the acceptance of hypotheses, theory 
choice, and the evaluation of explanations in science. One of the main purposes is to 
show that non-epistemic interests play a more prominent role in reasoning processes 
within scientific research than most people tend to think. I will do this by attacking two 
versions of the ideal of purity: (1) the full ideal of purity, which states that ideally, non-
epistemic interests do not play a role in scientific decisions such as hypothesis 
acceptance and theory choice, and (2) the partial ideal of purity, which states that 
ideally, non-epistemic interests do not play a direct role in such scientific decisions. My 
criticism on the latter version will be the most extensive one, since it is more 
controversial. Together, my criticisms reveal that non-epistemic interests form an 
integral part of scientific reasoning. 
Once we acknowledge this, a second challenge arises: to distinguish acceptable 
interest influences in science from unacceptable interest influences in science. The Vioxx 
case shows that the influence of certain interests on the research process can 
sometimes be troublesome. Philosophers of science should specify when it is 
troublesome and when it is not. For those particular interest influences that are 
regarded as problematic, it should be clarified why they are problematic. This is the 
second challenge for philosophy of science. 
The aim of part 2 of this dissertation is to contribute to meeting the second 
challenge. The focus is on epistemically problematic interest influences, and so I will not 
consider interest influences that are only for non-epistemic reasons problematic. An 
example of an epistemically problematic interest influence is the interest influence in 
the Vioxx case discussed above. Biddle (2007) characterizes the inadequacies in Merck’s 
characterization and reporting of data as epistemic failings. He does, however, not 
sufficiently explain why exactly they are epistemic failings. He claims that “the research 
was organized in such a way as to allow short-term commercial interests to compromise 
epistemic integrity” (Biddle 2007, p. 21). But he does not explicate what he means by 
‘epistemic integrity’, nor does he clarify why short-term commercial interests 
compromised it. 
In part 2 of this dissertation, an explication of the concept of epistemic integrity is 
developed, and I clarify why epistemic integrity was compromised by short-term 
commercial interests in the Vioxx case. Several other examples of interests 
compromising epistemic integrity are discussed as well. In these discussions, my 
concept of epistemic integrity is applied to examples from aerospace science and 
climate science. The purpose is to show how this concept can be used (1) to identify 
epistemically problematic interest influences in the sciences, and (2) to explain why 
these interest influences are epistemically problematic. 
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1.4 Overview of this dissertation 
Now that I have touched on and clarified some topics and questions that will be 
addressed in this dissertation, let me offer a more systematic overview of the parts and 
chapters in it. The first part deals with the question which roles different kinds of 
interests play in reasoning processes within scientific research. Chapter 2 starts by 
presenting a common view on this matter: the full ideal of purity. A criticism on this 
view is developed on the basis of Richard Rudner’s argument that the scientist qua 
scientist makes value judgments. Next, I present a less strict version of the ideal of 
purity – the partial ideal of purity – which avoids my criticism on the basis of Rudner’s 
argument. Furthermore, I discuss some insights from the existing philosophical 
literature that challenge the ideal of purity. It is argued that while these insights may 
successfully undermine the full ideal of purity, they do not undermine the partial ideal of 
purity. 
Nevertheless, I think the partial ideal of purity is untenable as well. The remainder of 
part 1 aims to show this. Chapters 3-5 reveal that the scientific explanation of 
phenomena is often affected by interests in ways that have not been considered in 
chapter 2. The focus of chapters 3-4 is on explanation in technological science, that is, 
sciences that have human-made, rather than natural objects as their ultimate study 
object (Hansson 2007). I discuss the role of interests in the development and evaluation 
of mechanistic artifact explanations (explanations that account for an artifact behavior 
by describing the underlying mechanism) in chapter 3, and chapter 4 reveals how 
epistemic and non-epistemic interests operate in the development and evaluation of 
explanations in software engineering. Chapter 5 shows that the kinds of interest 
influences identified in chapters 3-4 are not unique to technological science. Similar 
interest influences can be found in other sciences. More specifically, chapter 5 reveals 
how epistemic and non-epistemic interests can play in the explanation of phenomena in 
the social sciences, biology, and the medical sciences. Chapter 5 also clarifies how the 
findings of chapters 3-5 exactly undermine the partial ideal of purity. 
The second part aims to develop a criterion to determine when interest influences in 
science become epistemically problematic. A concept of epistemic integrity that can 
function as such a criterion is developed in chapter 6. Several possible definitions of this 
concept, some of which are inspired by earlier writings on research integrity, are 
discussed. A final, new definition of epistemic integrity is shown to avoid the 
shortcomings of the other definitions. It forms the basis for chapters 7-10. 
In chapter 7, I show that my concept of epistemic integrity is a good explication of 
‘epistemic integrity of the research process’. I do this by arguing that it meets Rudolf 
Carnap’s four requirements of explication: (1) it is similar to our common sense notion 
of epistemic integrity of the research process, (2) it is exact, (3) it is fruitful, and (4) it is 
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as simple as requirements (1), (2), and (3) permit. It is in chapter 7 that my concept of 
epistemic integrity is applied to the Vioxx case. I show how this concept can be used to 
explain why the influence of short-term commercial interests is epistemically 
problematic in the Vioxx case. 
The purpose of chapters 8-9 is to reveal how the concept of epistemic integrity can be 
used to identify epistemically problematic interest influences in different fields of 
science. In chapter 8, the concept of epistemic integrity is applied to a case from 
aerospace science: the U.S. Space Shuttle Program. It is demonstrated that the epistemic 
integrity of different kinds of research processes in the Space Shuttle Program was 
damaged. I explain this damage by the financial and career interests of those involved in 
the research processes; epistemic integrity may have been compromised by these 
interests. In that way, the particular influence of these interests is shown to be 
epistemically problematic. Chapter 9 discusses the epistemic integrity of research 
processes in climate science. The focus is on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). Two controversies concerning the work of the IPCC are analyzed in 
terms of epistemic integrity. More specifically, the epistemic integrity of the work by 
the IPCC that has been the target of criticism is assessed. Where epistemic integrity was 
compromised, an explanation in terms of the non-epistemic interests of the persons 
involved is offered, suggesting that non-epistemic interests influenced the relevant 
research process in an epistemically problematic way. 
Finally, in chapter 10, I summarize some of the main results of this dissertation. I 
clearly indicate how it contributes to addressing the two challenges presented in section 
1.4. Some routes of further research needed to fully tackle these challenges, are 
described. 
 
  
Part 1  
THE ROLES OF INTERESTS WITHIN 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
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Chapter 2  
The ideal of purity 
 
 
This chapter starts with a standard, common view on the roles of non-epistemic 
interests within scientific research, which I call the full ideal of purity (section 2.1). 
While this view seems mainly common among non-philosophers, I show that there are 
also some philosophers of science whose views correspond with the full ideal of purity. I 
criticize this ideal by building on an argument which is known as Rudner’s argument 
(section 2.2). Next, a less strict ideal for science is described: the partial ideal of purity 
(section 2.3). This less strict ideal avoids the objection developed in section 2.2. 
Furthermore, I argue that insights from the existing literature on values in science, 
which challenge the full ideal of purity, do not undermine the partial ideal of purity 
(section 2.4). Nevertheless, the latter ideal should be rejected as well I think, as I will 
argue in chapters 3-5. In those chapters, a new criticism on the partial ideal of purity 
will be developed. These discussions should result in a more accurate picture of interest 
influences in reasoning processes within scientific research, which will be used as a 
basis for part 2. But first, let me describe the common view which I will attack. 
2.1 The full ideal of purity 
It is often stated that certain decisions in science – decisions such as whether or not 
one accepts a certain hypothesis, which theory one chooses out of a set of rival theories, 
how one explains a certain phenomenon, etc. – should in principle not be affected by 
non-epistemic interests such as political interests or financial interests. Rather, these 
decisions should be made on the basis of the degree to which the relevant 
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hypothesis/theory/explanation manifests truth-seeking values such as empirical 
adequacy and internal consistency. The influence of non-epistemic interests on such 
scientific decisions is regarded as undesirable; something to be reduced as much as 
possible. I call this view the full ideal of purity (Proctor 1991, pp. 3-4). It states that 
ideally, scientific decisions are pure, in the sense of being unaffected by non-epistemic 
interests.  
This is the view of a lot of people. Let me give an example of an article in which such 
a view is expressed. ‘Funding food science and nutrition research: Financial conflicts 
and scientific integrity’ is an article which was published in the journals ‘Nutrition 
Reviews’ and ‘The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition’. It is an article which has 16 
authors, and it was written for the International Life Sciences Institute North America 
Working Group on Guiding Principles. The following passage appears in the article: 
 
It has been said that “scientific ‘truth’ is the primary aim that all should pursue in the 
jungle of academic-industry interactions” (1). The point of scientific endeavor, in the 
first place, is and should be, the pursuit of truth—nothing more, nothing less—
irrespective of financial or other interactions. It goes without saying that seekers of 
truth must not impose preconceptions on the method or result of their search: they 
must not have ulterior motives. (Rowe et al. 2009, p. 1285) 
 
To put it in my terminology (see section 1.1), this passage suggests that the point of 
scientific endeavor is to satisfy epistemic interests, and that this quest should be 
independent of non-epistemic interests (financial or other). This corresponds with the 
full ideal of purity. 
While such views are common mainly among non-philosophers (also see Douglas 
2009, p. 1; Proctor 1991, pp. 3-4; Ruphy 2006, p. 192), they are less common among 
present-day philosophers of science. There are, however, still some philosophers of 
science whose view corresponds with what I have here called the full ideal of purity. 
Take Stéphanie Ruphy. She calls her view ‘empiricism all the way down’. According to 
this view, scientists may use background assumptions and various constitutive values 
(e.g., empirical adequacy, simplicity, external consistency) to make scientific decisions. 
But ideally, the background assumptions should be justified on the basis of constitutive 
values, and the constitutive values that are not epistemically rewarding in all branches 
of science (e.g., simplicity, external consistency, novelty) should be justified on 
empirical grounds. The only two constitutive values that need no further justification in 
Ruphy’s view, as their epistemic virtues are assumed to be universal, are empirical 
adequacy and internal consistency. She puts it as follows: 
 
I propose thus to distinguish between a very minimal, stabilized set of values whose 
cognitive virtues are universal (this set would be restricted to empirical adequacy 
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and internal consistency), and a larger, unstabilized set that would include values 
whose cognitive virtues are not universal. Simplicity may be a good guide to 
empirical success in certain branches of physics at a certain stage of their 
development, but not in economics or biology today, where ontological 
heterogeneity is a better bet. Requiring external consistency is sometimes 
epistemically rewarding, sometimes not. And the same goes for novelty. In any case, I 
see no good reason why the epistemic worth of these values could not be established 
(by inductive arguments in particular), or challenged, on empirical grounds. Let us 
then be an empiricist all the way down: not only background assumptions can and should 
be criticized by appealing to constitutive values, but what counts as constitutive (i.e. 
cognitive) values (except of course the minimal set mentioned earlier) is also 
susceptible of being revised on empirical grounds. (Ruphy 2006, p. 212) 
 
Ruphy thinks that in this way, that is, by establishing non-universal constitutive 
values on empirical grounds, it is in principle possible to free the appeal to constitutive 
values in scientific practice from political and social interests: 
 
What I’m contesting thus is only Longino’s claim that the appeal to constitutive 
values in an ideal process of mutual criticism could not free itself from social or 
political motivations. It can. And not because there are such things as “universally 
applicable criterion of epistemic worth”, but because the actual epistemic merit of 
what is taken as constitutive values by a scientific community is itself susceptible to 
be critically discussed on purely empirical grounds. (Ruphy 2006, p. 213). 
 
So, in a nutshell, Ruphy’s view is that the influence of political and social interests on 
scientific decisions can and should be eliminated by justifying the background 
assumptions and constitutive values used in such decision-making ultimately on purely 
empirical grounds. This view can be regarded a specific version of the full ideal of 
purity. 
Another philosopher of science who endorses the full ideal of purity is Sheldon 
Krimsky. In ‘Science in the private interest: Has the lure of profits corrupted biomedical 
research?’, he criticizes the increasing influence of financial interests on biomedical 
research. One of the norms for science he uses to support this criticism is the norm of 
disinterestedness. He describes this norm as follows: 
 
It requires that scientists apply the methods, perform the analysis, and execute the 
interpretation of results without considerations of personal gain, ideology, or fidelity 
to any cause other than the pursuit of truth. Of course, this concept is highly 
idealistic and quite antithetical to the practice of science. Scientists are not neutral to 
the outcome of a study in which they may have much at stake. Scientists pose 
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conjectures. Positive results may be publishable, whereas negative outcomes are 
generally not. Such a scenario means that scientists are not disinterested in the 
outcome and that they would prefer that the results support their conjecture. […] 
Although scientists are not disinterested in the outcome of their investigations, 
they must behave as if they were disinterested. They must not allow their bias to 
affect how they approach their experimental inquiry and how they interpret the 
results. (Krimsky 2003, p. 77) 
 
This passage reveals that Krimsky is a proponent of the full ideal of purity: according to 
Krimsky, scientific decision-making should be as if it were only driven by epistemic 
interests, and it should not be affected by non-epistemic interests. 
2.2 Rudner’s argument and beyond 
I think the full ideal of purity is untenable. This can be shown on the basis of an 
argument developed by Richard Rudner. His argument is that before a hypothesis can be 
accepted in science, a value judgment has to be made, that is, the judgment that the 
evidence supporting the hypothesis is strong enough to warrant its acceptance (Rudner 
1953). The value involved is the property to be supported by a certain kind of evidence, 
namely, the kind of evidence that we would regard as scientific. This is a property that 
comes in degrees; a hypothesis can be more or less supported by scientific evidence. The 
value judgment is then whether the hypothesis manifests the value of being supported 
by scientific evidence to a sufficient degree. 
Such a judgment depends on non-epistemic interests. An example can help me clarify 
this. Suppose scientists consider the hypothesis that a certain toxic ingredient of a drug 
is not present in lethal quantity.1 We want the scientists to only accept this hypothesis if 
it is supported by very strong scientific evidence. The reason is that if the scientists 
would wrongly accept the hypothesis, then this could cause the death of several 
potential users of the drug. Because the users’ interest to stay alive is a much more 
fundamental interest than the interest, say, not to suffer from minor ailments like acne 
or itchiness, stronger evidence is required to accept that the toxic ingredient is not 
present in lethal quantity than to accept that the drug does not cause such minor 
ailments. 
 
                                                     
1 This hypothesis is also offered as an example by Rudner (1953, p. 2). 
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That is basically Rudner’s point, but I think the actual picture is more complex; non-
epistemic interests affect hypothesis acceptance in more complicated ways. Let me 
clarify this on the basis of the example. The stronger the evidence should be, the more 
time it usually takes to gather it; more tests are needed to obtain enough evidence. If we 
assume then that the drug can only be brought to market once scientists have accepted 
that the toxic ingredient is not present in lethal quantity, then this implies that the 
more evidence is required, the longer it takes to bring the drug to market. This could 
damage the health interests of the patients who urgently need the drug. Furthermore, 
requiring more evidence increases the costs of research. So requiring more evidence 
also harms the financial interests of those who have to pay for gathering the evidence 
(note that this could, indirectly, be the patient, since higher research costs may lead to a 
higher price of the drug). 
It is on all of these non-epistemic interests (not just the users’ interest to stay alive) 
that the decision as to how much evidence is exactly needed to accept the hypothesis, 
depends. If the degree of evidential support for the hypothesis that the toxic ingredient 
is not present in lethal quantity could be considerably increased in a very quick and 
very cheap way, then we may consider this necessary before it can be accepted, given 
the harmful consequences of wrongly accepting this hypothesis. If, on the other hand, it 
would be very time-consuming and expensive to marginally increase an already high 
degree of evidential support, then the current degree of evidential support may be 
considered sufficient to accept the hypothesis, and we may not consider it beneficial 
that more time and resources are spent on gathering additional evidence. 
In general, when scientists decide whether or not to accept a certain hypothesis, they 
have to ask whether the amount of evidence they have is sufficient, and for this, they 
have to consider the different non-epistemic interests that would be served/harmed by 
rightly/wrongly accepting the hypothesis and by postponing this decision in order to 
gather additional evidence. In that way, non-epistemic interests influence whether or 
not scientists accept a certain hypothesis. 
A possible response is that scientists can avoid this interest influence by restricting 
their task to determining the probability of a hypothesis, or the degree to which it is 
supported by scientific evidence. The decision whether or not to accept the hypothesis 
could be left to others (non-scientists). But, as Rudner (1953, p. 4) rightly points out, this 
would not avoid that scientists have to make a decision on the acceptance of a 
hypothesis. The hypothesis would then be that the likelihood of hypothesis h is p, or 
that h is supported by a particular kind of evidence with a particular strength. Scientists 
would have to decide whether or not to accept such hypotheses (i.e. hypotheses on 
probability or strength of evidence), and for that, they would have to consider the 
relevant non-epistemic interests just as well. 
Decisions on the acceptance of hypotheses are inevitable in science. These decisions 
have a potential impact on how well our non-epistemic interests are served. Scientists 
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have to take this impact into consideration. When deciding whether or not to accept a 
hypothesis, they have to consider the relevant non-epistemic interests, and these 
considerations should affect their judgment. 
What are the implications of this argument for the ideal of purity? I have argued that 
the decision on whether or not to accept a hypothesis in science should not be detached 
from non-epistemic interests. Hence, we should reject the full ideal of purity, which 
states that such scientific decisions should be detached from non-epistemic interests. 
2.3 The partial ideal of purity 
One way to avoid this objection is to opt for a less strict version of the ideal of purity, 
which allows scientists to consider non-epistemic interests in judging whether or not 
the evidence in favor of a hypothesis is sufficient to accept it. Such a view has been 
defended by Heather Douglas (2009). Her view is based on a distinction between 
epistemic criteria and values. Douglas mentions two epistemic criteria: internal 
consistency and predictive competence. She distinguishes these criteria from values, 
including ethical values (which focus on the good or the right), social values (which 
arise from what is valued by a particular society), and cognitive values (which help 
scientists with their cognition in science) (Douglas 2009, pp. 92-94). 
Furthermore, Douglas makes a distinction between two roles that values can play: a 
direct and an indirect role. Values play a direct role when they act as stand-alone 
reasons to motivate a decision (just as evidence is a stand-alone reason for accepting a 
claim). They play an indirect role when they are used to determine whether the 
available evidence is sufficient to make a certain decision. More specifically, in the 
indirect role, they are used to weigh the potential consequences of a wrong decision, 
and when these consequences are considered dire, this leads to more evidence being 
required (Douglas 2009, pp. 96-97). Douglas states that in certain kinds of decisions in 
science, namely, decisions on how to characterize data, on how to interpret evidence, 
and on the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories, values are not allowed to play a 
direct role, but only an indirect role (Douglas 2009, pp. 102-103). 
This corresponds with the following view on interest influences on scientific 
decisions. The only role that non-epistemic interests are allowed to play in scientific 
decision-making on the characterization of data, the interpretation of evidence, and 
theory acceptance, is the role of being considered in judgments on whether or not the 
available evidence is sufficient to make the decision. Such an indirect influence of non-
epistemic interests on scientific decisions is regarded as acceptable. But when non-
epistemic interests have a direct influence on decisions concerning the characterization 
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of data, the interpretation of evidence, or theory acceptance, that is, when scientists use 
these non-epistemic interests as stand-alone reasons to motivate the decision, then 
their influence is not acceptable. I call this view the partial ideal of purity. It consists of 
the following theses: 
 
(1) An interest indirectly influences a decision if it is used to determine whether the 
available evidence is sufficient to make that decision. 
(2) Indirect influences of non-epistemic interests on scientific decisions are harmless 
(and even desirable). 
(3) An interest directly influences a decision if it is used as a stand-alone reason to 
motivate the decision. 
(4) Direct influences of non-epistemic interests on decisions concerning the 
characterization of data, the interpretation of evidence, or theory acceptance are 
unacceptable in science. 
(5) Such influences can and must be eliminated. 
2.4 Earlier work on values in science 
In the next chapters, I will attack the partial ideal of purity. But first, I want to link 
this ideal to the existing philosophical literature on values in science. A lot of 
philosophers of science have worked on the topic of values in science, and their work 
contains some insights that challenge the ideal of purity. What I wish to argue in the 
current section is that while these insights may successfully undermine the full ideal of 
purity, they do not undermine the partial ideal of purity. 
2.4.1 Underdetermination of scientific theory 
A lot of writings on values in science build on the idea of underdetermination of 
scientific theory. So let me start from there. Underdetermination arguments, which are 
often linked to the original formulation of underdetermination by Pierre Duhem 
(1914/1954) and W.V.O. Quine (1951), support the view that empirical evidence alone is 
not sufficient to choose between scientific theories. According to Stanford (2009), there 
are two fundamental varieties of such arguments. The first is that when we falsify an 
empirical prediction derived from a certain hypothesis, then we do not know whether 
the fault lies with this particular hypothesis, or with one of the many background 
assumptions (e.g., about the operation of instruments) that we needed to generate the 
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failed prediction. A hypothesis can never be tested in isolation; we need additional 
assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses to generate predictions. If a prediction then turns 
out to be falsified, then this indicates that there is something wrong with the collection 
of hypotheses and assumptions that we used to derive the prediction. But which part of 
this collection – which particular hypothesis or background assumption – is problematic 
remains undetermined. So it is not because we derived a failed prediction from a 
hypothesis, that we need to abandon the hypothesis; we can also abandon any of the 
other elements used. Stanford (2009) calls this idea ‘holist underdetermination’. 
The second kind of underdetermination he distinguishes is contrastive 
underdetermination. Contrastive underdetermination concerns the thought that 
whenever a theory is confirmed by a body of evidence, there might be other theories 
which are confirmed by that same body of evidence (Stanford 2009). A now-classic 
illustration of this idea has been offered by Bas van Fraassen. Let me recapitulate it. 
Newton’s theory of mechanics and gravitation assumes that there is an absolute space 
to which motion is relative. Newton added the hypothesis that the center of gravity of 
the solar system is at rest in absolute space. He noted, however, that if this center of 
gravity would move at a constant velocity in absolute space, the appearances would be 
no different. This means that we can generate an endless amount of theories which are 
all consistent with the same appearances: take Newton’s theory and add the postulate 
that the center of gravity of the solar system has constant absolute velocity 0 m/s; take 
Newton’s theory and add the postulate that the center of gravity of the solar system has 
constant absolute velocity 1 m/s; repeat this step for an endless amount of other 
velocities. The resulting theories are all consistent with the same body of empirical 
evidence (van Fraassen 1980, p. 46). 
Both kinds of underdetermination arguments challenge the following view on theory 
choice: first, we should develop as many theories about a set of phenomena as we can 
come up with, and then, we should test them until all theories but one have failed 
certain empirical tests; the only theory that hasn’t failed on any tests, is the one we 
should choose. Holist underdetermination shows that it is not because a theory has 
failed on an empirical test, that we should dismiss the theory; maybe there is nothing 
wrong with the theory, but with the background assumptions we made in linking the 
empirical test to the theory. Contrastive underdetermination shows that it is naïve to 
think that we will ever end up with only one theory that hasn’t failed on any tests; 
whenever there is one theory that has passed all tests, we can always come up with 
other theories that would have passed exactly the same tests. 
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2.4.2 Thomas Kuhn on theory choice 
How, then, should we choose between theories? It has been argued that in science, 
different values (for theories) are used to make such choices – not only the value of 
empirical adequacy or (predictive) accuracy, but other values, such as simplicity or 
fruitfulness, as well. Thomas Kuhn (1977) mentions five characteristics of a good 
scientific theory: a theory should (1) be accurate (i.e. in demonstrated agreement with 
the results of existing experiments and observations), (2) be consistent with itself and 
with other currently accepted theories applicable to related aspects of nature, (3) have 
broad scope (that is, the theory’s consequences should extend beyond the particular 
observations, laws, or subtheories it was initially designed to explain), (4) be simple 
(that is, bring order to an otherwise confused set of phenomena), and (5) be fruitful 
(that is, the theory should disclose new phenomena or relationships). According to 
Kuhn, these five criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory form, together with 
other criteria of the same sort, the shared basis for theory choice (Kuhn 1977, pp. 321-
322). 
Kuhn stresses that we should not think of the criteria as rules that determine theory 
choice; they do not provide a shared algorithm for choosing between theories. Rather, 
we should think of them as values, which influence theory choice. Kuhn presents his 
desiderata as part of a shared list of properties that scientists have to consider in 
choosing between theories. The outcome of considering these properties may, however, 
differ from scientist to scientist (Kuhn 1977, p. 331). The reasons Kuhn gives for this are 
that the interpretation of a certain desideratum may differ from scientist to scientist, 
and that different scientists may attach different relative weights to the various 
desiderata. Both kinds of differences could result in a different theory choice (Kuhn 
1977, pp. 324-325). 
Thus, theory choice does not only depend on which desiderata are used, but also on 
how these desiderata are interpreted and weighed. The latter is, according to Kuhn, 
influenced by the characteristics of the individuals making the choice (Kuhn 1977, p. 
324). Note that this view provides a first hint at some potential influences of interests on 
theory choice: the personal interests of a scientist could affect how he interprets the 
desiderata for theory choice and which relative weights he attaches to these desiderata, 
and this could, in turn, affect which theory he ends up choosing. 
2.4.3 The epistemic/non-epistemic distinction 
The basics of Kuhn’s view are later endorsed by Ernan McMullin (1983). McMullin 
reworks Kuhn’s list of values a bit and ends up with predictive accuracy, internal 
coherence, external consistency, unifying power, fertility, and simplicity as desiderata 
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for theories. He agrees with Kuhn that such desiderata operate as values, and that 
different scientists, committed to the same set of values, could end up choosing 
different theories because they can disagree on how well a certain theory scores on a 
certain value, and because they may attach different relative weights to the different 
values (McMullin 1983, pp. 15-17). Where McMullin goes further than Kuhn is in calling 
the values that are appropriate for theory assessment ‘epistemic’ and linking them to 
truth. He puts it as follows: 
 
Such characteristic values I will call epistemic, because they are presumed to promote 
the truth-like character of science, its character as the most secure knowledge 
available to us of the world we seek to understand. An epistemic value is one we have 
reason to believe will, if pursued, help toward the attainment of such knowledge. I 
have concentrated here on the values that one expects a good theory to embody. But 
there are, of course, many other epistemic values, like that of reproducibility in an 
experiment or accuracy in a measurement. (McMullin 1983, p. 18) 
 
McMullin makes a distinction between these values and other, non-epistemic values on 
the basis of a correspondence theory of truth: 
 
The decision as to whether a value is epistemic or non-epistemic in a particular 
context can sometimes be a difficult one. But the grounds on which it should be made 
are easy to specify in the abstract. When no sufficient case can be made for saying 
that the imposition of a particular value on the process of theory choice is likely to 
improve the epistemic status of the theory, that is, the conformity between theory and 
world, this value is held to be non-epistemic in the context in question. (McMullin 
1983, p. 19) 
 
Larry Laudan (1984) calls values such as empirical accuracy, coherence, and 
simplicity ‘cognitive values’, and distinguishes them from moral values. Contrary to 
McMullin, he does not base this distinction on the idea that the values of the former 
category are conducive to truth or to the conformity between theory and world. The 
distinction is instead based on the (rough) idea that the cognitive values represent 
properties of theories “which we deem to be constitutive of ‘good science’” (Laudan 
1984, p. xii). The cognitive values figure in Laudan’s reticulated model, which states that 
theories, methods, and aims (including cognitive values) are involved in mutually 
supportive relationships in science. Elements of all three categories can change (Laudan 
1984, Chap. 4). From this, we can infer that truth is not the ultimate, fixed aim of science, 
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and hence, that cognitive values need not necessarily be truth-conducive in Laudan’s 
view.2 
Helen Longino (1983, 1990) makes a distinction between constitutive and contextual 
values which is similar to Laudan’s distinction. Constitutive values are, in her view, 
“generated from an understanding of the goals of science”, and they are “the source of 
the rules determining what constitutes acceptable scientific practice or scientific 
method” (Longino 1990, p. 4). For instance, if we take explanation of the natural world 
to be the goal of science, then the constitutive values are determined on the basis of an 
understanding of what counts as a good explanation (e.g., satisfying criteria such as 
truth, accuracy, simplicity, predictability, and breadth). Contextual values belong, on 
the other hand, “to the social and cultural environment in which science is done” 
(Longino 1990, p. 4). Contextual values are  “group or individual preferences about what 
ought to be” (Longino 1990, p. 4), and they include personal, social, and cultural values. 
Longino uses this distinction to argue that contextual values are incorporated in 
scientific reasoning. Her argument is that background assumptions are needed in 
evidential reasoning (i.e. reasoning between data and hypotheses), and these 
background assumptions sometimes reflect certain contextual values (Longino 1990, pp. 
215-216). 
2.4.4 Criticism 
Regardless of whether values such as empirical adequacy, consistency, and simplicity 
are called ‘epistemic’, ‘cognitive’, or ‘constitutive’, the very idea that they could/should 
be distinguished from other values, such as moral or political values, has been criticized. 
For instance, Phyllis Rooney (1992) questions the distinction by arguing that how a 
scientist perceives the simplicity, fruitfulness, or coherence of a theory – that is, how 
well the theory scores on the so-called ‘epistemic’ values – is determined by all sorts of 
‘non-epistemic’ factors. An example she offers is the perception of the simplicity of the 
linear-hormonal model. This model posits that prenatal hormone levels causally 
influence brain organization, that the latter causally influences gender-linked behavior, 
and that while the environment may influence gender-linked behavior as well, this 
influence is independent of hormone levels and brain organization (Longino 1990; 
Magnus 2005). This explains biological determinism (i.e. the assumption that behavior is 
determined by biological factors), which is, according to Rooney, one of the reasons why 
 
                                                     
2 Also see Laudan (2004), in which Laudan explicitly argues that some of the cognitive virtues, namely 
attributes of scope and generality, have no epistemic foundation, since manifesting these virtues is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a statement. 
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the linear-hormonal model was considered simple. The view of biological determinism 
was, however, motivated by gender dimorphism (i.e. the assumption that men and 
women are different), and the latter was based on the social and cultural values of a 
society based on gender order and hierarchy. Hence, it was partly because of the ‘non-
epistemic’ values of those developing the linear-hormonal model, that this model was 
perceived as manifesting the ‘epistemic’ value of simplicity (Rooney 1992, p. 18). 
Another criticism on the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction has been developed by 
Longino (1996). She starts by describing two lists of values for theories. On the one hand, 
she recapitulates Kuhn’s original list of cognitive values, consisting of accuracy, 
(internal and external) consistency, simplicity, breadth of scope, and fruitfulness (see 
above). Next, she shows that Kuhn’s list is not the only possible one. She presents an 
alternative list of values for theories, which contains, besides empirical adequacy 
(Kuhn’s accuracy), also the values of novelty, ontological heterogeneity, mutuality of 
interaction, applicability to current human needs, and diffusion of power (Longino 1996, 
pp. 41-50). 
Longino links the latter values to the feminist cognitive aim of revealing gender 
and/or the activities of those gendered female, which is also a sociopolitical aim. More 
specifically, she claims that the values of the second list can be justified by the fact that 
theories manifesting them are more likely to increase the visibility of women, female-
identified phenomena, and gender relations. The first list does not seem to have that 
same progressive, feminist potential. In fact, Longino argues that at least some of the 
values of the first list (external consistency, simplicity, and fruitfulness) often serve 
anti-progressive, gender-oppressive ends. Accordingly, which values one uses to 
evaluate theories reflects certain political values, which suggests that the former values 
are not purely cognitive. This undermines the dichotomy between cognitive and non-
cognitive values (Longino 1996, pp. 50-55). 
(Note that none of the criticisms on the distinction between epistemic and non-
epistemic values undermine the distinction I made between epistemic and non-
epistemic interests. I have characterized epistemic interests as interests in knowing 
something, and non-epistemic interests as all other interests. The purpose of this 
distinction is to show that interests other than epistemic interests affect scientific 
decisions. For this purpose, a strict separation between epistemic and non-epistemic 
interests is not required. Epistemic interests may reflect certain non-epistemic 
interests, and vice versa. I do not presuppose that such links are absent.) 
The ideal of purity 
 29 
2.4.5 Values in science and the ideal of purity 
How do these discussions on values in science exactly challenge the ideal of purity? 
These discussions suggest that there are at least three ways in which non-epistemic 
interests can potentially affect theory choice: 
 
(1) Non-epistemic interests can influence which properties one regards as values for 
theories (which are then used to evaluate theories and choose between them). 
(2) Non-epistemic interests can influence how the values, used to choose between 
theories, are interpreted. 
(3) Non-epistemic interests can influence the relative importance or weights one 
attaches to the different values in choosing between theories. 
 
It seems hard, if not impossible, to exclude such potential interest influences from 
scientific practice. So far, no one has been able to develop a complete and viable picture 
of how theories ought to be evaluated which ensures that theory choice is unaffected by 
non-epistemic interests. Therefore, requiring that scientific decisions such as theory 
choice are unaffected by non-epistemic interests, is too demanding. Since the full ideal 
of purity does require that, we can conclude that it is too demanding. Hence, earlier 
work on values in science undermines the full ideal of purity. 
It does, however, not undermine the partial ideal of purity. In none of the three 
potential interest influences described above, non-epistemic interests are used as stand-
alone reasons to choose a certain theory. So these interest influences do not involve a 
direct influence of non-epistemic interests on theory choice (see section 2.3). Instead, 
non-epistemic interests indirectly influence theory choice, by influencing which values 
are used in theory evaluation, how these values are interpreted, or how they are 
weighed. Since the partial ideal of purity only condemns certain direct influences of 
non-epistemic interests, it is not challenged by the apparent inevitability of the three 
potential indirect interest influences on theory choice described above. 
2.4.6 Janet Kourany on values in science 
Finally, I should mention Janet Kourany’s ‘Philosophy of science after feminism’. In 
that book, Kourany attacks the ideal of value-free science (which corresponds with what 
I have here called the full ideal of purity), and defends an alternative view: the ideal of 
socially responsible science. According to the ideal of socially responsible science, 
scientific research should be controlled through and through by sound epistemic values 
as well as by sound social values (Kourany 2010, pp. 68-71). It seems then that Kourany 
allows non-epistemic interests to play a more prominent role in science than adherents 
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of the ideal of purity would allow. But I think that Kourany’s arguments only undermine 
the full ideal of purity, and not the partial ideal of purity. To support this point, let me 
consider one of Kourany’s key arguments in favor of her ideal of socially responsible 
science. 
In order to argue that scientific research should be controlled through and through 
by sound social values, Kourany uses the example of Carolyn West’s psychological 
research program concerned with the problem of domestic violence in the United 
States. The aim of this program is “to uncover the similarities in intimate-partner 
violence within the black and white communities of the United States without negating 
the experiences of black women and simultaneously to highlight the differences within 
the black and white communities without perpetuating the stereotype that black 
Americans are inherently more violent than other ethnic groups” (Kourany 2010, p. 69). 
According to Kourany, this complex aim requires research on domestic violence to 
change in multiple ways. More specifically, it requires (1) that the definition of partner 
violence is broadened so that it includes psychological, emotional, verbal, and sexual 
abuse as well as physical abuse, (2) that the ways in which violence is measured are 
changed – from merely counting violent acts and measuring their severity to taking into 
account the contexts, motives, and outcomes of the violent acts, using a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods, including listening to the voices of 
battered women, (3) that measurement scales are revised so that they reflect more than 
the experiences of white European Americans, (4) that within-group differences in the 
black and white communities are investigated in order to determine whether 
apparently racial differences are not simply socioeconomic differences instead, and (5) 
that participants are integrated into every stage of the research process, from planning 
to implementing, interpreting, and disseminating results (Kourany 2010, pp. 69-70). 
Kourany identifies two social values that play in West’s research program: ‘women 
deserve to live without fear of violence from domestic partners’ and ‘black women 
deserve the same opportunities as white women to live in such partnerships’. She 
argues that these social values imply that the similarities in domestic violence between 
the black and white communities should be highlighted in the relevant research, and 
that any dissimilarities between these communities should be explained in terms of 
social differences such as racism and poverty, insofar as this is empirically possible 
(Kourany 2010, p. 70). So according to Kourany, social values shape the research 
program. She also specifies which aspects of the research program are exactly affected:  
 
It affects not only research questions but also, as we have seen, such aspects of 
research as concepts (e.g., the concept of ‘partner violence’ itself); measurement 
scales and techniques; methods of subject selection; strategies of data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation; and even methods of publishing and disseminating 
results. It may even affect other central aspects of the research process, such as 
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consideration of the consequences of error and setting acceptable levels of risk (see, 
e.g., Douglas 2000). (Kourany 2010, pp. 72-73) 
 
This passage can be used to argue against the full ideal of purity. More specifically, 
the recognition of the role of social values in considering the consequences of error and 
in setting acceptable levels of risk corresponds with Rudner’s argument, and this 
argument shows that the full ideal of purity must be rejected, as we have seen in section 
2.2. The above passage does, however, not show that the partial ideal of purity must be 
rejected as well. It suggests that non-epistemic interests affect decisions concerning the 
characterization of data, the interpretation of evidence, and theory acceptance by 
influencing which concepts and methods are used to characterize data and to interpret 
evidence, and by influencing how much evidence is needed to accept a theory. So non-
epistemic interests affect the relevant decisions via certain conceptual and 
methodological choices, and via judgments on the sufficiency of evidence. Such indirect 
interest influences are acceptable according to the partial ideal of purity. Accordingly, 
the view that the interest influences identified by Kourany are acceptable does not 
undermine the partial ideal of purity. 
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Chapter 3  
Mechanistic artifact explanation1 
Although the partial ideal of purity avoids certain problems of the full ideal of purity 
(see chapter 2), I think we should reject it as well. A criticism on the partial ideal of 
purity will be developed in this and the next chapters. In order to develop such a 
criticism, I will discuss certain interest influences that have not been considered so far 
in this dissertation. More specifically, I will discuss certain influences of epistemic and 
non-epistemic interests in the construction and evaluation of explanations in science. 
Since these influences are maybe most evident in the technological sciences, I will draw 
on examples from these sciences to clarify the roles of interests in explanatory tasks (in 
chapters 3 and 4). Chapter 5 will show that similar interest influences can also be found 
in other sciences. Furthermore, chapter 5 will reveal how my findings exactly challenge 
the partial ideal of purity. 
3.1 Seeking a mechanistic artifact explanation 
To elucidate how interests could affect explanation, let me start with a kind of 
explanation constructed and used in many technological sciences: mechanistic artifact 
explanation, i.e. an explanation that accounts for an artifact behavior by describing the 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on De Winter (2011), which is an article on a pragmatic account of mechanistic artifact 
explanation. I have included parts of that article in this dissertation because I think that it has some important 
(unexpected) implications with respect to the roles of non-epistemic interests in science (which are not 
reported in De Winter (2011)). These implications are discussed at the end of this chapter (sections 3.4 and 
3.5). 
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underlying mechanism. Following Glennan (2002, p. S344), a mechanism can be defined 
as follows: 
 
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be 
characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations.2 
 
In order to illustrate and clarify my claims, I will use an example of a simple 
mechanism. The mechanism is depicted in figure 3.1. When one puts a wooden box on 
the left block of the artifact (1), then it slides down the slope until it is on the foot of the 
elevator (2). When one pulls the handle, the box moves up (from 2 to 3), after which it 
slides down the second slope, to finally drop in the cup on the right hand side of the 
box-moving device (4). The explainee (= the person who seeks an explanation) does not 
 
                                                     
2 I use Glennan’s (2002) definition of mechanisms because I think it captures a number of important aspects of 
mechanisms (which are spelled out in de Ridder (2006)), and because I see no reason to reject this definition. 
(De Ridder (2006) does formulate some criticisms on Glennan (2002), but these focus on Glennan’s 
characterization of a mechanical model, and not on his notion of a mechanism.) 
Figure 3.1 Simple mechanism. 
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know what happens within the dotted line. He knows that when one puts a box on the 
left block, and pulls the handle after a while, the box will turn up on the right hand side 
of the artifact, but he does not know the inner workings of the box-moving device. 
However, he is interested in these inner workings, and therefore, he asks for an 
explanation that explains the behavior of the artifact by describing the underlying 
mechanism of this behavior. In other words, he asks for a mechanistic artifact 
explanation of the transportation of the box. I believe that different mechanistic artifact 
explanations can be constructed for this artifact behavior. 
3.2 Top-down and bottom-up 
De Ridder (2006) distinguishes two strategies to create mechanistic artifact 
explanations: the top-down strategy and the bottom-up strategy. He offers the following 
definitions: 
 
Top-down strategy: take the behavior to be explained and decompose it into more basic 
sub-behaviors, reiterate this step if possible, it should become clear how the complex 
behavior being explained is realized by simpler behaviors in a specific spatiotemporal 
configuration, and for all the sub-behaviors, indicate which component(s) take(s) 
care of them. 
Bottom-up strategy: name the structural components of the artifact and give 
information about their physicochemical make-up and spatial configuration, show 
how their physicochemical features and configuration result in various behaviors 
and then describe how these behaviors, in their spatiotemporal configuration, 
together make up the behavior to be explained. (de Ridder 2006, p. 87)3 
 
 
                                                     
3 Similar explanatory strategies are presented in Bechtel & Richardson (1993, p. 18). The top-down strategy is 
Bechtel & Richardson’s synthetic strategy applied to an artifact. The bottom-up strategy, on the other hand, is 
not entirely the same as Bechtel & Richardson’s analytic strategy applied to an artifact. The difference is that 
the bottom-up strategy includes giving information about the physicochemical make-up of the components, 
while the analytic strategy does not. Cummins (1975) also presents two explanatory strategies, the analytical 
strategy and the subsumption strategy, that are similar to, respectively, the top-down and the bottom-up 
strategy. For the differences between Cummins’s explanatory strategies on the one hand, and the top-down 
and bottom-up strategy on the other hand, see de Ridder (2006, p. 87n). 
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Before I illustrate these strategies, it should be noted that whether or not the first step 
of the top-down strategy (decompose the behavior into more basic sub-behaviors) can, 
and thus should, be reiterated, is relative to context in de Ridder’s view. We can infer 
this from the following quote. 
 
It would be absurd if the […] guideline [‘break the function down as fine as possible’] 
were interpreted as requiring that every functional decomposition end in 
fundamental physics. The relevant sense of ‘as fine as possible’ must be more 
pragmatic. It seems plausible that certain sub-behaviors will count as basic or atomic 
for particular engineering disciplines. Which will vary across different fields; where 
mechanical engineering will accept, say, the strength of a particular alloy as given, 
materials engineering will be interested in how this strength is realized by the 
behaviors of elements in the alloy. (de Ridder 2007, p. 83) 
 
This implies that which sub-behaviors are not further decomposed in a top-down 
explanation can differ from context to context, and thus, that a top-down explanation 
can include less or more information. 
Let me construct two different top-down explanations of the transportation of the 
box in the box-mover. The first makes abstraction of the forces at work, the second does 
not. The first top-down explanation decomposes the transportation of the box into 
three sub-behaviors: the box’s movement from 1 to 2 (see figure 3.1) during time 
interval [t1, t2[, the upward movement of the elevator with the transportation of the box 
to 3 during [t2, t3[, and the box’s movement from 3 to 4 during [t3, t4[.The first sub-
behavior is taken care of by slope a (see figure 3.2); the second sub-behavior is taken 
care of by elevator system b; and the third sub-behavior is taken care of by slope c. This 
is the first top-down explanation. 
The second top-down explanation includes more information. Just as the first one, it 
decomposes the transportation of the box into three sub-behaviors: the box’s 
movement from 1 to 2 during time interval [t1, t2[, the upward movement of the elevator 
Figure 3.2 Artifact components to which the top-down explanations refer. 
Mechanistic artifact explanation 
 37 
with the transportation of the box to 3 during [t2, t3[, and the box’s movement from 3 to 
4 during [t3, t4[. But it also decomposes each of these behaviors. Slope a causes the box to 
move from 1 to 2 by reacting to gravitational force FG (see figure 3.3) with normal force 
FN, and by reacting to the resultant FR (= FG ∙ sin α) of these two forces with a frictional 
force FF that is smaller than FR, so that the total force F, which is parallel to the surface 
of the ramp and equal to FR – FF, is larger than 0. Because F > 0, the box slides down slope 
a, from 1 to 2. The box’s movement from 2 to 3, and from 3 to 4, can be decomposed in 
similar ways. To reduce the complexity of this chapter, I do, however, not explicate such 
decompositions here, but they are assumed to be included in the second top-down 
explanation. 
Some may claim that only an explanation such as the second, more extensive top-
down explanation is a full explanation of the transportation of the box from 1 to 4, and 
that an explanation that does not reveal the forces at work is not a real explanation. I 
return to this point in section 3.3, showing that the first, more concise top-down 
explanation can be a complete and fully satisfying explanation as well. 
Now consider a bottom-up explanation of the transportation of the box. Such an 
explanation might look as follows. The box is a 0,5 kg oak box. Components d, e and g 
(see figure 3.4) are oak blocks that each have a lubricated 30-degree slope. Components f 
and h are also made of oak. The foot of f has a 30-degree slope that is lubricated, and is 
strongly screwed down the rod, which is held upright by the surrounding box. The top 
of h is a lubricated 30-degree slope with a barricade at its end. (Of course, several other 
features should be added, such as the length, width, and height of each component, but I 
will stop here because summing up all these features is not necessary to clarify how a 
bottom-up explanation might look.) In which behaviors do the physicochemical and 
spatial features of the components of the box-mover result? 
This is revealed in the second part of the bottom-up explanation. Because the ramps 
in the box-mover are constituted by oak components, they do not collapse when a 0,5 kg 
box is on top of them (if the constituting components were made of, say, whipped 
Figure 3.4 Artifact components to which the bottom-up 
explanation refers. 
Figure 3.3 Forces exerted on a box on a 
slope. 
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cream, then the ramps would collapse). Instead, they react to the weight FG of the box 
with normal force FN (see figure 3.3). FR is the resultant of FG and FN, and is equal to FG ∙ 
sin α. Since FG = 4,9 N and α = 30°, FR is equal to 2,45 N. The box slides down the slope if FR 
exceeds the friction between the slope and the box (FF). In the box-mover, it is 
guaranteed that FF is smaller than 2,45 N because the slopes and the box are lubricated 
(lubrication reduces friction). As a consequence, the box moves down the slopes in the 
box-mover, from 1 to 2, and from 3 to 4. Because f is made of oak and because the foot is 
strongly screwed down the rod, it is solid enough to carry the weight of the box if the 
handle is pulled. As g is made of oak, it is solid enough to prevent the box from sliding 
down the foot of f as long as it is next to g. Because f can carry the weight of the box, and 
because g prevents the box from sliding down f’s foot, we know that when the box is on 
the foot of f and the handle is pulled, the box moves from 2 to 3. 
So far, I have explicated physicochemical and spatial features of the different 
components of the box-moving device, and I have shown how these features result in 
various behaviors. One thing remains to be done for our bottom-up explanation to be 
complete: it should be clarified how these various behaviors make up the behavior to be 
explained, that is, the transportation of the box. This can easily be done by specifying 
the temporal organization of the different behaviors. The box’s movement from 1 to 2 
occurs during time interval [t1, t2[, its movement from 2 to 3 occurs during [t2, t3[, and its 
movement from 3 to 4 occurs during [t3, t4[. This organization constitutes the 
transportation of the box from 1 to 4 during [t1, t4[. 
What are the differences between top-down and bottom-up explanation of the 
transportation of the box? A salient difference is the fact that the bottom-up 
explanation does not only refer to sub-behaviors of the behavior to be explained and 
the components taking care of these behaviors, as the two top-down explanations do; it 
also mentions physicochemical and spatial properties of the artifact components, while 
the top-down explanations do not. 
A second difference is that the artifact components to which the top-down 
explanation refers, differ from the artifact components to which the bottom-up 
explanation refers (compare figure 3.2 to figure 3.4; the components are marked out 
differently). This is due to a difference in perspective. When one uses the top-down 
strategy, one takes a behavioral or functional perspective: one marks out the artifact 
components on the basis of the sub-behaviors of the behavior to be explained. If several 
pieces contribute to the same behavior, then there is, from a functional perspective, a 
tendency to take them together as one more-piece component. When one uses the 
bottom-up strategy, one takes a structural perspective, which means that one identifies 
the artifact components before one knows what they do. From this perspective, one will 
typically pick out one-piece components; these components cannot be taken together 
on the basis of the behavior to which they contribute because one does not know the 
relevant behaviors yet. Let me call artifact components that are identified from a 
Mechanistic artifact explanation 
 39 
functional perspective, functional components or F-components, and artifact 
components that are identified from a structural perspective, structural components or 
S-components. Since top-down explanations correspond with a functional perspective, 
they refer to F-components, and since bottom-up explanations correspond with a 
structural perspective, they refer to S-components.4 
3.3 Ideal explanation in different contexts 
So there are at least three mechanistic artifact explanations of the transportation of 
the box in the box-mover. Does the fact that the bottom-up explanation reveals more 
about the artifact than the top-down explanations imply that the bottom-up 
explanation is always the best explanation? I do not think so. I think that for each 
explanation, there are contexts in which it is ideal. Mechanistic artifact explanations are 
useful in at least two kinds of contexts: the context of use and the context of design. 
First, let us consider the context of use. 
3.3.1 Context of use 
If we know the underlying mechanism of the box transportation, then we can draw 
several conclusions about how the box-mover will react to certain manipulations. For 
instance, we know that if we hold the box-mover upside down, it will not display the 
behavior it is supposed to display; and if we pull the handle before the box is on the foot 
of the elevator, then the box will end up under the elevator. We can draw these 
conclusions from all the mechanistic explanations of the box transportation discussed. 
But some conclusions can only be drawn from the bottom-up explanation. For instance, 
we know that we can drive (metal) screws in the parts of the box-mover (e.g., for 
attaching the box-mover to a wooden bottom plate) because we know that these parts 
are made of oak, and not of metal or some other hard material. The fact that the parts 
are made of oak is only revealed by the bottom-up explanation. 
 
                                                     
4 I do not assume that F- and S-components are necessarily different, because often, they are not. My point is 
that in a top-down explanation, we can be sure that the components referred to are F-components, while it is 
not guaranteed that they are also S-components. In a bottom-up explanation, the components referred to are 
necessarily S-components, but they are not necessarily F-components. 
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We can draw more conclusions about an artifact from a bottom-up explanation of the 
behavior of this artifact, but this comes with a cost. Suppose we want to draw 
conclusions that are not only relevant to the artifact under consideration, but also to 
artifacts with other physicochemical/spatial properties. We should then make 
abstraction of the physicochemical and spatial properties, and only focus on the factors 
that the different artifacts have in common. Top-down explanations do that, contrary to 
bottom-up explanations, and therefore, the conclusions we draw from them are more 
likely to be relevant for artifacts with other physicochemical/spatial properties as well. 
So while bottom-up explanations are more adequate if our goal is to draw as many 
conclusions as possible about a certain specific artifact, top-down explanations are more 
adequate for drawing conclusions that are relevant for as many artifacts as possible. 
But how much information should exactly be included in a top-down explanation? 
This depends on what the explanation will be used for. Consider the first top-down 
explanation of the box transportation. Once we know this explanation, we can predict 
what will happen if we turn the box-mover upside down, or if we pull the handle before 
the box is on the foot of the elevator; we do not need the additional information that the 
second top-down explanation provides to make such predictions. This is because we are 
familiar with falling objects and with objects sliding down slopes. 
But sometimes, we want to make predictions concerning situations with which we 
are not familiar. Suppose that, before the first man traveled in space, one wanted to 
know how box-movers would behave in an orbital space station. The explainee could 
then not be familiar with the situation about which he wanted to make a prediction. As 
a result, the first top-down explanation could not help him out: knowing the sub-
behaviors of the box transportation on earth, and the components taking care of these 
behaviors, would not be sufficient to predict what would happen in space. The explainee 
would need more information, and such information is provided by the second top-
down explanation. The second top-down explanation reveals that slope a causes the box 
to move from 1 to 2 by reacting to FG with normal force FN. Since slope a does not react 
to FG with normal force FN in an orbital space station, our explainee could conclude, on 
the basis of the second top-down explanation, that the box would not move from 1 to 2 
in the space station. 
It is clear that in the latter context, the second top-down explanation is more 
adequate than the first, since it enables the explainee to satisfy his epistemic interest 
(predicting how box-movers behave in an orbital space station), contrary to the first 
top-down explanation. Therefore, the second top-down explanation is the better one in 
that context. But in the former context (in which the explainee only wants to make 
predictions concerning situations with which he is familiar), the first top-down 
explanation is the better one I think. The reason is that, in this context, the additional 
information that the second top-down explanation provides is redundant: the 
explainee’s interests can be satisfied without it. Hence, the time and effort needed to 
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gather and use this information would be a waste of time and energy for the explainee. 
If we assume that the explainee wants to use his time and energy efficiently (= non-
epistemic interest),5 then this means that the first top-down explanation is more 
adequate – it serves the explainee’s interests better. 
3.3.2 Context of design 
Mechanistic artifact explanations are also useful in the context of design. Suppose we 
want to design an artifact that performs the same behavior as some pre-existing 
artifact. A mechanistic artifact explanation of the behavior of the pre-existing artifact 
can then be very helpful. Suppose we want to build a fireproof box-mover that is as flat 
as possible (= non-epistemic interest). Due to the new requirements, we do not consider 
the physicochemical and spatial features of the original box-mover’s components very 
relevant for our goal (we cannot just use oak because the box-mover should be 
fireproof, and the slopes should be reconsidered because the box-mover should be as 
flat as possible), and therefore, the explanation should not explicate these 
physicochemical and spatial features. So the bottom-up strategy drops out. What is 
useful in this context, is to know the sub-behaviors of the box transportation and the 
components taking care of these sub-behaviors. Such information is very useful for our 
goal because these sub-behaviors and components can be used to realize the box 
transportation in the new box-mover as well. Although the components of the new box-
mover will have different physicochemical and spatial properties, it can, just as the 
original box-mover, transport the box by making it slide down two slopes and by using 
an elevator to transport the box from the first slope to the second. As both top-down 
explanations refer to these sub-behaviors and components, the question is: which top-
down explanation is most appropriate? 
To know the minimal height of the box-mover (it should be as flat as possible), one 
should determine the optimal degree of slope (the lower the degree of slope, the flatter 
one can make the box-mover, but if the degree of slope is too low, the box does not slide 
down anymore). To determine this optimum, the generalizations to which the second 
top-down explanation refers (FR = FG · sin α, and F = FR – FF) are very useful. If the 
material of the box and of the ramp is given, then we can, on the basis of these 
generalizations, determine a minimal degree of slope that guarantees the sliding down 
of the box. So it seems that the second top-down explanation of the box transportation 
 
                                                     
5 Note that in practice, this interest is often connected to financial interests: usually, an investor (e.g., the 
government, a private firm) has to pay for the time and energy of scientists, which entails that the efficient 
use of their time and energy serves the investor’s financial interests. 
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is most useful, and thus most adequate, as it refers, contrary to the first top-down 
explanation, to generalizations that can help us in reaching our goal. This is often the 
case, but there are also contexts in which the first top-down explanation is most 
adequate. 
Suppose the explainee has a lot of experience with slopes, and knows, for different 
combinations of materials (e.g., a copper box on a zinc ramp, an aluminum box on a 
glass ramp, etc.), the lowest degree of slope that guarantees the sliding down of the box. 
Due to this background knowledge, the explainee does not need the generalizations to 
which the second top-down explanation refers to reach his goal, that is, to make a 
fireproof box-mover that is as flat as possible. The additional information that the 
second top-down explanation provides would then be redundant, and the first top-
down explanation would provide all the information needed, and thus be most adequate 
in this context (assuming that the explainee has a non-epistemic interest in not losing 
time and energy on the acquisition of redundant information). 
It is also possible that the job of the explainee is not to build the new box-mover by 
himself, but to delegate sub-tasks to experts. Once he knows that a box can be 
transported by making it slide down two slopes, and by using an elevator to transport it 
from the first slope to the second, he can give slope experts the assignment of designing 
the two slopes, and experts in elevator systems the assignment of designing the elevator 
system. No additional information is needed, which means that the first top-down 
explanation is fully satisfying, and thus most adequate. 
So top-down explanations are often most adequate for developing an artifact that 
performs the same behavior as a pre-existing artifact, and how much information 
should exactly be included in the top-down explanation can differ from context to 
context. In still other contexts, the most promising explanatory strategy to create an 
artifact that displays the same behavior as a pre-existing artifact, is the bottom-up 
strategy. This is the case when a description of the physicochemical make-up and 
spatial configuration of the components of the pre-existing artifact is a good starting 
point for the new design. If the current context resembles the context in which the pre-
existing artifact was designed (same requirements, same material costs, etc.), then a lot 
of physicochemical and spatial features of the components of the original artifact can be 
used for the new artifact as well. In such cases, knowing these features is useful. Because 
a bottom-up explanation explicates them, contrary to top-down explanations, it is more 
adequate in such cases. 
The first part of a bottom-up explanation (description of the physicochemical make-
up and spatial configuration of the S-components of the artifact) is a first suggestion on 
how an artifact performing the desired behavior might look. We may, however, still be 
critical of the physicochemical make-up and spatial configuration of the components of 
the original artifact, and ask questions such as ‘Why is the artifact made of the materials 
it is made of?’ The second and third part of a bottom-up explanation (demonstration of 
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how the physicochemical make-up and spatial configuration of the artifact components 
result in various behaviors and a description of how these behaviors result in the 
behavior to be explained) help one to answer such questions. For instance, the bottom-
up explanation of the box transportation reveals that the artifact components are made 
of oak in order to be able to carry the weight of the box without collapsing. Such information is 
not only useful to legitimize the physicochemical or spatial property under 
consideration, but it is also relevant if one decides to change it: e.g., given that the 
components of the original box-mover are made of oak in order to be able to carry the 
weight of the box, we know that the new material should be solid enough to carry the 
weight of the box as well. 
3.3.3 Limitations 
We have seen that there are various interests that can be served by mechanistic 
artifact explanations. There are, however, also contexts in which non-mechanistic 
explanations are most adequate. Suppose that the question ‘Why is the box transported 
from the one end of the box-mover to the other end?’ is not motivated by the interest in 
the underlying mechanism of this behavior, but by the desire to know why the box-
mover did not work properly a minute ago, while it does work properly at this moment. 
The explanatory interest in the box transportation can then be motivated by the desire 
to know what has changed. An explanation that perfectly serves this epistemic interest 
is: the box is transported because someone repaired the handle of the box-mover, which 
was broken a minute ago. This is not a mechanistic artifact explanation as it does not 
explicate any mechanism, and it outperforms the aforementioned mechanistic artifact 
explanations because it reveals what has changed in the last minute, while the 
mechanistic artifact explanations do not. 
So it is wrong to think that offering a good explanation of an artifact behavior means 
offering a mechanistic explanation of this behavior. Although mechanistic artifact 
explanations can serve various interests, there are also interests that they do not serve, 
such as the desire to know what has changed. For these interests, mechanistic artifact 
explanations are inadequate, and therefore bad explanations. 
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3.4 Construction and evaluation of mechanistic artifact 
explanations 
Section 3.3 shows that a mechanistic artifact explanation that is ideal and fully 
satisfying in one context, may be insufficient in another, and that a mechanistic artifact 
explanation that only includes relevant information in one context, may include a lot of 
redundant information in another. Hence, whether or not an explanation is ideal is 
relative to context. The reason is that explanations are always sought in specific 
contexts, in which there are particular interests (e.g., the central epistemic or non-
epistemic goal that one wants to reach in this context, but also other interests, such as 
the non-epistemic interest not to waste time and energy), and it is on the basis of these 
interests that the explanations are evaluated; the better these interests are served by 
the explanation, the better the explanation.6 Let me, on the basis of this finding, develop 
a general picture of the construction and evaluation of mechanistic artifact 
explanations in the technological sciences. 
It is not the case that technological scientists first construct several different 
mechanistic artifact explanations for an artifact behavior and then use the interests to 
be served to compare and evaluate the resulting explanations (as I have done above). 
Rather, the interests to be served are considered from the beginning, before an 
explanation is constructed. When the explainer decides which explanatory strategy to 
pursue, the top-down or the bottom-up strategy, he does this on the basis of the 
interests to be served, more specifically, on the basis of what kind of explanation he 
expects to be most adequate for the explainee’s (epistemic and non-epistemic) 
interests.7 If, for example, the explainee wants to predict how a class of artifacts, with 
different physicochemical and spatial properties but which behave more or less the 
same, will behave in certain situations, then the explainer will opt for the top-down 
strategy. If the explainee wants to make predictions for which he needs information 
about the physicochemical and spatial properties of a specific artifact, the explainer will 
use the bottom-up strategy. 
During the construction of the explanation, interests keep playing. Suppose, for 
instance, that in the context of design the explainer starts with the top-down strategy 
to check whether the mechanism of the original artifact can also be used for the new 
 
                                                     
6 This corresponds with Pitt’s (2009) account of technological explanation. According to Pitt, which 
explanation should be offered, depends on the audience for whom the explanation is meant, on what would 
satisfy them, and on the specific why- and/or how-questions the explanation is supposed to answer. 
7 Note that the explainer, that is, the person who constructs the explanation, and the explainee will often be 
one and the same person. 
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design. Once he sees that it can, he may shift to the bottom-up strategy in order to 
check whether the physicochemical and spatial properties of the original artifact are 
also relevant for the new design. This move is justified because if they are, knowing 
these properties could significantly facilitate the design process (hence, this move is 
justified on the basis of the non-epistemic interest to save time and energy insofar as 
possible). Suppose, however, that the explainer finds out that they aren’t; the artifact to 
be designed needs totally new physicochemical and spatial properties in order to meet 
design requirements. Instead of gathering more information about the physicochemical 
and spatial properties of the original artifact, the explainer will then immediately shift 
back to the top-down strategy (which does not require that such information is 
gathered). This shift is justified because no time and energy should be wasted on 
searching for useless information (i.e. useless for the goals pursued). 
During the construction of a top-down explanation, interests are also used to decide 
where to stop. When the explainer has decomposed a behavior into certain sub-
behaviors, he has to decide whether or not to further decompose these sub-behaviors 
into even more basic sub-behaviors. This depends on whether this would serve or 
damage the interests of the explainee. If it would serve the explainee’s interests, the 
sub-behaviors are further decomposed; if it would damage his interests (e.g., by wasting 
his time), they are not. 
So interests play an important role in the construction of mechanistic artifact 
explanations. They are also used in the evaluation of such explanations. While 
mechanistic artifact explanations are being developed, intermediate results are 
constantly being evaluated, and this evaluation is based on how well the current 
explanation serves the interests of the explainee. Is the information currently included 
sufficient for the realization of the explainee’s goals, or should more information be 
incorporated? Is all the information currently included relevant for the explainee’s 
goals, or should certain parts be removed? If the explanation is sufficient to accomplish 
the explainee’s mission and if it only includes relevant information, it is considered a 
good explanation, as it is fully adequate. 
3.5 Non-epistemic interests and the acceptance of 
mechanistic artifact explanations 
The picture presented in this chapter suggests that non-epistemic interests are 
allowed to have a direct influence on the decision whether or not one accepts a certain 
mechanistic artifact explanation. Let me first specify what I mean by a direct influence 
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of an interest on a decision. An interest has a direct influence on a decision if it is used 
as a stand-alone reason to motivate that decision (see section 2.3). The phrase ‘using x as 
a stand-alone reason to motivate a decision’ does not mean that x is the only reason for 
the decision, or that it is sufficient to make the decision; it means that x is used as a 
reason, in itself, to motivate the decision. This does not exclude that one also has other, 
additional reasons for making this decision. Additional reasons may even be necessary 
for the decision to be considered a justified decision. The point is that the reasons can 
be thought of as separate reasons, and not just as part of an overarching argument 
(although they may be part of such an overarching argument). Such separate reasons 
can be weighed against each other in order to arrive at a justified decision. It should also 
be stressed that a direct influence of a non-epistemic interest on the decision whether 
or not one accepts a certain explanation does not imply that the non-epistemic interest 
acts as an ulterior motive. The explainer may be very open about the fact that he uses 
the non-epistemic interest as a stand-alone reason to motivate his decision. The 
relevant interest is then definitely not ulterior. 
Let me now, in light of my discussion of mechanistic artifact explanation, argue that 
non-epistemic interests are allowed to have a direct influence on the decision whether 
or not one accepts a certain explanation. Suppose someone wants to design a new 
artifact and that he wants to spend as little time and energy as possible on the design. 
He thinks that a mechanistic artifact explanation of the behavior of an existing artifact 
can help him in satisfying these non-epistemic interests. Therefore, he (= the explainee) 
consults someone who can offer him such an explanation (= the explainer). Once the 
explainer has constructed a mechanistic artifact explanation of the relevant artifact 
behavior, there are different ways in which he can proceed: he can decide to include 
more information in the explanation, to remove parts from it, or he can switch to 
another explanatory strategy (from top-down to bottom-up or vice versa). He can also 
decide to accept the explanation as it is, and present it in its current form to the 
explainee. If the explainer considers the current explanation most adequate for the 
explainee’s non-epistemic interests, then he is allowed to use this as a stand-alone 
reason to accept the explanation as it is. This implies that non-epistemic interests are 
allowed to have a direct influence on the decision to accept a certain mechanistic 
artifact explanation. 
Some may object that I have mixed things up. They may have a division in mind 
between two stages. In the first stage, the explainer decides whether or not he accepts a 
certain explanation, and in the second, he assesses the adequacy of the accepted 
explanation for the explainee’s non-epistemic interests. The idea is that non-epistemic 
interests can act as stand-alone reasons in the second stage, but not in the first. In the 
first stage, the explainer should only consider epistemic factors, such as epistemic 
interests and the values of accuracy and internal consistency, and non-epistemic 
interests should not have a direct influence on decisions in this stage. Since decisions in 
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the first stage concern the acceptance of explanations, the conclusion of this line of 
reasoning is that non-epistemic interests should not have a direct influence on the 
acceptance of explanations. The objection against my point of view is then that by 
claiming that such a direct influence is allowed, I have mixed up the stage in which one 
decides whether or not one accepts an explanation, and the stage in which one assesses 
the adequacy of an accepted explanation for the explainee’s non-epistemic interests. 
But although such a two-stage approach may sometimes be acceptable, I reject the 
idea that it is mandatory. In my view, scientists should be allowed to operate in one 
single context in which both epistemic and non-epistemic interests directly influence 
decisions on the acceptance of explanations. To support this view, it is useful to point at 
the fact that none of the mechanistic artifact explanations of the behavior of the box-
mover offered in this chapter is entirely accurate. This is because the box is never in 
position 3 (see figure 3.1). In fact, the box starts sliding down the foot of the elevator as 
soon as the top right corner of the box is higher than ramp g (see figure 3.4); it does not 
wait until the elevator is completely lifted (as in position 3 in figure 3.1). Since all of the 
mechanistic artifact explanations above state that at a certain time the box is in position 
3, they are all (partly) inaccurate. The reason why I have not eliminated the inaccuracy 
is that this would make the explanations more complex. I would have to spend more 
time and effort on formulating the explanations, and the reader would have to spend 
more time and effort on reading them. Although such additional time and effort would 
make the explanations more accurate, it would not make these explanations more fit for 
the purpose of making certain philosophical ideas clear to the reader. Therefore, I have 
opted for the inaccurate mechanistic artifact explanations instead of replacing them by 
more accurate ones. 
I think that similar situations can occur in scientific practice. Technological scientists 
may opt for inaccurate explanations because these explanations are more adequate for 
the explainee’s interests than more accurate explanations. Suppose, for instance, that 
someone seeks a mechanistic artifact explanation of the behavior of the box-mover (= 
epistemic interest) because this will help him in designing a new box-mover (= non-
epistemic interest). Suppose that one of the explanations offered above is adequate for 
the latter interest, and that eliminating the aforementioned inaccuracy would not make 
the explanation even more adequate for this interest. It would only make the 
explanation more complex, so that more time and effort would be needed for the 
explainee to understand the explanation. Since the explainee has an interest in saving 
time and energy (= non-epistemic interest), the explainer decides to accept the 
relatively inaccurate explanation, and he presents it to the explainee. So in deciding 
whether or not to accept the explanation, the explainer does not only look at epistemic 
factors such as accuracy, but he also considers the non-epistemic interests to be served. 
The fact that the inaccurate explanation serves these interests best is used as a reason, 
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in itself, to accept the explanation. So non-epistemic interests directly influence the 
acceptance of an explanation in this case. 
There is an easy strategy to transform such a direct influence into an indirect 
influence: one can regard the value of simplicity (in the sense of requiring as little time 
and effort as possible) as an epistemic value which is adopted because of the explainee’s 
non-epistemic interest to save time and energy. Because simplicity is an epistemic 
value, it is allowed to have a direct influence on the acceptance of explanations. The 
non-epistemic interest to save time and energy then indirectly influences the acceptance 
of explanations, via the epistemic value of simplicity. But if we would allow this, then 
why not allow a direct influence of the non-epistemic interest to save and energy as 
well? It seems that both the direct and indirect influence come down to the same thing 
in this case. Hence, if one allows the latter, one should also allow the former. 
The proponent of the two-stage approach can avoid this objection by disallowing not 
only the direct influence, but also the indirect influence via the value of simplicity. 
Following Douglas (2009), he may hold that only the values of accuracy and internal 
consistency are true epistemic values, and that the value of simplicity is not (see section 
2.3). Accordingly, in the first stage, in which the explainer decides whether or not he 
accepts an explanation, he is only allowed to use the epistemic values of accuracy and 
internal consistency, and he should neither use non-epistemic interests nor the value of 
simplicity as stand-alone reasons in this context. But then, the explainer in the case at 
hand would not end up with the most adequate mechanistic artifact explanation. In the 
first stage, he would have to reject this explanation because it is inaccurate, and because 
non-epistemic reasons would not be allowed to overrule such an epistemic argument in 
this stage. So the best explanation, that is, the explanation that serves the explainee’s 
interests best, would never reach the second stage. Since explainers in technological 
science should be able to arrive at the best explanations, we should allow them to use 
more than the values of accuracy and internal consistency in deciding whether or not to 
accept an explanation. Once we allow them to also use values like simplicity, we should 
also allow them to use non-epistemic interests as stand-alone reasons, as we have seen. 
The conclusion is that non-epistemic interests are allowed to have a direct influence on 
the acceptance of explanations. 
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Chapter 4  
Explanations in software engineering1 
The fact that interests play an important role in the construction and evaluation of 
explanations is not idiosyncratic to mechanistic artifact explanation. In this chapter, I 
offer an analysis of explanatory practice in software engineering,2 in which several 
different kinds of explanation are considered. I will indicate how interests give rise to 
certain specific explanation-seeking questions, and how both influence the construction 
and evaluation of explanations in software engineering. At the end of this chapter, I will 
use my findings to argue that non-epistemic interests are allowed to have a direct 
influence on the acceptance of explanations in software engineering. 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on De Winter (2010), which is an article on a pragmatic account of explanations in 
software engineering. The reason why I have included parts of that article in this dissertation is the same as 
the reason why I have included parts of De Winter (2011) (see previous chapter): the article has some 
important (unexpected) implications with respect to the roles of non-epistemic interests in science. These 
implications (which are not reported in De Winter (2010)) are discussed at the end of this chapter (sections 4.5 
and 4.6). 
2 In this dissertation, it is assumed that software engineering is a technological science. It should, however, be 
noted that there is a lot of controversy about the scientific status of computer science (see Tedre (2011) for an 
overview), of which software engineering is a branch. Therefore, I want to remark that the assumption that 
software engineering is a science is in fact a stronger assumption than strictly necessary for the purpose of 
this chapter. As it only concerns explanatory practice in software engineering, I only need to assume that 
explaining in software engineering is scientific. The latter assumption may provoke significantly less 
controversy. 
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4.1 Explanation-seeking questions 
Let me start by giving some theoretical background. According to the erotetic model 
of explanation, which I will take for granted here, explanations can be thought of as 
answers to why-questions. A framework of question formats that covers all why-
questions I will consider in this chapter, is formulated by Van Bouwel & Weber (2002), 
and contains the following formats (each accompanied by an example): 
 
(P-contrast) Why does object a have property P, rather than property P’?3 
e.g., ‘Why does the software procedure GenerateSchedule have a very long worst-case 
execution time, rather than a short worst-case execution time?’ 
(T-contrast) Why does object a have property P at time t1, but property P’ at time t2? 
e.g., ‘Why does the software procedure GenerateSchedule have a very long worst-case 
execution time, while ten minutes ago, it had a very short worst-case execution 
time?’ 
(O-contrast) Why does object a have property P, while object b has property P’? 
e.g., ‘Why does the software procedure GenerateSchedule1 have a very long worst-case 
execution time, while the software procedure GenerateSchedule2 has a very short 
worst-case execution time?’ 
(plain fact) Why does object a have property P? 
e.g., ‘Why does the software procedure GenerateSchedule have a very long worst-case 
execution time?’ 
 
Questions that fit one of the first three formats, are contrastive questions. According 
to Van Bouwel & Weber (2008), such questions can be motivated by (amongst others) 
surprise and a therapeutic or preventive need. A question is motivated by surprise if the 
reason for asking it, is that one wants to explain why things turn out to be different 
from what we expected. A question is motivated by a therapeutic or preventive need if 
it is motivated by a desire to know why things are different from how we want them to 
be, and by the need to know how the correspondence between the actual and the 
desired state of affairs can be achieved. Possible incentives for asking a plain fact 
question, are sheer intellectual curiosity, a desire to have information that enables us to 
predict whether and in which circumstances similar events will occur in the future, and 
a desire to causally connect object a having property P to events with which we are  
 
 
                                                     
3 P and P’ are mutually exclusive properties. 
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a Conference 1 Conference 2    
 p u    
 q v    
 r w    
b p – q q – r r – u u – v v – w 
 p – q q – r r – v u – v v – w 
 p – r q – u r – w u – w  
 p – r q – v  u – w  
 p – u q – w    
 p – v     
 p – w     
Table 4.1 Teams and games. 
 
more familiar (Van Bouwel & Weber 2008, p. 170). Later in this chapter, we will meet 
more possible incentives for raising explanation-seeking why-questions. 
4.2 Example 
In order to clarify how interests result in certain specific explanation-seeking 
questions, and how both affect the construction and evaluation of explanations in the 
field of software engineering, I will use an example of a software engineering task, 
which I consider representative of projects in software engineering. Let me describe it. 
There are two conferences in a sports league, each containing three teams, as is 
depicted in table 4.1a. Every team has to play at least one game against every other 
team. Teams of the same conference have to play two times against each other, while 
two teams of different conferences have to compete only once. Table 4.1b presents all 
the games that have to be played. A schedule has to be generated that meets the 
following conditions: (1) the schedule contains no more and no less than the games in 
table 4.1b, (2) a team cannot play more than one game per day, and (3) the games are 
distributed over as few days as possible ((1) and (2) take priority over (3)). 
A software procedure should fulfill the task of generating the schedule. This software 
procedure should do this in such a way that the content of the schedule is as random as 
possible. In other words: if n is the number of schedules that meet conditions (1) to (3), 
then for any schedule that meets conditions (1) to (3), the probability that it is 
generated by the procedure should be equal to 1/n. The user should be able to execute 
the procedure by pressing a button, but only after all games on the current schedule 
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have been finished. When the current schedule contains games that haven’t been played 
yet, pressing the button should cause the appearance of the message ‘You can only 
generate a new schedule after finishing all games on the current schedule.’ 
Several problems might occur while developing such a computer program, and a 
strategy I consider very useful in solving some of these problems, is to ask certain 
explanation-seeking questions. The usefulness of this strategy is made clear in the next 
sections, in which I give examples of interests and explanation-seeking questions that 
might turn up in the process of writing and debugging software, and pay attention to 
the nature of the explanations that answer these questions. 
4.3 Contrastive questions 
In order to come to a first explanation-seeking question, I suggest an algorithm that 
might allow our software procedure to randomly generate a schedule that satisfies the 
three conditions mentioned earlier. The first step of the algorithm is the random 
permutation of the set of games presented in table 4.1b.4 We can call the resulting array 
of games array1. The second step fills a calendar with days on which games will be 
played. For each day d, the procedure runs through array1, checking for each element 
whether it can be added to d. An element can only be added if two requirements are 
met. The first is that it is a game, and the second is that for both teams, this game should 
be the first they have to play on d. If and only if these two requirements are met, the 
game is added to d and removed from array1 (replaced by something that is not a game). 
When all elements of array1 have been checked, d is added to the calendar, and if array1 
still contains games, a new day is created. This process is repeated until all games are 
part of the calendar. Then, the calendar is converted into a schedule that is accessible 
for users. 
It is possible that one has made some mistakes in implementing this algorithm. In 
that case, the procedure will probably not have the anticipated result. Suppose an 
engineer has tried to implement the algorithm, but made a typing error in the program 
line that should bring about the adding of a game to day d if possible. When he tests his 
procedure, he finds out that it does not work properly. Of course, the engineer does not 
know what causes the perceived error (otherwise, he would have corrected the typing 
 
                                                     
4 An algorithm that can be used to shuffle the games, is Knuth’s modern version of the Fisher-Yates algorithm 
(Radu 2008). 
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error before testing). In order to debug the procedure, he asks why the procedure led to 
the error, and not to the desired result (P-contrast question). The answer to this 
question is that the procedure should contain a program line that actually adds a game 
to the calendar if possible, while his procedure does not. This explanation is complete if 
the explainer assumes that the procedure would have worked properly if it contained 
such a program line. It has the following format: 
 
Object a has property P, rather than P’ because it does not have the properties D1, …, 
Dn (with n ≥ 1). 
 
It is assumed that object a would have property P’ if it had properties D1, …, Dn. I call the 
combination of this assumption and the explanation format, the P-contrast explanation-
type. 
In order to solve P-contrast questions, it can sometimes be useful to ask other 
explanation-seeking questions. To demonstrate this, we can look at how our engineer 
attains a button that allows the user to generate a new schedule if and only if all games 
on the current schedule have been finished. Suppose a button with the label ‘generate 
schedule’ has already been inserted. Suppose further that when the last game of the 
regular season is finished, the value of a variable V stocked at a certain location in a 
database, turns from 0 into 1. When a new schedule is generated, the value of V turns 
from 1 into 0. Because up till now, all cases in which the value of V is equal to 1, 
correspond with the cases in which all games on the schedule have been finished, and 
all cases in which the value of V differs from 1, correspond with the cases in which the 
schedule still contains games that have not been played yet, the consequences of 
pressing the button can be determined on the basis of whether or not the value of V is 
equal to 1. The engineer knows this and assigns to the pressing of the button a 
procedure that generates a new schedule if and only if the value of V is equal to 1. While 
testing his program, he finds out that the pressing of the button has the desired 
consequences. 
Later, the engineer decides to extend his program with some post-season events. The 
games at the post-season events should be added to the schedule, and only when all 
these games are over, the user should be able to generate a new schedule. During a first 
attempt at implementing the extension, the engineer deletes the program line that 
shifts the value of V from 0 into 1 when the last game of the regular season is finished, 
but forgets to insert a line that brings about this shift when the last game of the last 
post-season event is finished. He discovers that the pressing of the ‘generate schedule’ 
button never leads to a new schedule, even when there are no non-played games on the 
schedule remaining. An answer to the T-contrast question ‘Why does the program have, 
at this moment t1, the property of never generating a new schedule when the ‘generate 
schedule’ button is pressed, while at time t2 (before extending the program), it had the 
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property of generating a schedule if (1) the ‘generate schedule’ button was pressed and 
(2) all games on the schedule were finished?’ can help him solve this problem. 
The T-contrast can be explained by the fact that at t2, a program line that leads to the 
shift of V’s value when the last game on the schedule is finished, was present, while such 
a program line is absent at t1. This explanation can be fitted into the following format 
(without changing its meaning):5 
 
Object a has property P at time t1 but P’ at time t2 because it had properties D1, …, Dn 
(with n ≥ 1) at t2, while these properties are absent at t1. 
 
In combination with the assumption that object a would have property P’ at time t1 if it 
had properties D1, …, Dn at t1, I will call this format the T-contrast explanation-type. 
The T-contrast explanation brings the engineer closer to an answer to the question 
why the pressing of the button does not lead to a new schedule when it should, that is, 
when all games on the schedule are over (P-contrast question). The answer is that the 
program should contain a program line that changes the value of V into 1 when the last 
game on the schedule is finished, while it doesn’t (P-contrast explanation). The benefit 
in asking the T-contrast question ‘Why doesn’t object a work properly at this moment t1, 
while it did at time t2?’, is that it draws attention to those factors that have been 
changed during interval [t2, t1]. Since the program worked properly at time t2, these 
factors are more likely to cause the malfunctioning, as is illustrated by the previous 
example. The fact that the value of V did not get changed anymore, caused the 
malfunctioning, and not, say, a typing error in the program line that converts the 
calendar into an accessible schedule. One need not pay attention to this last possibility 
because if this program line would not perform its function, the program would not 
have worked at time t2 either, while it did. A T-contrast question can thus function as a 
tool to address the engineer’s attention to those factors that are most likely to be part of 
an accurate answer to a P-contrast question.6 
 
                                                     
5 The explanation can be reformulated into: The program has, at this moment t1, the property of never 
generating a new schedule when the ‘generate schedule’ button is pressed, while at time t2, it had the property 
of generating a new schedule if (1) the ‘generate schedule’ button was pressed and (2) all games on the 
schedule were finished, because at t2, it had the property of containing a program line that leads to the shift of 
V’s value when the last game on the schedule is finished, while this property is absent at t1. 
6 The fact that a T-contrast explanation helps the explainer to answer a P-contrast question, does not mean 
that a P-contrast explanation is in itself insufficient to answer such a question. The P-contrast explanation is a 
complete answer to the P-contrast question, and this answer should not contain any additional information. 
The T-contrast explanation is the preferential and complete answer in another context, that is, when a T-
contrast question is being addressed. 
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An O-contrast question can serve the same purpose. Suppose the engineer did not 
extend the original program with some post-season events, but started a new program, 
in which he reuses the program code that allows for the random generation of a 
schedule. The same error as with the T-contrast might arise (pressing a button does not 
lead to a new schedule when it should). Given that the engineer now has two programs, 
one that does not generate a schedule at the appropriate times, and one that does, he 
can ask the O-contrast question ‘Why does the new program never generate a new 
schedule, while the original program generates a new schedule at the appropriate 
times?’ This question draws the engineer’s attention to those factors that the two 
programs do not share (and makes abstraction of all other factors), which are the 
factors that are most likely to be part of an accurate answer to the P-contrast question 
‘Why does the new program never generate a new schedule, instead of generating a new 
schedule at the appropriate times?’ Thus, both T- and O-contrast questions can facilitate 
the debugging process. 
The preferential answers to O-contrast questions are O-contrast explanations. An O-
contrast explanation has the following format: 
 
Object a has property P, while object b has property P’ because b has properties D1, …, 
Dn (with n ≥ 1) which object a does not have. 
 
An explanation that fits this format is an O-contrast explanation if it is assumed that 
object a would have property P if it had properties D1, …, Dn. 
4.4 Plain facts 
Not only contrastive questions can help one to solve P-contrast questions. To 
illustrate this, we can return to an earlier stage in the development of the computer 
program, that is, before our engineer assigned a procedure to the button with the label 
‘generate schedule’, and after he corrected the typing error in the program line that 
should bring about the adding of a game to the calendar if possible. At this stage, the 
engineer is still testing the (alleged) implementation of the algorithm I described at the 
beginning of the previous section. While doing this, he faces a problem: in two tests, his 
generator generates the two schedules presented in table 4.2. Because schedule 1 
contains less days then schedule 2, the engineer knows that his procedure cannot 
guarantee that a generated schedule meets the third condition (the games are 
distributed over as few days as possible). 
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Schedule 1 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7   
p – q p – v p – u u – v p – r q – v u – v   
v – w u – w r – v q – r q – u p – r r – w   
r – u q – r q – w p – w v – w u – w p – q   
Schedule 2 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 
q – r q – v p – r p – q p – u p – r p – v q – w p – q 
u – v r – u v – w u – v v – w u – w u – w r – v  
p – w  q – u r – w q – r     
Table 4.2 Schedules. 
 
The following P-contrast question arises: ‘Why does the software procedure, when 
executed several times, occasionally result in schedules with more than seven days, 
instead of always resulting in schedules with exactly seven days?’7 To know where to 
search for an answer to this question, the engineer wonders what causes the 
malfunctioning: a problem with the algorithm, or a problem with the conversion of the 
algorithm into a software procedure. If the algorithm is problematic, he should develop 
a new algorithm, and if not, he should correct the implementation error(s). So in order 
to know how to continue the debugging process, the engineer needs to know whether 
his algorithm is problematic. This he can find out by trying to explain the shortcomings 
of schedule 2 by clarifying how the execution of the algorithm could have caused them. 
If such an explanation is possible, the algorithm is problematic, and if not, there’s 
something wrong with its implementation. 
One of the shortcomings of schedule 2 is that the second day contains only two 
games.8 The engineer then asks the plain fact question ‘Why does the second day of 
schedule 2 contain only two games?’, and tries to answer it by an explanation that 
clarifies how the execution of the algorithm led to this plain fact (explanation by 
algorithm). The format of such an explanation is: 
 
                                                     
7 Seven days is the minimum of days in a schedule, since each team has to play seven games (see table 4.1b), 
and a team cannot play more than one game per day (second condition). The fact that a schedule containing 
seven days is possible, is shown by schedule 1. 
8 Each day should contain three games. We know this because 21 games (see table 4.1b) should be distributed 
over seven days (see previous footnote), and one day cannot contain more than three games. If there would be 
more than three games (each between two teams) on a day, there should be more than six teams, since one 
team cannot play more than one game per day (second condition), and this is not the case (see table 4.1a). 
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Object a has property P because: 
At step n, event en occurred 
(Step n + 1 was the next step because condition c(n+1) was satisfied) 
At step n + 1, event e(n+1) occurred 
(Step n + 2 was the next step because condition c(n+2) was satisfied) 
At step n + 2, event e(n+2) occurred 
... 
(Step n + m was the next step because condition c(n+ m) was satisfied) 
At step n + m, event e(n+m) occurred 
(with n ≥ 1; and m ≥ 0) 
 
An explanation by algorithm assumes that the execution of a certain algorithm caused 
the fact that object a has property P, and explains this fact by referring to events that (1) 
were instructed by the algorithm, and (2) are relevant to object a’s acquiring property P. 
The reason why the sentences that explain why a certain step was next, are bracketed, 
is that they are only necessary in cases in which a condition, specified by the algorithm, 
had to be satisfied for this step to be next. 
An explanation by algorithm of the fact that the second day of schedule 2 contains 
only two games, might go as follows. After the second game was added to the second 
day of the calendar, the focus moved to the next game of array1. Because this game 
could not complete the second day without leading to a schedule that doesn’t meet the 
three aforementioned conditions,9 it wasn’t added to the second day. Then, the focus 
moved to the next game of array1. This game could not complete the second day either, 
so that, again, the focus moved to the next game without the second day being extended 
with a third game. This process continued until all games of array1 had been checked, 
after which the composition of the third day started. Thus, no third game was added to 
the second day before the process of constituting this day ended. Similar explanations 
can elucidate why days 6 to 9 contain less than three games. 
Because the shortcomings can be explained by the execution of the original 
algorithm, our engineer does not have to control whether his software procedure is a 
correct implementation of the original algorithm, and can refine his P-contrast question 
into ‘Why does the algorithm, when executed several times, occasionally result in 
schedules with more than seven days, instead of always resulting in schedules with 
 
                                                     
9 All games other than ‘p – w’ could not complete the second day because they contain teams that already had 
a game to play on the second day. ‘p – w’ could not complete the second day either, because it was added to the 
first day, and interconference games should appear only once on the schedule. 
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exactly seven days?’10 An answer to this question is that the algorithm permits that 
games that together exclude the possibility of a third or a second game being added to 
one of the days that do not yet contain three games, are added to the definitive 
calendar. For example, the first two games of the second day of schedule 2 exclude 
together with the third game of the first day, that a third game is added to the second 
day. 
An algorithm that avoids this mistake, is the following. First, the interconference 
games are randomly shuffled. Next, for each game of the resulting array, it is checked 
whether it can be added to the first day. If so, the game will be added to the first day, if 
not, it will be the first game of a day that does not contain games yet. This step results in 
a calendar consisting of seven days, with the first day containing three interconference 
games, and the next six days containing each only one (interconference) game. Then, 
days 2 to 7 are completed by those intra-conference games that can be added to them 
without leading to a schedule that does not meet the three aforementioned conditions. 
Next, for each day, the three games on it are randomly shuffled, and so are the days of 
the calendar. This calendar is converted into a schedule that is accessible for users. 
When this algorithm is implemented correctly, one obtains a software procedure that 
satisfies the requirements stated above. 
Answering plain fact questions can also serve other purposes than satisfying the 
desire to know whether a certain algorithm caused an error. One such purpose is related 
to the development of a new program by using components of an outdated program. If 
our engineer prefers creating a new program a over updating an old program b, and he 
wants to reuse those components of b that together have the function of generating a 
new schedule, he has to know which part of the original program b fulfills this function. 
The corresponding knowledge-seeking question can be reformulated into the plain fact 
explanation-seeking question ‘Why does the original program b have the capacity to 
generate schedules?’ 
The answer the engineer is looking for, is a set of reusable software components that 
are non-redundant parts of the set of all factors that bring about the explanandum. The 
reason why he wants his answer to contain only reusable software components, and not, 
say, physical laws, non-reusable software, etc., is that he wants to obtain software that 
he can use while writing the new program. The reason why the software components 
should not be redundant, is that the engineer does not want to reuse more than needed. 
In most (if not all) cases in which the question of why program b has property P, is 
motivated by the desire to pass on property P to a new program by reusing parts of b, 
the optimal answer will be an inus explanation. According to John Mackie, “what is 
 
                                                     
10 Notice that by answering this question, one also answers the original, non-refined P-contrast question. 
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typically called a cause, is an inus condition, or an individual instance of an inus 
condition …” (Mackie 1974, p. 64), with an inus condition being an ‘insufficient but non-
redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition’ for the effect to occur. For 
example, if (D1 ∧ D2) ∨ (D3 ∧ D4) is necessary for object b to have property P, while both 
D1 ∧ D2 and D3 ∧ D4 are sufficient for b to have property P, then D1, D2, D3 and D4 are 
possible causes of the fact that object b has property P. An inus explanation is, then, an 
explanation that refers to some of the factors that are insufficient but non-redundant 
parts of a conjunction that is not only unnecessary and sufficient for object b to have 
property P, but also true. The format of this kind of explanation is: 
 
Object b has property P’ because of factors D1, …, Dn (with n ≥ 1). 
 
I can now indicate why in most cases in which the question ‘Why does program b 
have property P?’ is motivated by the desire to pass on property P to a new program a 
by reusing parts of b, the optimal answer will be an inus explanation. We already saw 
why the explanation should only refer to software components that are not redundant: 
because the engineer does not want to reuse more than needed. These software 
components will not be sufficient for the program to work in a certain way, because 
there will always be some non-software-related background conditions (e.g., certain 
physical laws being active) that have to be met for any computer program to work. The 
software components are part of a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the 
explanandum, because, if otherwise, the explanandum would not occur (while it does). 
In most cases, this sufficient condition will not be necessary to cause the explained 
effect, since this effect could also be caused by using other algorithms, or other 
implementations of the same algorithm. The software components that constitute the 
explanation can thus be considered to be insufficient but non-redundant parts of an 
unnecessary but sufficient condition for the original program to have the property one 
wants to pass on to the new program. That the unnecessary but sufficient condition 
should be true, is evident, since the engineer wants his explanation to point at factors 
that actually (and not just possibly) caused the fact that program b has property P. 
4.5 Construction and evaluation of explanations 
We have seen how in software engineering, one central non-epistemic interest (the 
desire to have a software procedure that performs a certain task) can give rise to certain 
epistemic interests (e.g., the desire to know how to debug the procedure, the desire to 
know which components of an earlier computer program to reuse), and how these 
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epistemic interests can result in certain explanation-seeking questions. The interests 
and questions determine what kind of explanation one will construct. If one wants to 
know how to debug a software procedure, one asks a P-contrast question, which is 
answered with a P-contrast explanation. In order to construct such an explanation, one 
has to look for properties that the software procedure currently does not have, and that 
could eliminate the problem. We have also seen that, in order to answer P-contrast 
questions, the best strategy can sometimes be to first address other kinds of 
explanation-seeking questions, such as T-contrast questions, which are answered with 
T-contrast-explanations, or O-contrast questions, which are answered with O-contrast 
explanations. It can also sometimes be helpful to ask a plain fact question and try to 
answer it with an explanation by algorithm, that is, when one wants to know whether a 
problem is due to the algorithm or to its implementation. One will then check whether 
certain shortcomings could be explained in terms of the algorithm, regardless of its 
implementation. Another possible epistemic interest we met is the goal to know which 
part of an earlier computer program to reuse. One then asks a plain fact question, and 
tries to answer it with an inus explanation that indicates which components to reuse. 
This brief sketch of explanatory practice in software engineering indicates that 
interests play an important role in the construction of explanations: they determine 
which questions are asked and what type of explanation is constructed. As such, they 
determine the kind of information that is sought and included in the explanation. 
Interests are also important in the evaluation of explanations. Let me clarify this with 
an example. Suppose that a software procedure does not work properly and that one 
wants to fix it, and that one has constructed an explanation of the error that reveals a 
property that the procedure currently does not have, and that would eliminate the 
error if it would be implemented in the procedure. This property is all the explanation 
refers to. As it enables the explainee to satisfy his interest, that is, to fix the procedure, 
he will consider it a good, fully adequate explanation. Even though a lot more 
information could be included in the explanation (e.g., the entire mechanism leading up 
to the error could be described), he will not consider the former, less extensive 
explanation insufficient, incomplete, or inadequate, since including more information is 
neither necessary nor useful for his interest to be served. In fact, adding such 
information would only make the explanation less adequate, as it would then contain a 
lot of redundant information on which the explainee probably does not want to spend 
any time and energy (assuming that he has a non-epistemic interest in using his time 
and energy efficiently). 
Table 4.3 presents the epistemic and non-epistemic interests at play in the different 
contexts we met in this chapter. Each row corresponds with a certain kind of context, in 
which there are certain interests, and in which a certain kind of explanation-seeking 
question is asked. The non-epistemic interests to have a software procedure that  
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Non-epistemic 
interests Epistemic interests 
Kind of 
question 
Kind of 
explanation 
The desire to have a 
software procedure 
that performs a 
certain task; the 
desire to use one’s 
time and energy 
efficiently 
The desire to know how to 
debug the procedure 
P-contrast 
question 
P-contrast 
explanation 
The desire to know the 
answer to a P-contrast 
question (in order to know 
how to debug the procedure) 
T-contrast 
question 
T-contrast 
explanation 
The desire to know the 
answer to a P-contrast 
question (in order to know 
how to debug the procedure) 
O-contrast 
question 
O-contrast 
explanation 
The desire to know whether 
an error is caused by the 
algorithm (in order to know 
how to debug the procedure) 
Plain fact 
question 
Explanation by 
algorithm 
The desire to know which 
parts of a computer program 
b with property P’ should be 
reused to pass on P’ to 
program a 
Plain fact 
question 
Inus 
explanation 
Table 4.3 Interests, question-formats and explanation-types. 
 
performs a certain task, and to use one’s time and energy efficiently, are present in all 
contexts. The right hand column shows what kind of explanation is best in each kind of 
context. Thus, it indicates what kind of explanation will be constructed and evaluated as 
most adequate given the engineer’s non-epistemic interests, his epistemic interest, and 
the question he asks. So for instance, the first row reveals that a P-contrast explanation 
will be constructed and considered most adequate in a context in which (1) an engineer 
wants to have a software procedure that performs a certain task, (2) he wants to use his 
time and energy efficiently, (3) he wants to know how to debug the current procedure, 
and (4) he asks a P-contrast question. 
The table shows that there is not one explanation-type which is always the best, but 
that different explanation-types are most adequate in different contexts. We can infer 
from the table that which explanation-type is most adequate, depends on the kind of 
question asked and the underlying epistemic interest. 
It also depends on the underlying non-epistemic interests (hence the left hand 
column). This can be demonstrated as follows. Suppose that the explainee would not 
want to have a software procedure that performs a certain task, and that he would not 
bother spending his time and energy on activities that are irrelevant for the 
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development of such a procedure. Suppose his main goal would be to kill time. Thus, the 
non-epistemic interests in table 4.3 would be replaced by the non-epistemic interest to 
kill time. In that case, the explanation-types in the right hand column would be too 
concise; e.g., an explanation that only reveals properties which are relevant for 
eliminating a certain error (P-contrast explanation) would be less adequate for the 
explainee’s interests than an explanation that also describes the entire mechanism 
leading to the error. The explainee would, due to his desire to kill time, prefer an 
explanation of the latter kind. Thus, how things (e.g., an error) are to be explained 
depends on the presence/absence of the non-epistemic interests in the left hand 
column of table 4.3. The conclusion is that in software engineering, the construction 
and evaluation of explanations is not only influenced by the kinds of questions asked 
and the underlying epistemic interests, but also by the non-epistemic interests of the 
explainee. 
4.6 Non-epistemic interests and the acceptance of 
explanations 
The picture presented in this chapter suggests that non-epistemic interests are 
allowed to have a direct influence11 on a software engineer’s decision to accept a certain 
explanation. When software engineers want to develop a software procedure that 
satisfies certain requirements (= non-epistemic interest), they often use explanations 
that can help them with this, and they usually do not want to spend more time and 
resources on such explanations than needed (= non-epistemic interest). When such an 
explanation is most adequate for the engineer’s non-epistemic interests (that is, it is 
most useful for developing the relevant procedure and it does not waste time or 
resources), the engineer can use this as a stand-alone reason to accept the explanation. 
His non-epistemic interests then have a direct influence on the acceptance of the 
explanation. Such a direct influence should not be regarded as dangerous or harmful, on 
the contrary. It is exactly because engineers use non-epistemic interests to guide their 
choices that certain goals are accomplished most efficiently and that no resources are 
wasted. This promotes technological progress. Therefore, direct influences of non-
 
                                                     
11 An interest has a direct influence on a decision if it is used as a stand-alone reason to motivate that decision 
(see section 2.3). 
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epistemic interests on decisions concerning the acceptance of explanations should be 
permitted in software engineering. 
  65 
Chapter 5  
Interests and explanation in the sciences 
We have seen that interests, including non-epistemic interests, play certain roles in 
the construction and evaluation of mechanistic artifact explanations and of 
explanations in software engineering. Interests such as specific design goals and the 
desire not to waste time and energy, influence how much and what kind of information 
is included in an explanation of an artifact behavior or of an artifact property. We have 
also seen that technological scientists are allowed to use non-epistemic interests as 
reasons to motivate the acceptance of explanations. 
We can then conclude that scientific decisions in the technological sciences should 
not be ‘pure’, in the sense that they should not be detached from the non-epistemic 
interests of certain stakeholders. This conflicts with the full ideal of purity (see section 
2.1). But my findings also contest the partial ideal of purity. In section 2.3, I 
characterized the partial ideal of purity as consisting of the following theses: 
 
(1) An interest indirectly influences a decision if it is used to determine whether the 
available evidence is sufficient to make that decision. 
(2) Indirect influences of non-epistemic interests on scientific decisions are harmless 
(and even desirable). 
(3) An interest directly influences a decision if it is used as a stand-alone reason to 
motivate the decision. 
(4) Direct influences of non-epistemic interests on decisions concerning the 
characterization of data, the interpretation of evidence, or theory acceptance are 
unacceptable in science. 
(5) Such influences can and must be eliminated. 
 
At the end of the two previous chapters, in sections 3.5 and 4.6, I argued that direct 
influences, as characterized by (3), of non-epistemic interests on decisions concerning 
the acceptance of explanations should be allowed in the technological sciences. This 
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conclusion challenges theses (4) and (5) of the partial ideal of purity. Therefore, I think 
that we should not only reject the full ideal of purity, but the partial ideal of purity as 
well. 
Some may, however, think that I move too quickly. Perhaps the partial ideal of purity 
is untenable as an ideal for technological science, but not for other scientific disciplines. 
The current chapter aims to show that interest influences similar to those identified in 
technological science in the previous chapters, can also be found in other scientific 
fields. I will consider the social sciences (section 5.1), biology (section 5.2), and the 
medical sciences (section 5.3). I use my findings on interest influences in these fields to 
argue that the partial ideal of purity is untenable as an ideal for science in general 
(section 5.4). 
5.1 The social sciences 
Social phenomena can be explained in a variety of ways: one can explain a social 
phenomenon by showing that the rational choices of agents that are driven by self-
regarding desires result in the phenomenon, by describing how the actual biographies 
of particular individuals (who may have behaved irrationally and/or on the basis of 
other-regarding desires) culminated in the social phenomenon, by referring to another 
social phenomenon that caused the first one, by describing the social or cultural 
function of the phenomenon, etc. While some pick out one of these approaches as the 
one that is always the best one, others prefer explanatory pluralism in the social 
sciences, i.e. the view that different kinds of explanation are legitimate in this field. To 
support the latter view, several philosophers of science have argued that different kinds 
of explanation serve different interests. I think such pragmatic defenses of explanatory 
pluralism can be used to argue that non-epistemic interests influence decisions in 
explanatory contexts in the social sciences. So I start by briefly recapitulating some of 
those defenses. 
Jackson & Pettit (1992) make a distinction between individual-level explanations (or 
micro-explanations) and structural explanations (or macro-explanations). The former 
explain social phenomena in terms of individuals, and the latter in terms of 
supraindividual entities, such as institutions, groups, norms, aggregate statistics, etc. To 
support the view that both kinds of explanation are legitimate in the social sciences, 
Jackson & Pettit contend that they provide different kinds of information, which are 
complementary. They state that a macro-explanation offers “modally contrastive 
information”, that is, it “focuses on similarities between the actual world and other 
possible worlds; it takes us to a distance at which we can discern constancies across the 
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actual way things are and the ways things might have been” (Jackson and Pettit 1992, p. 
15). A micro-explanation, on the other hand, offers “modally comparative information”, 
which means that it “focuses on the differences between the actual world and other 
possible worlds; it homes in the particularities of the actual case” (Jackson and Pettit 
1992, p. 15). This view supports explanatory pluralism in the social sciences: because 
micro- and macro-explanations offer different kinds of information, they are both 
legitimate kinds of explanation, and we should not assume that one of the two is always 
preferable. Which kind of explanation is preferable in a particular context depends, 
according to Jackson & Pettit, one one’s specific perspective and purpose in that context 
(Jackson & Pettit 1992, p. 16). 
Elsewhere, Philip Pettit discusses rational-choice explanation of social behavior, that 
is, an explanation of such behavior by reference to rational self-regard. According to 
Pettit, rational choice theory presupposes that people are (1) self-centered, i.e. they do 
what they do as a result of their own desires or utility functions, and (2) self-regarding, 
in the sense that the more a desire bears on one’s own advantage, the stronger it is. He 
argues that the second presupposition conflicts with common sense. But that does not 
lead him to the conclusion that rational-choice explanations should be rejected in the 
social sciences. Pettit rejects rational-choice explanations as explanations of the 
emergence or continuation of patterns of behavior, but not as explanations of the 
resilience of patterns of behavior. He contends that a rational-choice explanation can be 
used to explain why a certain pattern of behavior is robust under various contingencies. 
The underlying idea is that even when people’s behavior is not dictated by self-regard, 
but instead, e.g., by cultural perceptions and expectations, self-regard can still be 
virtually present. This is the case when selfish interests function as alarm bells, which 
ring whenever these interests are possibly compromised, prompting the relevant agent 
to consider personal advantage. Such virtual presence of self-regard makes certain 
patterns of behavior resilient under possible disturbance or drift according to Pettit. His 
conclusion is then that rational-choice explanations of social behavior are highly useful 
to explain why this behavior is resilient under possible disturbance or drift. Therefore, 
rational-choice explanation is, in his view, a legitimate kind of explanation in the social 
sciences (Pettit 1995, 2000). 
Satz & Ferejohn (1994) discuss rational-choice explanation in the social sciences as 
well. They argue against the view, which they claim is common among philosophers, 
that rational-choice explanations are necessarily individualist, psychological 
explanations, i.e. explanations of social behavior in terms of the mental states of 
individuals and their interactions. They claim that rational-choice explanations can also 
be structural explanations, which account for social behavior in terms of irreducible 
relational or structural properties. More specifically, they argue that a rational-choice 
explanation can explain the stability of a pattern of behavior by spelling out structural 
conditions that constrain possible behaviors. This corresponds with Pettit’s view that a 
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rational-choice explanation is useful to clarify why a pattern of behavior is resilient (see 
above). The difference with Pettit’s view is that according to Satz & Ferejohn, rational-
choice explanations can also be legitimate psychological explanations, and they ask for 
a background theory that specifies in which contexts such psychological rational-choice 
explanations are appropriate (Satz & Ferejohn 1994, p. 87). They suggest that this 
depends on the interests at play: 
 
Whether individual or structural accounts of social phenomena are appropriate 
depends, we believe, on the purpose of the explanation. For some purposes, the 
appropriate focus is on individual agency and choice. For many social-science 
questions, however, the appropriate focus is on how social structures and features of 
the agent's environment exert constraints on her action. This is not an a priori 
feature of social-science explanation. Rather, it is a feature of the types of questions 
in which social scientists are typically interested. In contemplating a reduction, we 
need always to focus on the question of what purposes our explanation is intended to 
serve. (Satz & Ferejohn 1994, pp. 83-84) 
 
The view that which kind of explanation is appropriate depends on the specific 
interests and purposes that the explanation has to serve, is also endorsed by Uskali 
Mäki. He puts it as follows: 
 
[T]he account of explanatory relevance cannot be based on an account of causal 
relevance only. It would most naturally be given in terms of explanatory pragmatics, 
in terms of the explainers’ and explainees’ interests and purposes. While 
macrosociologists and ministries of justice will be interested in explaining crime 
rates in terms of unemployment rates, individual psychologists and social workers 
will want explanations given in terms of theoretically understood individual 
biographies. Different kinds of explanatory information serve different purposes. 
(Mäki 2002, pp. 255-256) 
 
These positions constitute a pragmatist argument for explanatory pluralism in the 
social sciences: because different kinds of explanation provide different kinds of 
information, which are useful for different kinds of interests, they are all legitimate, and 
we should not assume that only one of them is appropriate in the social sciences. Such a 
pragmatist argument for explanatory pluralism in the social sciences has been 
developed in more detail by Van Bouwel & Weber (2008). 
Van Bouwel & Weber make a distinction between intentional explanations (which 
explain a social phenomenon in terms of the intentional states and actions of one or 
more individuals), structural explanations (which explain a social phenomenon by 
referring to another social phenomenon that caused the first one), and functional 
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explanations (which explain a social phenomenon by describing its function). 
Furthermore, structural explanations that refer to proximate causes are distinguished 
from structural explanations that refer to remote causes. Van Bouwel & Weber propose 
four criteria to assess different explanations of a social phenomenon: accuracy (i.e. their 
correctness, or their relation with reality), adequacy (i.e. how well they serve the 
interests they are supposed to serve), efficiency (i.e. the amount of work that is needed 
to construct the explanation), and appropriateness (i.e. their relevance for the 
explanation-seeking question asked). These criteria determine, according to Van 
Bouwel & Weber, how good an explanation is (compared to other explanations) within a 
certain context. It is shown that different kinds of explanation are the best in different 
contexts, depending on the particular interests of the explainee and the specific kind of 
explanation-seeking question that is addressed in the context (Van Bouwel & Weber 
2008). 
So one of Van Bouwel & Weber’s criteria to evaluate explanations in the social 
sciences is adequacy for the relevant interests. They sum up several interests that 
explanations of social phenomena could serve: the desire to know how the social 
phenomenon was produced given antecedents via spatiotemporally continuous 
processes, the desire to know whether and in which circumstances similar events will 
occur in the future, the desire to know how object a having property P is causally 
connected to events with which we are more familiar, and the desire to know why 
things have been otherwise than we expected them to be. These are all epistemic 
interests, but Van Bouwel & Weber also mention two non-epistemic interests: the desire 
to anticipate actions of persons/groups, and the desire to change a property of an 
object.1 Depending on which of these epistemic and non-epistemic interests one wants 
to serve in an explanatory context, an explanation of a social phenomenon is regarded 
as a (relatively) good or a (relatively) bad explanation. 
But I think that what we have seen so far doesn’t capture the whole spectrum of 
interest influences on how good an explanation is within a certain context. First, 
consider Van Bouwel & Weber’s third criterion to evaluate explanations: efficiency. This 
criterion is, I think, the second criterion (adequacy) in disguise. Efficiency can be 
reformulated as adequacy for the (non-epistemic) interest not to carry out more work 
 
                                                     
1 Van Bouwel & Weber call these two interests epistemic interests. But in my framework (see section 1.1.1), they 
are non-epistemic, because they are not interests to know something. The potential state that is regarded as 
beneficial in these interests, is not the state of knowing something, but, respectively, the state in which 
certain actions are anticipated, and the state in which a certain property of an object is changed. The reason 
why Van Bouwel & Weber and I use different concepts of epistemic interests, is that our aims are different 
(their aim is to defend explanatory pluralism in the social sciences, and my aim is to discuss interest 
influences in the social sciences). Van Bouwel & Weber’s concept of epistemic interests is not adequate for the 
aims of this dissertation, and therefore I use a different concept. 
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than needed. It is because social scientists usually have this interest, that efficient 
explanations are usually preferable. However, if they would not have this interest, then 
efficiency may not be an explanatory virtue. Suppose someone wants to construct an 
explanation of a social phenomenon just to kill time. In such a context, a relatively 
inefficient explanation, which requires more work, may be preferable, since such an 
explanation is more adequate for the interest to kill time. So which explanation is best, 
depends on the presence/absence of the interest not to carry out more work than 
needed. 
Van Bouwel & Weber’s fourth criterion – relevance for the explanation-seeking 
question asked – can also be used to bring certain interest influences to light. Van 
Bouwel & Weber show that a certain explanation of a social phenomenon, which is a 
good, relevant answer to a certain explanation-seeking question concerning the 
phenomenon, can be irrelevant for another explanation-seeking question concerning 
the same phenomenon. For instance, a functional explanation of object a having 
property P may be a good and relevant answer to the explanation-seeking question 
‘What is the function of object a having property P?’, but not to the explanation-seeking 
question ‘What is the cause of object a having property P?’ Therefore, whether an 
explanation is appropriate in a certain explanatory context, depends on the specific 
explanation-seeking question to be addressed in the context (Van Bouwel & Weber 
2008). 
But for appropriateness for a certain explanation-seeking question to be an 
explanatory virtue in a certain context, it is important that it is legitimate to ask that 
question in the first place. This depends on the interests that are present in the context. 
For instance, if one wants to legitimize or criticize the existence and/or properties of 
certain institutions or patterns of behavior (= non-epistemic interest), then it is 
legitimate to ask what their function is, because a functional explanation of the 
existence/properties of these institutions/patterns can help one satisfy this non-
epistemic interest (Van Bouwel & Weber 2008, p. 178). But in a context in which one has 
other interests, interests for which a functional explanation would be useless, it is not 
legitimate to seek a functional explanation (by asking what the function of the relevant 
social phenomenon is). This points at an influence of interests on which explanation is 
best: the interests that are present in a certain context determine what kind of 
explanation-seeking question would be appropriate to ask, and this question in turn 
determines which kind of explanation would be appropriate. Thus, interests affect, via 
explanation-seeking questions, which kind of explanation is best. 
My general conclusion is that how good an explanation is within a certain context, is 
highly dependent upon the different interests, including non-epistemic interests, that 
are present in the context. But do social scientists actually use non-epistemic interests 
in evaluating explanations? And should we allow them to use such interests as stand-
alone reasons in decisions concerning the acceptance of explanations? 
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The explicit use of non-epistemic interests in explanatory contexts seems 
significantly less common in the social sciences than it is in technological science.  
While technological scientists are often driven by certain non-epistemic goals (e.g., 
designing a new artifact), and tailor their explanations to these specific goals (see 
chapters 3 and 4), social scientists often work in explanatory contexts in which non-
epistemic interests are less dominant, and in which one approach to explanation is 
taken for granted. Nevertheless, I think that even in the social sciences, there are 
contexts in which non-epistemic interests play much the same roles as they play in 
technological science. 
Consider, for instance, contexts in which an external party (e.g., a government body) 
consults social scientists as scientific advisors on how to realize certain non-epistemic 
social goals (e.g., to reduce crime rates). In order to develop decent scientific advice, the 
consulted scientists will use scientific explanations of the relevant social phenomena. If 
the relevant non-epistemic goal is, say, to reduce crime rates, then they will build on 
explanations of current crime rates. But not every kind of explanation will be equally 
helpful. For instance, if the purpose is to implement a policy that leads to lower crime 
rates, then an explanation in terms of unemployment rates is much more useful than a 
psychological explanation in terms of individual biographies. The social scientists will 
then focus on those explanations which are most helpful. They favor such explanations 
on the ground that they are most useful for the non-epistemic goal on which they have 
to give scientific advice. 
Let me now turn to the question whether social scientists should be allowed to use 
non-epistemic interests as stand-alone reasons in decisions concerning the acceptance 
of explanations. My answer is that this should be allowed. For instance, if social 
scientists are consulted to develop decent scientific advice on how to reduce crime 
rates, then they are allowed to accept an explanation of current crime rates on the 
ground that it is most useful for the non-epistemic goal to reduce crime rates. Such a 
direct influence of non-epistemic goals on the acceptance of explanations leads to an 
optimal realization of the relevant non-epistemic goals, and therefore, it should be 
allowed. 
In order to further support this view, consider two ways in which the opposite view 
(i.e. that a direct influence of non-epistemic interests on the acceptance of explanations 
should not be allowed in the social sciences) could be developed. Firstly, one can start 
from a distinction between the decision whether or not one accepts an explanation, and 
the decision how good/adequate an accepted explanation is, assuming that non-
epistemic interests are only allowed to have a direct influence on decisions of the latter 
kind, and not on decisions of the former kind. Decisions of the former kind should be 
based solely on the accuracy of the explanation. 
Perhaps the easiest way to challenge such a position is on the basis of Pettit’s view on 
rational-choice explanation (see above). As we have seen, Pettit holds that rational 
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choice theory rests on an implausible presupposition, namely, that people are self-
regarding. Suppose, in line with this view, that social scientists have developed a 
rational-choice explanation of a social phenomenon which presupposes that people are 
self-regarding with respect to this phenomenon, and that this presupposition is shown 
to be inaccurate, in the sense that we have evidence which demonstrates that people 
are not self-regarding with respect to the relevant phenomenon. If accuracy would then 
be the only criterion that is allowed to guide decisions on the acceptance of 
explanations in the social sciences, then the scientists’ conclusion would have to be that 
they do not accept the rational-choice explanation. 
But, as Pettit has shown, even though rational choice theory rests on an implausible 
presupposition, rational-choice explanations can still be highly useful to explain the 
resilience of social phenomena. Suppose this also applies to the case at hand: although 
the rational-choice explanation is inaccurate, it is still adequate to explain the resilience 
of the relevant social phenomenon. So in a context in which one is interested in the 
question why this phenomenon is resilient under possible disturbance or drift, the 
rational-choice explanation can be a good, fully adequate answer. Therefore, I think that 
social scientists should be allowed to accept the rational-choice explanation, despite its 
inaccuracy. This shows that in deciding whether or not to accept an explanation, social 
scientists should be permitted to look at more than the accuracy of the explanation. 
This brings us to a second version of the idea that social scientists should not be 
allowed to use non-epistemic interests as stand-alone reasons for accepting an 
explanation. This version states that in motivating decisions on the acceptance of 
explanations, social scientists are allowed to use other values besides accuracy, such as 
adequacy, efficiency, and appropriateness. The idea is that these values are epistemic 
values, and that decisions on the acceptance of explanations should be made solely on 
the basis of such epistemic values; non-epistemic interests should not directly influence 
such decisions. The view under consideration does allow non-epistemic interests to 
indirectly influence such decisions, since the values of adequacy, efficiency, and 
appropriateness are linked to non-epistemic interests, as we have seen above. 
But once we acknowledge this, it no longer makes sense to prohibit a direct influence 
of non-epistemic interests on the acceptance of explanations. Let me explain. The view 
under consideration allows the following indirect interest influence. One of the reasons 
that a social scientist uses to motivate the acceptance of an explanation e is that he 
considers e highly adequate, and he considers e highly adequate because e serves the 
non-epistemic goal it is supposed to serve very well. This seems to come down to the 
same thing as using the judgment that e serves the relevant non-epistemic goal very 
well as a reason, in itself (not via the value of adequacy), to motivate the acceptance of e. 
The latter involves a direct influence of a non-epistemic interest on the acceptance of 
an explanation. As it comes down to the same thing as the indirect influence, it does not 
make sense to allow the indirect influence but not the direct influence. 
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5.2 Biology 
Now consider a second discipline: biology. Ingo Brigandt (2013) endorses different 
kinds of pluralism in biology. The first states that in the field of biology, different 
explanations may be of a different type. Brigandt distinguishes two types of 
explanation: mathematical explanation and causal-mechanistic explanation. In 
mathematical explanations, individual phenomena are explained as being instances of 
quantitative generalizations. Such explanations can be found in evolutionary biology 
and ecology. He states that “[m]athematical models in these fields typically represent 
the dynamics of biological systems, such as change in gene frequencies, the size and 
structure of populations, or the geographical distribution of several species” (Brigandt 
2013, p. 73). Causal-mechanistic explanations, on the other hand, account for 
phenomena in terms of mechanisms. A mechanism consists of “several entities, often 
different kinds of entities, and their causal interactions, such as mechanical or chemical 
interactions” (Brigandt 2013, p. 73). In a causal-mechanistic explanation, the outcome 
state of a token mechanism or the type of behavior that is regularly produced by a type 
of mechanism, is explained by a scientific representation of relevant aspects of the 
mechanism. Causal-mechanistic explanations are, according to Brigandt, widespread in 
physiology, developmental biology, and molecular biology (Brigandt 2013, p. 73). 
A second, broader kind of pluralism that Brigandt mentions is the view that “biology 
is characterized by and in fact needs a plurality of methods, theories, and explanatory 
perspectives, as opposed to a unique and overarching approach” (Brigandt 2013, p. 78). 
The idea is that biology consists of a diversity of fields and theoretical approaches (e.g., 
evolutionary biology, physiology, developmental biology) because reduction to one 
fundamental field (e.g., molecular biology) is impossible. Moreover, even within one 
field, different concepts, methods, modes of reasoning, and explanatory approaches are 
required (Brigandt 2013, p. 78). 
Both kinds of pluralism can be defended on the ground that different kinds of 
explanation/theoretical approaches are needed to explain different phenomena. But 
one can also argue, as Brigandt does, that “different explanatory frameworks may be 
used for a single phenomenon, because there are different legitimate explanatory aims 
and questions that different scientists can pursue in the study of the phenomenon” 
(Brigandt 2013, p. 88). The idea is that different explanatory frameworks are needed to 
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satisfy the different explanatory aims that motivate and guide research on the 
phenomenon.2 
The different explanatory frameworks that are legitimate to approach a certain 
phenomenon in biology may be complementary, but this is not necessarily the case. It is 
possible that different legitimate explanatory models make conflicting claims about a 
phenomenon (Brigandt 2013, p. 88). Let me clarify this. 
Explanations in biology often make idealizations by abstracting away from certain 
aspects of the phenomenon to be explained. They focus on the most important aspects 
of this phenomenon and leave out irrelevant details. The purpose of idealization is to 
make the situation represented less complex, and to permit quantitative models that 
are mathematically more tractable. An example is the assumption of some models in 
population genetics that populations consist of an infinite number of organisms (even 
though actual populations are finite), which is made for the sake of mathematical 
simplicity (Brigandt 2013, pp. 82-83). 
Whether a certain idealization is legitimate depends on the aim that the explanation 
is supposed to serve. An explanation should pick out those factors that are relevant for 
this aim, and it is allowed to ignore empirical details that are irrelevant for this aim 
(Brigandt 2013, p. 83). So if empirical fact f is relevant for explanatory aim a1, but not for 
explanatory aim a2, then ignoring f is legitimate with respect to a2, but illegitimate with 
respect to a1. Suppose then that we have two explanations of a certain phenomenon p, 
one which refers to f and satisfies aim a1, and one which makes an idealization that 
conflicts with f and satisfies aim a2. As both explanations satisfy a certain explanatory 
aim (a1 and a2 respectively), they are both legitimate explanations of p, even though 
they make incompatible claims with respect to f. Brigandt gives the following example 
to illustrate this idea: 
 
For example, descriptions in developmental biology break the development of a 
model organism species into normal stages (e.g., molt-to-molt intervals in insects). 
While this is useful for explaining development, the distinct explanatory aim of 
accounting for the evolution of development may require a different 
representational framework because developmental biology’s normal stages obscure 
natural variation in development, phenotypic plasticity, and the way in which 
developmental stages are created and transformed in evolution (Love 2009, 2010, this 
issue). Explaining the development of a species and explaining the evolution of this 
 
                                                     
2 This pragmatic argument for the need of different explanatory frameworks in biology is also offered by Steel 
(2004, p. 67). For a pragmatic defense of the view that mechanistic explanations (i.e. explanations in terms of 
the underlying mechanism) and inferential explanations (i.e. explanations in terms of generalizations from 
which the explanandum can be inferred) are both legitimate in biology, see Gervais & Weber (2013). 
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species’ development are two different explanatory aims about the same empirical 
object, and different representations of this object are needed to meet the respective 
aims. (Brigandt 2013, p. 83) 
 
The explanatory aims guiding research in biology that Brigandt has in mind seem to 
be epistemic; one wants to know something about a certain phenomenon and this 
epistemic interest determines how the phenomenon is to be explained and which 
idealizations are legitimate. But non-epistemic interests can play in research contexts in 
biology as well. In chapter 1, I already mentioned that the Human Genome Project was 
(partly) justified on the basis of the expectation that it would serve the non-epistemic 
interest to more effectively cope with certain diseases (see section 1.2.1). Other non-
epistemic interests that can play in biology are the desire to change certain properties 
of certain organisms (e.g., via breeding or genetic modification), the desire to have more 
effective tools for improving animal health and well-being, the desire to anticipate 
biological events, etc. There are different ways in which such non-epistemic interests 
can be present in research contexts in biology. For instance, an organization may 
financially support a certain biological research project because it expects this project 
to contribute to a certain non-epistemic aim, and the organization’s continued support 
may depend on how well the project meets this expectation. It is also possible that a 
biological scientist postulates a certain non-epistemic interest (e.g., contributing to 
animal health and well-being) as his personal goal, which drives his research (even 
though financial support of this research does not depend on how well the research 
serves this goal). 
The question is then: Should we allow such non-epistemic interests to have a direct 
influence on the acceptance of explanations in biology? In other words: Is it acceptable 
for biological scientists to use non-epistemic interests as stand-alone reasons for (not) 
accepting an explanation? I think it is. In deciding whether or not to accept an 
explanation, biological scientists should not use accuracy as the only criterion, because 
then they could not accept explanations which make inaccurate, but useful 
idealizations. Accordingly, they should be allowed to look at more than accuracy. My 
proposal is that they should be allowed to also consider how useful the explanation is 
for the interests it is supposed to serve, and this could include non-epistemic interests, 
as we have seen. The judgment that an explanation serves a certain non-epistemic 
interest very well can then be a stand-alone reason to motivate the decision to accept 
the explanation. This should be permitted because it leads to an optimal realization of 
the interests at play in the relevant research context. 
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5.3 The medical sciences 
A last discipline I will discuss in this chapter is the field of the medical sciences. De 
Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel (2010) distinguish between three kinds of explanation in 
the medical sciences: (non-reductive) macro-explanations, non-reductive micro-
explanations, and reductive micro-explanations. A macro-explanation refers to a 
property that all members of a group have in common, but which is external to the 
individuals in the group, in the sense that if an individual leaves the group and joins the 
other group, he will no longer possess the property. A micro-explanation, on the other 
hand, refers to differences among individuals within a group. While a non-reductive 
micro-explanation refers to the behavior, lifestyle, habits, etc. of these individuals, a 
reductive micro-explanation refers to properties that require parsing an individual in 
terms of his or her biological make-up rather than externally observable characteristics 
and behaviors (De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel 2010, pp. 373-374). 
De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel illustrate these three kinds of explanation on the 
basis of the example of skin cancer. An example of a macro-explanation is then the 
following. In a group of Belgians spending their summer holidays each year in the 
Mediterranean, the incidence of skin cancer is higher than in a group of Belgians 
staying in Belgium during the summer holidays, because the exposure to sun rays is 
higher in the former group. If, on the other hand, we explain differences in the 
development of skin cancer among people exposed to a high amount of sun rays each 
year, by the fact that some have the habit of using suntan lotion while others do not, we 
offer a non-reductive micro-explanation. If we explain the fact that some of the Belgians 
spending their holidays in the Mediterranean develop skin cancer despite using suntan 
lotion, by referring to genes which make them more susceptible than others to risk 
factors such as excessive exposure to sun rays, then we offer a reductive micro-
explanation (De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel 2010, pp. 373-374). 
Which kind of explanation is best to explain a medical condition depends on the 
interests that the explanation ought to serve. As De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel (2010, 
p. 388) show, different interests lead to different explanation-seeking questions, and 
these require different kinds of explanation. Interests that motivate the request for 
non-reductive explanations are the following: the desire to have long-term rather than 
short-term solutions to health issues, the desire to have more efficient strategies for the 
prevention of disease at the population/policy level, the desire to provide whole 
societies with help rather than only those individuals that are able to afford healthcare, 
the desire to improve people’s health in general rather than tackling each single health 
problem separately when it arises, and the desire to reduce the society’s costs for 
healthcare. All of these interests are non-epistemic interests for which non-reductive 
explanations are most useful. There is also an epistemic interest for which non-
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reductive explanations are useful: the interest in a more complete understanding of the 
development of human disease (De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel 2010, p. 381). 
To have a more complete understanding of the development of human disease, we 
also need reductive explanations. Hence, reductive explanations are useful for the latter 
epistemic interest as well. Other epistemic interests that reductive explanations serve, 
are the desire to diagnose disease and the desire to predict disease development and 
disease progress at the individual level. Knowing from which disease a person suffers 
and how it will develop and progress is useful for timely intervention. This means that 
reductive explanations also serve the non-epistemic interest to intervene in time. 
Another non-epistemic interest that reductive explanations serve is the desire to have 
easy and efficient treatments for diseased individuals (De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel 
2010, p. 381). Finally, reductive explanations can help one develop a lucrative solution to 
a health problem (e.g., a patentable pill) (De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel 2010, p. 383).3 
Hence, they serve the financial interests of medical innovators. All of these epistemic 
and non-epistemic interests can motivate medical innovators to pursue a reductive 
explanation of a medical condition. 
What does this say about the roles of non-epistemic interests in the medical sciences? 
We have seen that there is a variety of health-related non-epistemic interests that are 
served by explanations in this field: the desire to have long-term solutions to health 
issues, the desire to have efficient strategies for the prevention of disease at the 
population/policy level, the desire to have easy and efficient treatments for certain 
health conditions at the individual level, etc. These interests can play in research 
contexts in the medical sciences. A medical scientist can for instance regard 
contributing to one of these non-epistemic interests as his personal goal, which guides 
his research. Non-epistemic interests can also be present in a more structural way, e.g., 
when a research project in medical science is supported on the ground that it is 
expected to contribute to a certain non-epistemic aim, and when continued support 
depends on how well the project meets this expectation. 
The following question arises: Where such non-epistemic interests are present in 
research contexts in the medical sciences, should they be allowed to directly influence 
decisions on the acceptance of explanations? I think they should. For instance, if a 
medical scientist aims to contribute to the development of an easy and efficient 
 
                                                     
3 De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel (2010, p. 383) refer to patentability in the context of the question to what 
extent unjustified interests guide research and practice towards a reductive approach. They do, however, not 
clarify why the interest in a patentable explanation and remedy is unjustified, while other interests are 
justified. Why are the health interests of (potential) patients allowed to play a role in explanatory contexts, 
but an innovator’s interest in a patentable explanation and remedy not? Since I do not see how the former 
interests are justified, contrary to the latter, I drop the justified/unjustified distinction. 
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treatment for a certain medical condition at the individual level, and a certain reductive 
explanation of the condition is most useful for this non-epistemic aim, then he should 
be allowed to use this as a stand-alone reason to accept the explanation (instead of, e.g., 
searching for other factors to explain the condition). I consider such behavior 
acceptable because it contributes to an optimal realization of the relevant non-
epistemic aim. Accordingly, direct influences of non-epistemic interests on the 
acceptance of explanations should be permitted in the medical sciences. 
I would even go a step further and state that reasons which are based on certain non-
epistemic interests should in principle be allowed to overrule reasons concerning the 
accuracy of the explanation. If an explanation rests on an assumption which is shown to 
be inaccurate, then this can be a reason to not accept the explanation. But if the 
inaccuracy is irrelevant for the non-epistemic aim that the explanation is supposed to 
serve, and if a more accurate explanation would only be more complex and therefore 
less useful for this aim, then the explainer should be allowed to accept the explanation 
in its current form, despite the inaccuracy. The argument that the explanation should 
not be accepted because it is inaccurate is then overruled by the argument that it should 
be accepted because it is most useful for a certain non-epistemic aim. Allowing such 
behavior facilitates the realization of certain valuable non-epistemic goals, of which 
there are plenty for the medical sciences, as we have seen. Therefore, I think we should 
allow such behavior in the medical sciences. 
5.4 Implications 
The previous chapters show that direct influences of non-epistemic interests on the 
acceptance of explanations should be allowed in technological science. As indicated in 
the introduction of this chapter, this finding undermines the partial ideal of purity. 
More specifically, it challenges the theses that direct influences of non-epistemic 
interests on theory acceptance are unacceptable in science, and that such influences 
must be eliminated. Some may, however, cling to the ideal of purity by stating that the 
partial ideal of purity is only shown to be untenable as an ideal for technological 
science, but not as an ideal for other scientific disciplines. In the current chapter, I have 
attacked this view by arguing that direct influences of non-epistemic interests on the 
acceptance of explanations should also be allowed in the social sciences, in biology, and 
in the medical sciences. Therefore, I think we should reject the partial ideal of purity as 
an ideal for science in general. 
Instead of further clinging to the ideal of purity by finding new ways to save parts of 
it, I think that it is better to fully abandon this ideal. Part 1 shows that its main 
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assumptions are problematic, and once these assumptions are rejected, I see no reason 
to further hold on to it. In light of the many different kinds of interest influences 
considered in chapters 2-5, we should accept the fact that non-epistemic interests form 
an integral part of reasoning within scientific research. Their influence on scientific 
decisions is not something that we should necessarily be suspicious about. 
This insight contains an important lesson for part 2 of this dissertation. Part 2 aims to 
contribute to the task of distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable interest influences 
in science. As indicated in the introduction, the influence of interests can sometimes be 
troublesome in science. To illustrate this, I offered the example of the Vioxx case, in 
which the influence of Merck’s short-term financial interests on the research process is 
clearly problematic. Now, it may be tempting to explain this problem by stating that 
non-epistemic interests such as Merck’s financial interests are external to scientific 
research, and that they are not allowed to play a role in it. Because they did play a role 
in the research on Vioxx, so the reasoning goes, their influence is problematic. 
But this line of reasoning rests on a false presupposition, i.e. that non-epistemic 
interests should not play a role within scientific research. I have shown that non-
epistemic interests form an integral part of scientific research. Hence, the fact that non-
epistemic interests affected the research on Vioxx is in itself not sufficient to conclude 
that an unacceptable interest influence occurred in this case. We need new criteria to 
determine when exactly the influence of non-epistemic interests on the research 
process is problematic and when it isn’t. The next part aims to develop one such 
criterion, namely, a criterion to determine when interest influences in science are 
epistemically problematic. 
 
  
Part 2  
EPISTEMIC INTEGRITY 
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Chapter 6  
Developing a concept of epistemic integrity1 
Perhaps the most obvious criterion to determine whether an interest influence in 
science is epistemically problematic, is to check whether or not it hinders the 
advancement of scientific knowledge; if it does then it is epistemically problematic, and 
if it doesn’t then it is not epistemically problematic. But this is not a very satisfying 
criterion. For instance, if a brilliant scientist decides to end his career in order to focus 
on his family life, then his family-related interests prevent him from making new 
valuable contributions to the body of scientific knowledge. In that way, these interests 
hinder the advancement of scientific knowledge. It seems, however, strange to conclude 
that therefore the influence of the scientist’s family-related interests is epistemically 
problematic. The decision to stop doing science does not seem to be an epistemic failing, 
and so it is not because certain interests cause such a decision, that their influence is 
epistemically problematic. With the notion of epistemically problematic interest 
influences, I aim to capture more disturbing interest influences; interest influences 
which hinder the advancement of knowledge in more disturbing ways. Hence, I need an 
alternative criterion to determine when exactly an interest influence is epistemically 
problematic. In this chapter, a new concept of epistemic integrity, which can function as 
such a criterion, is developed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 In this chapter, I pave the way for and present a new concept of epistemic integrity. This concept differs 
from the concept of epistemic integrity developed in De Winter & Kosolosky (2013a, 2013b). I distance myself 
from the latter concept because I learned that it has an important shortcoming. This shortcoming is discussed 
in section 6.4.2. In section 6.7.2, I show that the new concept of epistemic integrity does not have this 
shortcoming. 
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 Ethical Epistemological 
Agents 
Moral integrity of scientists and 
their institutions 
Epistemic integrity of scientists and 
their institutions 
Behavior 
Moral integrity of the research 
process 
Epistemic integrity of the research 
process 
Table 6.1 Four kinds of scientific integrity. 
6.1 Four kinds of scientific integrity 
Let me start by distinguishing four kinds of scientific integrity, in order to clarify 
which specific kind I will try to explicate (and which kinds I will not try to explicate). 
There are at least four categories of concepts of scientific integrity. These categories can 
be distinguished along two dimensions (see table 6.1). The first dimension is the 
distinction between ethical and epistemological concepts. Ethical concepts focus on the 
moral good. The moral good is here understood as the good in general, that is, the good 
in light of all considerations (epistemological considerations, sociocultural 
considerations, economic considerations, etc.). Ethical concepts of scientific integrity 
aim to capture what is required for science to be in accordance with this general good. 
Epistemological concepts, on the other hand, focus on the epistemic good. The 
epistemic good is what is good in light of epistemological considerations, that is, what is 
good for the purpose of generating knowledge. Epistemological concepts of scientific 
integrity try to indicate what is required for science to be adequate for this purpose.2 
The second dimension is the distinction between concepts that focus on agents and 
those that focus on behavior. Concepts of scientific integrity that focus on agents try to 
capture the integrity of the agents that participate in the research process, such as 
scientists and scientific institutions. Concepts of scientific integrity that focus on 
behavior, on the other hand, aim to describe the integrity of the research process itself, 
rather than of the agents participating in it. A research process is then understood as a 
set of behaviors that constitute a research project, including the research activities that 
are part of this project as well as the communication of the results of these activities.3 
 
                                                     
2 This distinction between ethical and epistemological concepts of scientific integrity is inspired by Resnik’s 
(1996) discussion on the connection between research ethics and epistemology. 
3 For a list of different activities that could be part of a research process, see PSRCR (1992, pp. 17-18). 
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On the basis of these two dimensions, four kinds of scientific integrity can be 
distinguished: (1) the moral integrity of scientists and their institutions, (2) the moral 
integrity of the research process, (3) the epistemic integrity of scientists and their 
institutions, and (4) the epistemic integrity of the research process (see table 6.1). The 
focus here is on the latter kind: I aim to develop a concept of epistemic integrity of the 
research process. Such a concept will enable us to identify epistemically problematic 
interest influences. More specifically, the idea is that the influence of an interest on the 
research process is epistemically problematic if the interest compromises the epistemic 
integrity of the research process. 
Three remarks are in place. Firstly, by distinguishing four kinds of scientific integrity, 
I do not mean to say that they are unrelated; there can be certain links between the 
different kinds of scientific integrity. One can, for instance, characterize epistemic 
integrity as a component of moral integrity. The idea could then be that having (the 
highest degree of) epistemic integrity is necessary but not sufficient for an agent or 
research process to have (the highest degree of) moral integrity, as moral integrity also 
has other components in addition to epistemic integrity. Furthermore, concepts that 
focus on agents can be linked to concepts that focus on behavior. One can, for example, 
define the (moral or epistemic) integrity of the research process in terms of the (moral 
or epistemic) integrity of the agents involved in it. This is in accordance with virtue 
theories in ethics and epistemology: in virtue ethics, the moral properties of a behavior 
are explained in terms of the properties of the agent performing the behavior, and in 
virtue epistemology, the normative properties of a cognitive performance are explained 
in terms of the properties of the cognizer (Greco & Turri 2013).4 Here, I do not wish to 
make any presuppositions on how the different kinds of scientific integrity are exactly 
related to each other. I only want to note that they need not be strictly separated. 
Secondly, I want to clarify why I characterize the research process as a process which 
does not only include certain research activities, but also the communication of the 
results of these activities. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is useful to think of 
research and the communication of its results as one whole, instead of regarding them 
as distinct behaviors which should be evaluated separately. This enables me to make 
abstraction of which part of the research process I regard as problematic in a certain 
case. Consider, for instance, a process in which (1) data are made up, and (2) these data 
are presented as if they resulted from genuine empirical research. This process is 
obviously problematic. There are two ways to account for this. The first is to state that if 
data were made up, then one should not present them as if they resulted from genuine 
 
                                                     
4 A specific example of a virtue epistemological approach to the notion of epistemic integrity of the research 
process is discussed in section 6.6. 
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empirical research. The second is to state that if one will present data as if they resulted 
from genuine empirical research, then one should not make them up. So how one 
accounts for the view that the process consisting of (1) and (2) is problematic, depends 
on which part one takes for granted; (1) or (2). Since the statement ‘the process 
consisting of (1) and (2) is problematic’ is compatible with both accounts, it makes 
abstraction of which part of the process is problematic. This is useful for the purpose of 
this dissertation because I just want a concept which enables us to determine whether 
or not a certain interest influence on the research process is epistemically problematic; 
I do not need to specify which part of the research process is problematic due to this 
interest influence. 
Thirdly, I should mention that I wish to characterize epistemic integrity as a property 
that comes in degrees: a research process can have a higher or lower degree of 
epistemic integrity. We can then say, for instance, that a research process in which both 
the recording of data and the reporting of the recorded data are sloppy, has lower 
epistemic integrity than a research process in which only the recording of data is 
sloppy, and that the latter research process has lower epistemic integrity than a 
research process in which neither the recording of data nor the reporting of the 
recorded data is sloppy. Accordingly, what I will try to define in the remainder of this 
chapter is the degree of epistemic integrity of the research process. When I say that an 
interest compromises the epistemic integrity of the research process, then I mean that 
it causes the degree of epistemic integrity of this process to decrease. By the ideal of 
epistemic integrity, I mean the ideal that scientific research processes have the highest 
degree of epistemic integrity. 
6.2 Integrity as purity 
6.2.1 Definition 
In order to develop a concept of epistemic integrity of the research process, let us 
start from the etymological roots of the term ‘integrity’. It stems from the Latin word 
‘integritās’, which is related to the word ‘integer’, meaning an indivisible whole. The 
Latin word ‘integer’ is in turn probably related to ‘in’ and ‘tegere’, or ‘in’ and ‘tangere’, 
which stands for ‘not’ ‘touch’. Accordingly, what has integrity is untouched, 
uncorrupted, pure (Kasulis 2002, p. 25). In other words, having integrity means “being 
able to stand alone, having a self-contained identity without dependence on, or 
infringement by, the outside” (Kasulis 2002, p. 53). Stéphanie Ruphy’s definition of the 
epistemic integrity of science is in accordance with these etymological roots: she 
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defines the epistemic integrity of science as “its capacity to screen out the influence of 
contextual values on its content” (Ruphy 2006, p. 190).5 
Inspired by these characterizations of (epistemic) integrity, we arrive at the 
following definition of the degree of epistemic integrity of the research process: 
 
EIR1 The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the degree to 
which the research process is untouched by the outside. 
 
The underlying idea of this definition is that there are certain factors which are external 
to the research process, such as the financial interests of those involved in it, the social 
goals it is supposed to serve, etc. It is assumed that these factors should not affect the 
research process; this process should be directed by internal factors (e.g., epistemic 
goals, empirical evidence) only. Whenever external factors do have an impact on the 
research process, the epistemic integrity of this process is damaged according to EIR1 
(in the sense that the research process does not have the highest degree of epistemic 
integrity). 
6.2.2 Criticism 
This view corresponds with the full ideal of purity, which states that scientific 
research should be detached from the non-epistemic interests of certain stakeholders. 
In part 1 of this dissertation, we have seen that non-epistemic interests, including 
financial interests and social interests, form an integral part of scientific research. This 
means that the underlying idea of EIR1 is problematic. Non-epistemic interests such as 
financial interests and social interests are not external to the research process. They 
influence research in a variety of ways, and their influence should be allowed, as we 
have seen. Since EIR1 is based on a problematic inside/outside distinction, I reject EIR1. 
 
                                                     
5 For more on Ruphy’s view, see section 2.1. 
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6.3 Honesty and verifiability 
6.3.1 Definition 
Perhaps a more satisfying definition can be found in the literature on research 
integrity and the responsible conduct of research. One of the most commonly used 
definitions of research integrity is the one proposed by the Panel on Scientific 
Responsibility and the Conduct of Research (PSRCR) in 1992. It defines the integrity of 
the research process as “the adherence by scientists and their institutions to honest and 
verifiable methods in proposing, performing, evaluating, and reporting research 
activities” (PSRCR 1992, p. 17). If we use this idea as the basis for a definition of the 
degree of epistemic integrity of the research process, we get: 
 
EIR2 The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the degree to 
which scientists and their institutions adhere to honest and verifiable 
methods in processing, performing, evaluating, and reporting research 
activities. 
6.3.2 Criticism 
A problem for this definition is that it cannot account for certain unintentional 
infringements of epistemic integrity. Take, for instance, the fact that pharmaceutical 
companies sometimes use inadequate doses of comparator drugs in active-controlled 
trials (Reiss 2010, p. 432). Of course, they can do this on purpose, to make their own drug 
appear relatively more effective. They are then acting dishonestly and so the epistemic 
integrity of the research process is damaged according to EIR2. But they can also do it 
unintentionally, and that is where EIR2 comes into trouble. 
Suppose a company wants to test its new drug in an active-controlled trial. It 
determines the dose of the comparator drug on the basis of an old study. Because the 
company does not bother to look at the recent literature on the comparator drug, it 
does not know that the dose suggested in the old study is now considered inadequate by 
all experts on the matter. As a consequence, it uses a comparator drug dose that is 
generally considered inadequate. 
The reason why the company is being so sloppy in determining the dose of the 
comparator drug (in the sense that it does not consult the recent literature), is that it 
might benefit from holding a false belief on this matter. If it administers the comparator 
drug in an inadequate dose, then this increases the likelihood that its own drug turns 
out to be the more effective one. This could promote the sales of the company’s drug, 
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which would serve the company’s financial interests. In short: the fact that the company 
has an interest in getting the dose of the comparator drug wrong, causes it to be sloppy 
in determining this dose. 
We have the intuition that there is something epistemically worrying about such 
behavior,6 and an account of epistemic integrity should enable us to explain why it is 
epistemically worrying. Let us see whether EIR2 is adequate for this purpose. 
According to EIR2, epistemic integrity requires honesty and verifiability. So to find 
out whether epistemic integrity is damaged in the case at hand, we have to check 
whether the company is acting dishonestly or uses unverifiable methods. Firstly, the 
company is not acting dishonestly. Sure, the company could be said to deceive its 
audience by raising the false impression that the comparator drug is administered in 
the dose which is generally considered most adequate, but that does not entail 
dishonesty. The company truly believes that the dose used is generally considered most 
adequate. Therefore, the deceit is unintentional. Since dishonesty requires that there is 
an intent to deceive (Resnik 1998, p. 54), the company is not acting dishonestly. 
Secondly, there is also no reason to assume that the company’s methods are 
unverifiable. So according to EIR2, the epistemic integrity of the research process is not 
damaged in the case at hand. 
I consider this a problem for EIR2. The account of epistemic integrity I am looking for 
should entail that epistemic integrity is damaged in the case under consideration. The 
company should not have ignored the recent literature on the comparator drug, and the 
fact that it did is an epistemic failure. An account of epistemic integrity of the research 
process should enable us to explain why such negligence is an epistemic failure. Because 
EIR2 does not enable us to do so, I consider it inadequate. 
6.4 Deception 
6.4.1 Definition 
One way to deal with the ‘inadequate doses’ case is to consider deception in itself 
sufficient for epistemic integrity to be damaged, regardless of whether the deception is 
intended. In the ‘inadequate doses’ case, the pharmaceutical company raises the false 
 
                                                     
6 Also see Reiss (2010, p. 432): he characterizes the use of inadequate doses of comparator drugs in active-
controlled trials as one of the epistemic failures of biomedical research in the United States. 
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impression that the comparator drug is administered in the dose which is generally 
considered most adequate. We can think of such deception as an epistemic problem, 
even if the company did not have the intention to deceive. This leads us to the following 
definition: 
 
EIR3 The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the degree to 
which the information provided through the research process is non-
deceptive. 
 
A term in this definition that needs further clarification is the term ‘non-deceptive’. 
Non-deceptiveness is the inverse of deceptiveness. What, then, does it mean for 
information to be deceptive? 
Let us start with a standard definition, offered by the Oxford English Dictionary: 
 
D1 To deceive =df to cause to believe what is false. 
 
This definition has the following problem. Suppose x tells y: “I have bought a $100,000 
car”, which is a true statement. To make the story more impressive, y tells a third 
person z that “x has bought a $200,000 car”, and z believes y. Now, if x had not told y 
about his expensive car, then y would not have mentioned the car to z, and so z would 
not have falsely believed that x has bought a $200,000 car. So x has indirectly caused z to 
hold a false belief. This means that x has deceived z according to D1. This is a 
counterintuitive implication of D1: it seems that z is deceived by y, but not by x. 
One way to deal with this problem is to define deception in terms of the deceiver’s 
intentions, as some others have done (see Mahon 2008). But intentions are exactly what 
I am trying to avoid by focusing on non-deceptiveness instead of honesty (see above). 
Moreover, it seems that appearances or observations, which cannot have intentions, can 
deceive as well. Hence, I need an alternative for D1 that does not refer to intentions. I 
propose the following: 
 
D2 To deceive =df to provide information from which the audience can 
legitimately infer a false statement. 
 
This definition avoids the aforementioned problem of D1. In the example, z falsely 
believes that x has bought a $200,000 car. This statement can be legitimately inferred 
from the information provided by y (“x has bought a $200,000 car”), but not from the 
information provided by x (“I have bought a $100,000 car”). So D2 implies that z is 
deceived by y, but not by x. 
D2 allows me to specify EIR3: 
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EIR3’ The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the inverse of 
the degree to which the audience can legitimately infer false statements 
from the information provided through the research process.7 
 
If we apply this definition to the ‘inadequate doses’ case, we get the following. If a 
pharmaceutical company reports that the comparator drug in an active-controlled trial 
is administered in dose d, then it is legitimate for the audience to infer that d is the dose 
which is generally considered most adequate. The reason is that this corresponds with 
the normal course of affairs: the doses used in clinical trials are usually those which are 
generally considered most adequate. In the ‘inadequate doses’ case, there is a deviation 
from this normal course of affairs: the company administers the comparator drug in a 
dose d which is generally considered inadequate. So the statement that d is generally 
considered most adequate, is false in this particular case. Because the audience can 
legitimately infer a false statement from the company’s report, the epistemic integrity 
of the research process is damaged according to EIR3’. 
6.4.2 Criticism 
Unfortunately, EIR3’ is too demanding. Consider a fictional (but realistic) example. A 
scientist runs a large clinical trial in which part of the study population is given (the 
most adequate doses of) new test drug d1, and the other part is given (the most adequate 
doses of) competing product d2. The percentage of patients recovering from health 
condition C is significantly higher in the test group. The study leader concludes that d1 is 
more effective for treating C than d2. His audience legitimately infers from the study 
leader’s report that d1 is more effective for treating C than d2. Later, this claim is 
rejected; new tests suggest that the initial research results were due to coincidence, not 
to d1 actually being more effective than d2. It turns out that d1 is in fact less effective for 
treating C than d2. If EIR3’ is then applied to the initial research process, then the 
conclusion is that the epistemic integrity of that process was damaged, since the 
audience has legitimately inferred a false statement (i.e. that d1 is more effective for 
treating C than d2) from the information provided through that process. 
This is an undesirable implication of EIR3’. The history of science teaches us that 
statements which are at a certain time accepted as true, often turn out to be false 
afterwards. Think, for instance, of Isaac Newton and his followers: some of their 
conclusions are now taken to be false. We do, however, not consider this a reason to 
 
                                                     
7 This definition is a variant of the account of epistemic integrity presented in De Winter & Kosolosky (2013a, 
2013b). 
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regard their research as epistemically problematic, or to question the epistemic 
integrity of their work. Rather, fallibility seems a normal, inevitable aspect of the 
scientific pursuit of knowledge. We cannot expect from research that it never leads to 
false conclusions. But EIR3’ fosters such an expectation: it entails that the epistemic 
integrity of the research process is damaged whenever the audience can legitimately 
draw false conclusions from the information provided through that process. Therefore, I 
consider EIR3’ too demanding.8 
6.5 Adherence to standards 
6.5.1 Definition 
Maybe we should think of epistemic integrity in terms of adhering to certain 
standards. A definition of research integrity that is in accordance with this line of 
thought, has been proposed by Nicholas Steneck. He defines research integrity as  
“possessing and steadfastly adhering to professional standards, as outlined by 
professional organizations, research institutions and, when relevant, the government 
and public” (Steneck 2006, p. 56). Elsewhere, he defines integrity as “a measure of the 
degree to which researchers adhere to the rules or laws, regulations, guidelines, and 
commonly accepted professional codes and norms of their respective research areas” 
(Steneck 2002, p. 2). 
Before this is translated into a definition of the degree of epistemic integrity of the 
research process, I should make a distinction between two different kinds of 
professional standards in science: epistemic standards and non-epistemic standards. 
Epistemic standards are standards that are justified on the basis of epistemic interests. 
Scientific research aims at satisfying certain epistemic interests, and it has to meet 
certain standards in order to accomplish that purpose. Consider for example an active-
controlled trial which aims to reveal which of two drugs is most effective to treat a 
certain disease (= epistemic interest). In such a trial, we want the dose of the 
comparator drug to be determined in light of a decent literature study (rather than, say, 
on the basis of one old study), because we believe that research that meets this standard 
is more likely to provide genuine knowledge on which drug is most effective. Our 
interest in such knowledge justifies the standard. 
 
                                                     
8 This criticism on EIR3’ is inspired by comments from Hans Radder, Julian Reiss, and Maarten Van Dyck. 
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There are also standards for science that are not justified on the basis of epistemic 
interests, but only on other, non-epistemic grounds. Think for instance of standards 
relating to informed consent from research subjects, or standards concerning the 
ethical treatment of animals in experiments. Our reasons for endorsing such standards 
have nothing to do with the epistemic interests we want science to serve. Because such 
standards are not justified on epistemic grounds, I call them non-epistemic. 
Violations of non-epistemic standards do not conflict with the epistemic good (i.e. 
what is good for the purpose of generating knowledge). Therefore, an account of 
epistemic integrity of the research process should not require the adherence to non-
epistemic standards. So where Steneck’s definition refers to professional standards in 
general, a definition of the degree of epistemic integrity of the research process should 
only refer to epistemic standards. We get: 
 
EIR4 The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the degree to 
which the research process adheres to professional epistemic standards, as 
outlined by professional organizations, research institutions and, when 
relevant, the government and public. 
6.5.2 Criticism 
A problem for EIR4 is that deviating from established standards can sometimes be 
justified. Suppose a number of pharmaceutical companies join forces to create a 
professional organization with the task of outlining epistemic standards for biomedical 
research. This organization then sets extremely demanding standards for showing that 
a drug which is already on the market, has a serious adverse effect. So in order to accept 
that such a drug has a serious adverse effect, extremely strong evidence is needed. In 
that way, the organization prevents lucrative drugs from being taken off the market. 
The fact that keeping potentially dangerous drugs on the market may cause severe 
suffering among a lot of patients, does not bother the organization. It justifies the 
extremely demanding standards by stating that research that meets these standards is 
more likely to deliver genuine knowledge on whether or not the drug has the adverse 
effect under consideration. So the relevant standards are epistemic standards. 
Suppose, now, that a scientist has very good reasons to believe that drug d has 
serious adverse effect E. Although his evidence is very strong, it is, according to the 
standards established by the professional organization, not sufficiently strong to accept 
that d has adverse effect E. According to these standards, he should conclude that it is 
still insufficiently clear whether or not d has adverse effect E. But the scientist considers 
the established standards too demanding; they make it nearly impossible to show that a 
drug on the market has a serious adverse effect. He thinks that it is better for public 
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health and general well-being if weaker evidence, such as the evidence he gathered, is 
considered sufficient to conclude that d has adverse effect E. Accordingly, he concludes, 
on the basis of his evidence, that d has adverse effect E. 
As the scientist violates an epistemic standard that is established by a professional 
organization, EIR4 implies that the epistemic integrity of his research process is 
damaged. This is strange: if anything is questionable, then it is the professional 
organization’s standards, rather than the scientist’s research process. EIR4 cannot 
account for this; it takes established standards for granted. It characterizes any violation 
of established standards as damaging to epistemic integrity. But scientists should be free 
to question existing standards, and to violate them when they think they should, as the 
example shows. So if the concept of epistemic integrity of the research process is to 
function as an ideal for science (as I want it to), then it should not require strict 
adherence to established standards. Because EIR4 does require that, I reject it. 
6.6 Intelligent adherence to one’s convictions 
6.6.1 Definition 
An alternative way to develop an epistemological concept of the integrity of the 
research process, is to start from an epistemological concept of the integrity of agents. 
This is a virtue epistemological approach. In virtue epistemology, agents are the 
primary source of epistemic value and the primary focus of epistemic evaluation. 
Accordingly, a cognitive performance is evaluated on the basis of the properties of the 
cognizer (Greco & Turri 2013). Recently, Greg Scherkoske (2012) has discussed integrity 
as an epistemic virtue for persons.9 Let me explore whether that discussion can form the 
basis for an adequate definition of the degree of epistemic integrity of the research 
process. 
Scherkoske begins with the intuition that integrity requires that one sticks to one’s 
convictions in the face of disagreement and challenge, and that one holds one’s line in 
face of temptation to capitulate, ‘sell-out’ or backslide. In order to avoid that integrity 
amounts to obstinate, dogmatic adherence to whatever one happens to believe, 
 
                                                     
9 For other accounts of integrity as an intellectual/epistemic virtue for persons, see, e.g., Baehr (2011, p. 20), 
Cooper (1994, p. 464), and Zagzebski (1996, p. 162). These accounts can all be situated in the top right corner of 
table 6.1. The reason why I focus on Scherkoske (2012) is that I consider his account of integrity the most 
advanced virtue epistemological account of integrity, and most promising for the purpose of this dissertation. 
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Scherkoske states that “integrity requires that one’s convictions be responsive to 
relevant reasons bearing on the justifiability of those convictions” (Scherkoske 2012, p. 
186). So when an agent has a good reason to change one of his convictions, then he is 
allowed (and maybe even required) to do so; this does not compromise the agent’s 
integrity. 
This leads Scherkoske to propose three components of integrity: 
 
(a) The complex disposition to maintain and revise one’s convictions in epistemically 
responsible ways. The person of integrity is committed to holding and revising 
her convictions on the basis of good reasons. 
(b) Integrity involves a reflexive awareness of the quality of one’s judgment – one 
has a warranted appropriate regard for one’s competence to judge on a matter. In 
short, the person of integrity seeks to exhibit good judgment in her convictions: 
she would be disposed to hedge her convictions to the extent they failed by her 
lights to enjoy the support of good reasons; she would be disposed to strongly 
adhere to her convictions when they do enjoy the support of good reasons. 
(c) Integrity finds full expression in its practical and social dimensions: the 
convictions for which persons of integrity stand will (barring forms of 
irrationality) be expressed in their actions and deliberation. The reasons which 
support a person’s convictions are, at the same time, reasons for acting on those 
convictions – and reasons suited to offer to others when challenged, asked for 
advice or in conversation. (Scherkoske 2012, p. 199) 
 
These three components can be used as the basis for a definition of the degree of 
epistemic integrity of the research process: 
 
EIR5 The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the degree to 
which the agents involved in the research process manifest components (a), 
(b), and (c) within the research process. 
6.6.2 Criticism 
A problem for EIR5 is that it is not very exact. To illustrate this, let me analyze the 
‘inadequate doses’ case on the basis of component (a). In the ‘inadequate doses’ case, 
which dose of the comparator drug is most adequate is determined on the basis of one 
old study. The fact that the study suggests that a certain dose d is most adequate, is a 
good reason to believe that d is most adequate. But, on the other hand, the recent 
literature provides even better reasons against the belief that d is  most adequate, and 
this literature is ignored by the people at the company. Does this mean that these 
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people are not committed to holding and revising their convictions on the basis of good 
reasons, as component (a) requires? 
EIR5 requires that the agents involved in the research process manifest a 
commitment to hold and revise their convictions on the basis of good reasons (see 
component (a)), but it is not clear what such a commitment exactly consists of. Does is it 
require that one is not ignorant of certain reasons against one’s convictions, or is it 
sufficient that one’s convictions are responsive to the reasons one knows of? The 
answer to this question is not clear, and depending on how we answer it, the verdict for 
the ‘inadequate doses’ case is different. If we assume that the agents involved in the 
research process should only consider the reasons they know of, then there is no 
integrity failure in the ‘inadequate doses’ case, since the people at the pharmaceutical 
company do not know of the reasons provided by the recent literature, and so they do 
not have to take them into account. If, on the other hand, we assume that the 
commitment to hold and revise one’s convictions on the basis of good reasons also 
requires that one knows of certain reasons which are available in the relevant 
literature, then there is an integrity failure in the ‘inadequate doses’ case: because the 
people at the company are ignorant of the recently published reasons against their 
conviction that d is the most adequate dose of the comparator drug, they do not 
manifest the commitment to hold and revise their convictions on the basis of good 
reasons, and so the epistemic integrity of the research process is damaged according to 
EIR5. 
Because the account of epistemic integrity I am looking for should entail that 
epistemic integrity is damaged in the ‘inadequate doses’ case (see section 6.3.2), the 
latter approach is preferable over the former. But the latter approach is problematic as 
well. More specifically, the problem is that we cannot require from scientists that they 
always know of all reasons for and against their convictions presented in the relevant 
literature. Suppose there are a thousand writings on a certain topic. A scientist 
interested in the topic faces a dilemma: either he reads all of these writings, but then he 
does not have the time left to perform his own research, or he only reads part of them. 
He takes the latter option, after which he performs his own research. As the scientist 
does not read all relevant writings, he remains ignorant of certain reasons against his 
convictions that are available in the relevant literature. But here, the ignorance seems 
acceptable, and requiring that the scientist avoids it would not only be too demanding, 
but also inappropriate, since he would then not be able to perform his own research. 
In both the ‘inadequate doses’ case and the ‘thousand writings’ case, there is 
ignorance of certain reasons against one’s convictions. But in the one case it is 
problematic and in the other it is not. The question is then: How much ignorance is 
epistemically acceptable? Or, to put it in terms of epistemic integrity: When exactly 
does ignorance become a threat to the epistemic integrity of the research process? EIR5 
does not enable us to answer this question. This means that it does not enable us to 
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make a clear distinction between what is epistemically problematic and what is not. 
Hence, EIR5 is insufficiently exact for the purpose of this dissertation. 
6.7 Adherence to standards revisited 
6.7.1 Definition 
As all of the definitions of the degree of epistemic integrity of the research process 
considered so far have certain problems, let me propose a new definition, which I think 
avoids the disadvantages of the other accounts: 
 
EIR6 The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the degree to 
which the research process lives up to the epistemic standards that the 
audience can legitimately assume to be met in the research process. 
 
This definition is, just as EIR4, based on the idea that research processes must adhere to 
certain epistemic standards in order to have the highest degree of epistemic integrity. 
But contrary to EIR4, the epistemic standards to be adhered to are not established 
epistemic standards. Instead, research processes should adhere to the epistemic 
standards that the audience can legitimately assume to be met. Let me explain what I 
mean by this. 
When the results of research are reported to an audience (i.e. a group or individual to 
whom the research is communicated), this causes the audience to make certain 
assumptions about the epistemic standards that the research meets. These assumptions 
could be very vague or more specific. For instance, if a scientist reports that research 
shows that drug d1 is more effective than drug d2 for treating a certain health condition 
C, then the audience assumes that scientific research has been performed which 
delivers good, scientific reasons to believe that d1 is more effective than d2 for treating C. 
So the following epistemic standards are assumed to be met in the research process: (1) 
scientific research has been performed, and (2) this research delivers good, scientific 
reasons to believe that d1 is more effective than d2 for treating C. This is an example of a 
very vague assumption about the epistemic standards adhered to. But that does not 
imply that it could mean anything. (1) and (2) are for instance incompatible with 
flipping a coin to determine which of the two drugs is most effective. So if that would be 
what the scientist actually did, then he has violated the epistemic standards that the 
audience assumes to be met. 
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The audience can also have a more specific idea of the epistemic standards that are 
met. A specialized audience of biomedical scientists may for instance have a more 
precise view of what kind of empirical evidence would be needed to conclude that d1 is 
more effective than d2 for treating C, and it may assume that such empirical evidence 
has been gathered. A lay audience may, on the other hand, lack such a precise view. This 
indicates that one report could lead to different assumptions among different 
audiences. 
Different assumptions about epistemic standards could also be due to the fact that 
the same research is often reported differently to different audiences. While only the 
results are communicated to laypeople, a detailed report of the different steps of the 
research process is usually made available to the expert community. This leads to 
experts making much more precise assumptions about the epistemic standards that are 
met in the research process. 
Of all the assumptions that different audiences can make about the epistemic 
standards that a research process lives up to, I want to focus on those assumptions that 
can be made legitimately. Let me propose an account of what it means for such 
assumptions to be legitimate for a certain audience. I consider the assumption that 
research process p meets epistemic standard s legitimate for audience a if (1) those 
involved in the research process report or imply to a that p meets s, or (2) s is a common 
epistemic standard in the relevant field and those involved in the research process do 
not (clearly) report to a that p does not meet s. If one of these two conditions is fulfilled, 
then s is an epistemic standard which a can legitimately assume to be met in p. 
The simplest case is when those involved in the research process explicitly state that 
the research process meets a certain epistemic standard. It is then legitimate for the 
audience to whom this statement is communicated to assume that the relevant 
epistemic standard is met, because condition (1) is fulfilled. But it is also possible that 
those involved in the research process do not explicitly state that the research process 
lives up to a certain epistemic standard, but that they imply it. Suppose a scientist argues 
in a research report that the relevant research should by all means meet a certain 
epistemic standard s. He does not add the explicit statement that s is actually met in the 
reported research since that is obvious in light of his argument, and since the report 
does not include any reason to think otherwise. So in this case, the scientist does not 
directly report that his research adheres to s, but he does say it in an indirect way. By 
endorsing s as an epistemic standard that his research must definitely adhere to (and by 
not mentioning a failure to meet s), he implies that s is met in the reported research. It 
is then, on the basis of condition (1), legitimate for the reader of the report to assume 
this. 
Now consider condition (2), which concerns common epistemic standards. Common 
epistemic standards are here understood as epistemic standards that are generally 
accepted as standards which should (normally) be respected in the relevant research 
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areas. This includes standards such as those that EIR4 refers to: professional epistemic 
standards, as outlined by professional organizations, research institutions and, when 
relevant, the government and public. It also includes common reasoning standards 
(which are not necessarily made explicit by a professional organization or some other 
relevant actor). An example is the standard that if 75% of the respondents in a survey 
have answered “yes” to question q, and 25% have answered “no” to q, then the 
conclusion should not be that the majority of the respondents have answered “no” to q. 
This is a common epistemic standard in science (regardless of whether or not it is made 
explicit by a professional organization or some other relevant actor). 
The audience can legitimately assume that such common epistemic standards are 
met in a certain research process unless those involved in this process clearly 
communicate that this is not the case. That is the point of condition (2). Condition (2) 
implies that for common epistemic standards to be standards which the audience can 
legitimately assume to be met in a certain research process, it is not required that those 
involved in this process actively report or imply that these standards are met; it is 
sufficient that those involved in the research process do not report that these standards 
are violated. 
As indicated above, research is often reported differently to different audiences. 
Consequently, it is possible that there are epistemic standards that one audience can 
legitimately assume to be met in the research process, while another audience cannot 
legitimately make that assumption. In other words, different assumptions about 
epistemic standards may be legitimate for different audiences. In such cases, it is 
sufficient that there is one audience that can legitimately assume that a certain 
epistemic standard is met, for this to be a standard that the research process should live 
up to (in order to have the highest degree of epistemic integrity). Researchers should be 
straight about their epistemic standards to all audiences to which they report their 
results. So if one audience can, on the basis of what is reported to this audience, 
legitimately make a false assumption about the epistemic standards that are met in the 
research process, then this is sufficient for the epistemic integrity of the research 
process to be damaged. 
Finally, I should say something about the fact that epistemic integrity comes in 
degrees. A research process can have a higher or lower degree of epistemic integrity. 
This depends on the degree to which the research process lives up to the epistemic 
standards that the audience can legitimately assume to be met in it. If one such standard 
is violated, then epistemic integrity is damaged, in the sense that it is not optimal and 
that in principle it could be higher. But that does not mean that the research process 
has zero epistemic integrity. If the research process still meets plenty of other epistemic 
standards that the audience can legitimately assume to be met, then its epistemic 
integrity could still be very high. 
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A concrete measure of degrees of epistemic integrity is not yet available. It should be 
noted however that this does not mean that EIR6 is in its current form useless. In fact, I 
think that a concrete measure of degrees of epistemic integrity is not needed for EIR6 to 
be highly useful, as I hope to show in the remainder of this dissertation. More 
specifically, chapters 8-10 will reveal how EIR6 can lead to plenty of new insights into 
cases from scientific practice. 
6.7.2 Dealing with the criticisms 
In order to further clarify EIR6, I will now indicate how it deals with each of the 
criticisms on the other definitions of epistemic integrity of the research process 
discussed above. My criticism on EIR1 was that it starts from a problematic distinction 
between factors that are external to the research process (e.g., financial interests) and 
factors that are internal to the research process (e.g., epistemic goals, empirical 
evidence). EIR6 avoids this criticism because it does not presuppose such a distinction. 
EIR2 was rejected because it cannot adequately deal with the ‘inadequate doses’ case. 
Let me analyze that case on the basis of EIR6. In the ‘inadequate doses’ case, the 
following epistemic standard is violated: in determining the dose of the comparator 
drug in an active-controlled trial, one ought to check the relevant literature, that is, not 
just one old study but also recent publications on the comparator drug (if available). 
This epistemic standard, let us call it s1, is violated because the pharmaceutical company 
completely ignores the recent literature on the comparator drug. Whether this means 
that the epistemic integrity of the research process is damaged, depends, according to 
EIR6, on whether or not the audience can legitimately assume that s1 is met; if it can, 
then the research process does not live up to an epistemic standard that the audience 
can legitimately assume to be met, and so its epistemic integrity is damaged. 
In order to find out whether the audience can legitimately assume that s1 is met, we 
need to examine whether one of the two conditions of legitimacy (see section 6.7.1) is 
fulfilled. Since s1 is a common epistemic standard in biomedical science, the second 
condition of legitimacy would be fulfilled if the company would not clearly report that s1 
is violated. Let me show then that in the ‘inadequate doses’ case as I described it in 
section 6.3.2, the company does not report that s1 is violated. 
I described the violation of s1 as a strategy to promote the sales of a drug. Being 
sloppy in determining the dose of the comparator drug increases the likelihood that the 
comparator drug is outperformed by the test drug, and this result could help the 
company in getting the test drug sold. But this strategy only works if the audience does 
not know that the research is sloppy. If the audience would know that the company has 
violated a basic epistemic standard such as s1, then the favorable result would lose much 
of its persuasiveness. Accordingly, the result would lose much of its usefulness for 
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getting the test drug sold. Therefore, part of the strategy is to keep the violation of s1 
secret. 
So the company does not mention that s1, which is a common epistemic standard in 
biomedical science, is violated. This means that the second condition of legitimacy (see 
section 6.7.1) is fulfilled. Accordingly, it is legitimate for the audience to assume that s1 
is met in the research process. Because s1 is in fact not met, the research process does 
not live up to an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately assume to be 
met, and so its epistemic integrity is compromised according to EIR6. 
Now consider my criticism on EIR3’. I objected that EIR3’ is too demanding because it 
implies that research which accidentally leads to false conclusions (e.g., Newton’s 
research) is epistemically problematic. EIR6 does not have this implication. If research 
meets the epistemic standards that the audience can legitimately assume to be met, 
then its epistemic integrity is not damaged according to EIR6, even if the research leads 
to false conclusions. 
My objection against EIR4 was that it does not respect the freedom of scientists to 
question established standards, and to violate these standards where they think this is 
appropriate. EIR6 does respect that freedom. If a scientist disagrees with an established 
epistemic standard, then he is allowed to violate that standard. It is then important that 
he clearly reports that his research does not adhere to the standard under 
consideration. In that way, he ensures that neither the first nor the second condition of 
legitimacy (see section 6.7.1) is fulfilled, so that the audience cannot legitimately assume 
that the established standard is met.10 The violation of that standard does then not 
involve the violation of an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately 
assume to be met, and so it does not involve damage to the epistemic integrity of the 
research process (as defined by EIR6). In a nutshell: the violation of an established 
standard does not damage the epistemic integrity of the research process as long as one 
is clear and open about this violation.11 
 
                                                     
10 This does not imply that there are no other epistemic standards which the audience can legitimately assume 
to be met. The scientist may propose an alternative epistemic standard and claim that his research adheres to 
this standard. The audience can then legitimately assume that this alternative standard is met in the research 
process. Furthermore, it is possible that besides the established epistemic standard that the scientist disagrees 
with, there are plenty of other established epistemic standards, and it may be legitimate for the audience to 
assume that these other standards are still respected in the research process. In case there are no epistemic 
standards which the audience can legitimately assume to be met (which is very unlikely in actual scientific 
practice), the epistemic integrity of the research process is by definition not damaged, since damage to 
epistemic integrity requires the violation of an epistemic standard which the audience can legitimately 
assume to be met in the research process. 
11 Note that the issue here is not whether the research process is worthy of the term ‘scientific’. If the research 
process does not live up to certain established standards, then some may claim that it is not science. I do not 
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Some may object that this makes my concept of epistemic integrity too liberal. 
Suppose a researcher believes that the most reliable way to answer yes-no questions is 
by flipping a coin, with ‘heads’ meaning ‘yes’ and ‘tails’ meaning ‘no’. To him, the 
standard that one should answer yes-no questions in this way is an epistemic standard 
that research should adhere to. Suppose that he performs ‘research’ that meets this 
strange standard, and that he is clear and open about this and about the fact that his 
research does not meet common epistemic standards. EIR6 implies then that there is no 
damage to epistemic integrity. In light of this example, it seems that all possible 
epistemic standards must be permitted under EIR6, and so EIR6 seems to be much too 
liberal. 
My response to this objection is twofold. Firstly, not all possible standards are 
compatible with my ideal of epistemic integrity. Take, for instance, the standard that 
one should fabricate data and then present these data as if they result from decent 
empirical research. Call this standard s2. s2 conflicts with the common epistemic 
standard s3 that one should not fabricate data and then present these data as if they 
result from decent empirical research. If one clearly reports that the research process 
does not meet s3, then it is clear that certain data are fabricated. Thus, the data are then 
not presented as if they result from decent empirical research, and so s2 is violated. This 
shows that adhering to s2 requires keeping the violation of s3 secret. If the violation of s3 
is kept secret, then the audience can legitimately assume that s3 is met, since s3 is a 
common epistemic standard (which means that the second condition of legitimacy (see 
section 6.7.1) is fulfilled). So adhering to s2 implies (1) that the research process does not 
meet the common epistemic standard s3, and (2) that the audience can legitimately 
assume that the research process meets s3. This shows that adhering to s2 implies that 
the epistemic integrity of the research process is damaged. Therefore, s2 is incompatible 
with my ideal of epistemic integrity. 
Secondly, I admit that there are still a lot of possible standards that are compatible 
with this ideal, but this is a consequence of the fact that I want my concept of epistemic 
integrity to be independent of my personal beliefs on which standards have to be met in 
order to generate good, reliable knowledge. Different people have different beliefs on 
these matters. Even within the field of science, there are disagreements on which 
approaches lead to the best, most reliable knowledge (think, for instance, of 
disagreements on which values should be used in theory choice, and on how these 
values should be interpreted and weighed; see section 2.4). I want my concept of 
epistemic integrity to transcend such disagreements, so that arguments in which this 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contest such claims. My discussion is about the epistemic integrity of the research process, not about the 
demarcation of science from non-science. The latter is a different issue. 
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concept is used are compelling to people holding different beliefs on these matters. I 
want my concept of epistemic integrity to be acceptable even to people who disagree 
with me on which particular epistemic standards research should adhere to. The fact 
that this concept is very liberal with respect to epistemic standards should therefore be 
regarded as an advantage rather than a disadvantage of this concept. The concept 
captures the idea that, regardless of which particular epistemic standards a research 
process adheres to, it is important that there is clarity about these standards to the 
audience, so that each audience member can decide on its own how good or reliable it 
considers the relevant research process and the knowledge it delivers. 
Finally, consider my criticism on EIR5, which was that EIR5 is not sufficiently exact. 
In the next chapter, I will say something more about the exactness of EIR6 (see section 
7.3). Let me here briefly show that EIR6 enables us to answer the question ‘When exactly 
does ignorance become a threat to the epistemic integrity of the research process?’, a 
question which cannot be answered on the basis of EIR5, as we have seen. 
EIR6 suggests the following answer: ignorance is a threat to the epistemic integrity of 
the research process whenever the audience can legitimately assume that this 
ignorance has been avoided. This answer enables us to distinguish the ignorance in the 
‘inadequate doses’ case from the ignorance in the ‘thousand writings’ case (a distinction 
that cannot be made on the basis of EIR5, see section 6.6.2). In the ‘inadequate doses’ 
case, the audience can legitimately assume that the researchers have checked the 
relevant literature on the comparator drug, including some recent publications, in that 
way avoiding complete ignorance of what has been recently published. Because the 
researchers have in fact not checked any recent publications, the epistemic integrity of 
the research process is damaged according to EIR6. Things are different in the ‘thousand 
writings’ case. The standard that one should read all writings on a research topic even if 
it means that one does not have any time left to perform one’s own research on the 
topic, is not a common epistemic standard. So the second condition of legitimacy (see 
section 6.7.1) is not fulfilled. Consequently, if the scientist does not state or imply that 
he has read all writings on the relevant topic, then neither condition of legitimacy is 
fulfilled. The audience can then not legitimately assume that the scientist has checked 
all writings on the relevant topic. Accordingly, the fact that the scientist has not 
checked all writings on the relevant topic does not involve the violation of an epistemic 
standard that the audience can legitimately assume to be met. This explains why the 
scientist’s ignorance in the ‘thousand writings’ case does not threaten the epistemic 
integrity of the research process. 
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Chapter 7  
The four requirements of explication 
Now that I have shown that my criticisms on EIR1-EIR5 do not apply to EIR6, it is time 
to offer a more systematic, positive defense of EIR6. More specifically, I will argue that 
EIR6 provides a good explication of ‘the degree of epistemic integrity of the research 
process’. In order to do that, I start from Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of 
explication: 
 
If a concept is given as explicandum, the task consists in finding another concept as 
its explicatum which fulfils the following requirements to a sufficient degree. 
1. The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way that, in most 
cases in which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used; 
however, close similarity is not required, and considerable differences are permitted. 
2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its use (for instance, in 
the form of a definition), is to be given in an exact form, so as to introduce the 
explicatum into a well-connected system of scientific concepts. 
3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the formulation of 
many universal statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical 
theorems in the case of a logical concept). 
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as simple as the more 
important requirements (1), (2), and (3) permit. (Carnap 1950, p. 7) 
 
Carnap states that philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians make explications 
very frequently (Carnap 1950, p. 7). Following Weber, Van Bouwel & De Vreese (2013, 
Chap. 2), I wish to note however that the fruitfulness of explications (see third 
requirement) in the field of philosophy of science may not lie in their usefulness for 
formulating empirical generalizations (like scientific explications) and/or 
mathematical/logical theorems (like mathematical/logical explications). Rather, it lies 
in their usefulness for formulating clear guidelines for science, and for analyzing cases 
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from scientific practice. So in order to show that the concept defined by EIR6 is a good 
explicatum for ‘the degree of epistemic integrity of the research process’, I will argue 
that it meets the following conditions: (1) it is similar to our common sense notion of 
epistemic integrity of the research process, (2) it is exact, (3) it is fruitful, that is, useful 
for the development and justification of norms for science and for the analysis of cases 
from scientific practice, and (4) it is as simple as requirements (1), (2), and (3) permit. 
But first, let me explain for each of these conditions why it is important that my concept 
of epistemic integrity meets it. 
7.1 A justification of the four requirements 
The first requirement, similarity to the explicandum, is important because I want my 
concept of epistemic integrity to be adequate for elucidating common intuitions on 
epistemic integrity. In cases in which it is common sense that the epistemic integrity of 
the research process is damaged, threatened, promoted, etc., my concept of epistemic 
integrity should enable us to explain why we think this is the case. For instance, while it 
is common sense that short-term commercial interests compromised the epistemic 
integrity of the research process in the Vioxx case, a decent clarification of this 
common intuition is absent (see section 1.3). My concept of epistemic integrity should 
deliver the basis for such a clarification. It can only do that if it is more or less similar to 
our common sense notion of epistemic integrity of the research process; if the two 
would be totally different, then the concept would not be helpful to deal with common 
intuitions on epistemic integrity. Complete similarity is, however, not necessary, as we 
may be prepared to give up some of our common intuitions in light of new analyses. So 
my concept of epistemic integrity should be similar, but not necessarily identical to our 
common sense notion of epistemic integrity of the research process. This corresponds 
with the first requirement of explication. 
The second requirement of explication, exactness, is important because the 
application of inexact concepts is undetermined. I introduced the concept of epistemic 
integrity because it would enable us to identify epistemically problematic interest 
influences in the sciences. But if this concept would be inexact, then there would be 
cases in which it is not clear whether or not epistemic integrity is compromised. 
Accordingly, it would not always be clear whether or not an interest influence is 
epistemically problematic. Since my concept of epistemic integrity should provide a 
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clear-cut criterion to determine whether or not an interest influence in science is 
epistemically problematic,1 it should be as exact as possible. 
The concept should also meet the third requirement of explication: fruitfulness. Two 
kinds of fruitfulness can be distinguished: (1) general fruitfulness, i.e. usefulness for the 
development and justification of general norms for science, and (2) applied fruitfulness, 
i.e. usefulness for the analysis of particular cases from scientific practice. It is important 
that general norms for science, which indicate how scientific research must be 
organized and carried out, are adequately formulated and justified. It is also important 
that we analyze and evaluate particular cases from scientific practice in such a way that 
we draw the right lessons from these cases. Therefore, we need ideals for science which 
are adequate for these purposes. My concept of epistemic integrity is supposed to 
function as such an ideal. Accordingly, I want this concept to have both kinds of 
fruitfulness. 
The fourth requirement of explication, simplicity, is important mainly for practical 
reasons. The simpler the concept, the easier it is to explain this concept, to fully 
understand it, and to apply it to specific cases. As a concept becomes more complex, 
more effort is required to clarify its meaning and to analyze particular cases on the basis 
of this concept. This also makes the concept less attractive to others who might want to 
use it. Therefore, I prefer a concept that is as simple as the other three requirements of 
explication permit. 
7.2 Similarity to the explicandum 
In order to show that my concept of epistemic integrity fulfils the first requirement 
of explanation, I should argue that is (more or less) in accordance with common 
intuitions on epistemic integrity. In section 6.7.2, I have already analyzed several cases 
on the basis of this concept, showing that my concept of epistemic integrity does not 
have counterintuitive implications with respect to these cases. Let me here consider 
some additional cases. I start with two of the most obvious threats to epistemic 
integrity: fabrication and falsification. 
 
                                                     
1 I characterized epistemic integrity as a property that comes in degrees. That does not mean that it cannot be 
a clear-cut criterion to determine whether or not an interest influence in science is epistemically problematic. 
The influence of an interest on the research process is epistemically problematic if the interest causes the 
research process to have lower epistemic integrity. If the interest does not cause the epistemic integrity of the 
research process to be lower, then its influence on this process is not epistemically problematic. 
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Fabrication is “making up data or results and recording or reporting them” (Office of 
Science and Technology Policy 2000, p. 76262). When made up data are presented as if 
they were obtained through empirical research, then it is legitimate for the audience to 
assume that the research process adheres to the following epistemic standard s1: 
empirical research was performed and the data obtained through this research are 
reported. As the reported data were actually made up in the case of fabrication, s1 is not 
adhered to. The epistemic integrity of the research process is then damaged according 
to EIR6. 
But fabrication does not necessarily imply damage to epistemic integrity. Suppose a 
scientist makes up certain data in order to establish certain statistical or conceptual 
problems, and that he openly communicates that the data were not obtained through 
empirical research, but that they were made up. It is then not legitimate for the 
audience to assume that the research process adheres to s1, as it is clear from the 
scientist’s report that this is not the case. So here, the fact that the data were made up 
does not involve a violation of an epistemic standard which the audience can 
legitimately assume to be met, and so there is no reason to believe that the epistemic 
integrity of the research process is damaged. This analysis corresponds with common 
sense: fabrication only damages epistemic integrity if it is kept secret. 
Now consider falsification. Falsification is “manipulating research materials, 
equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research 
is not accurately represented in the research record” (Office of Science and Technology 
Policy 2000, p. 76262). So falsification occurs when (1) research materials, equipment, or 
processes are manipulated, or data or results are changed or omitted, and (2) the 
research report raises the impression that the research did not involve such 
manipulations, adjustments, or omissions. The epistemic standard that no such 
manipulations, adjustments, or omissions occurred is then an epistemic standard which 
the audience can legitimately assume to be met in the research process. Because this 
epistemic standard was actually not met, the epistemic integrity of the research process 
is damaged according to EIR6. This conclusion is in accordance with common sense. 
In order to further support the idea that my concept of epistemic integrity is similar 
to our common sense notion of epistemic integrity of the research process, let me 
consider some earlier uses of this notion, and see whether my concept does not have 
counterintuitive implications in those contexts. Unfortunately, the term ‘epistemic 
integrity’ is not a term that is frequently used. It seems to be used almost exclusively by 
philosophers, and even in philosophy it is not ubiquitous. Moreover, where the term is 
used, it is often assumed to be a property of agents (e.g., Loder 2002; van Fraassen 1995). 
But with my concept I have not tried to capture the epistemic integrity of agents. 
Instead, I have developed a concept of the epistemic integrity of behavior (see section 
6.1). The use of such a concept is relatively rare. 
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There are, however, some cases in which epistemic integrity is taken to be a property 
of behavior (rather than of agents). In McMullin (1983), we find the following passage: 
 
Of course, it is not pragmatic values that pose the main challenge to the epistemic 
integrity of the appraisal process. If values are needed in order to close the gap 
between underdetermined theory and the evidence brought in its support, 
presumably all sorts of values can slip in: political, moral, social, religious. (McMullin 
1983, pp. 18-19) 
 
This passage explicitly presents epistemic integrity as a property of the appraisal 
process. It suggests that political, moral, social, and religious values pose a more serious 
challenge to the epistemic integrity of the appraisal process than pragmatic values. 
McMullin does, however, not specify what he exactly means by ‘epistemic integrity of 
the appraisal process’. What I will argue then, is that my concept of epistemic integrity 
of the research process is in accordance with this passage from McMullin. 
The problem with political, moral, social, and religious values in research is that they 
are often linked to a certain research outcome, in the sense that the value leads to a 
preference for this outcome over other potential outcomes of research. For instance, if 
the impact of capitalism on world poverty is investigated, then a capitalist investigator 
may hope that the conclusion is that capitalism substantially reduces world poverty, 
while a communist investigator may hope for the opposite outcome. Anti-racist 
researchers may hope that their research does not reveal a correlation between skin 
color and the suitability for certain jobs, and religious researchers may hope that their 
findings do not contradict their religious beliefs. 
When researchers have such a preference for a certain outcome, this can stimulate 
them to deviate from common epistemic standards in order to make the preferred 
outcome more likely. They could, for instance, systematically ignore unfavorable data. 
Such violations are then kept secret because exposing them would undermine the 
audience’s trust in the results, and this would render the results useless for the relevant 
political, moral, social, or religious goals. By keeping the violations secret, it becomes 
legitimate for the audience to assume that the research adheres to common epistemic 
standards. Because this assumption is false, the research process does not live up to 
certain epistemic standards that the audience can legitimately assume to be met. Thus, 
according to EIR6, its epistemic integrity is damaged. 
Such a danger does not arise with respect to pragmatic values. Pragmatic values 
concern the scarcity of the time and resources that are available for research (McMullin 
1983, p. 18). This scarcity could in certain contexts cause researchers to lower epistemic 
standards. For instance, if the time and/or resources needed to collect the usual amount 
of evidence are not available, researchers may consider a lower amount of evidence 
sufficient to draw a certain conclusion. But there is an important difference between 
 Epistemic integrity 
110 
this situation and the above situations. In the above situations, a common epistemic 
standard is violated in order to make a preferred research outcome more likely, and this 
violation is kept secret in order not to undermine the audience’s trust in the outcome. 
When, on the other hand, one deviates from a common epistemic standard for 
pragmatic reasons, this is not to make a preferred research outcome more likely, and 
there is no reason why one should cause the audience to overestimate the 
trustworthiness of the outcome. Hence, if researchers lower epistemic standards for 
pragmatic reasons, they can be clear and open about this, in that way protecting the 
epistemic integrity of the research process (as defined by EIR6). (Epistemic integrity is 
protected because if the researchers are clear and open about the fact that a certain 
common epistemic standard is not met, then the audience cannot legitimately assume 
that it is, which means that deviating from this standard does not involve the violation 
of an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately assume to be met.) 
This brief analysis suggests that political, moral, social, and religious values pose a 
more serious challenge to the epistemic integrity of the research process than 
pragmatic values, and this corresponds with the above passage from McMullin. The 
conclusion is that my concept of epistemic integrity is in accordance with McMullin’s 
intuitions on epistemic integrity. 
My concept of epistemic integrity should also be in accordance with Biddle’s (2007) 
use of the term; it should enable us to clarify why short-term commercial interests 
compromised epistemic integrity in the Vioxx case, as Biddle claims in his abstract 
(Biddle 2007, p. 21). Let me show that my concept of epistemic integrity is adequate for 
this purpose. 
Biddle mentions two reasons for believing that Merck’s research on Vioxx was 
epistemically irresponsible: 
 
The first is that, between 2000 (or even earlier) and 2004, Merck consistently 
mischaracterized the current state of knowledge regarding the possible 
cardiovascular side effects of Vioxx. The hypothesis that Vioxx did not possess 
dangerous cardiovascular side effects was, until 2004, uncertain, and Merck knew that 
it was uncertain. Despite this, the company consistently and publicly asserted that 
Vioxx was safe. Secondly, there are serious questions about whether Merck honestly 
reported data that was unfavorable to its financial interests. Since the withdrawal of 
the drug, information has come to light suggesting that Merck scientists did not 
report all of the cardiovascular events that they should have, thus calling into 
question at least two of the studies that reflected favorably upon Vioxx. (Biddle 2007, 
p. 27) 
 
My concept of epistemic integrity can be used to explain why these two practices are 
epistemically problematic. 
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Firstly, consider the mischaracterization of the contemporary state of knowledge 
regarding the possible cardiovascular side effects of Vioxx. For instance, on May 22, 
2001, Merck published a press release entitled ‘Merck confirms favorable cardiovascular 
safety profile of Vioxx®’2 (Biddle 2007, p. 26). The press release mentioned that in the 
VIGOR study (Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research), “significantly fewer heart 
attacks were observed in patients taking naproxen (0.1 percent) compared to the group 
taking Vioxx 50 mg (0.5 percent) in this study.” This finding suggests that Vioxx has 
dangerous cardiovascular side effects. Merck scientists, however, explained the finding 
by “naproxen’s ability to block platelet aggregation by inhibiting COX-1 like aspirin, 
which is used to prevent second cardiac events in patients with a history of heart attack, 
stroke or other cardiac events.”3 So according to Merck scientists, the VIGOR finding 
was not due to a harmful effect of Vioxx, but to a cardioprotective effect of naproxen. 
It was then legitimate for the audience to assume that Merck scientists had decently 
investigated this explanation, and that there was evidence which clearly demonstrated 
that the higher incidence of heart attacks among patients taking Vioxx in the VIGOR 
study was due to a cardioprotective effect of naproxen, and not to a harmful effect of 
Vioxx. In the absence of such evidence, it would have been premature for Merck to 
publicly state that it confirmed the favorable cardiovascular safety profile of Vioxx®; 
first, Merck should have collected the evidence necessary to rule out the possibility that 
the VIGOR finding was due to a harmful effect of Vioxx. 
It seems, however, that this standard was not met; Merck scientists had not decently 
investigated whether a cardioprotective effect of naproxen could (fully) explain the 
VIGOR finding. They should at least have checked whether naproxen actually has a 
cardioprotective effect, and whether this effect is large enough to account for the 
VIGOR finding. If they would have checked that, they would have discovered that the 
size of the cardioprotective effect of naproxen is in fact insufficient to fully account for 
the difference in observed heart attacks in the VIGOR study (see Ray et al. 2002). 
Because Merck scientists had not put their speculative explanation of this difference 
to the test (while at the same time presenting their conclusions as confirmed by 
scientific evidence), they violated an epistemic standard that the audience could 
legitimately assume to be met. This means that, according to EIR6, the epistemic 
integrity of Merck’s research process was compromised. 
Now consider the second epistemically problematic practice identified by Biddle: 
inadequate reporting of unfavorable data. He mentions a paper that was published in 
the New England Journal of Medicine on the VIGOR study. The paper reports that, in the 
 
                                                     
2 See http://dida.library.ucsf.edu/pdf/oxx12o10. 
3 See press release, http://dida.library.ucsf.edu/pdf/oxx12o10. 
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VIGOR trial, 17 heart attacks occurred in the Vioxx group. But actually, there were 20 
heart attacks in this group, and at least two of the authors were aware of this before the 
paper was published (Biddle 2007, p. 28). In other words, if common standards for 
identifying heart attack would have been used in the study under consideration, then 20 
heart attacks would have been identified in the Vioxx group. 
A similar problem occurred in another study, called ‘Advantage’. In a paper published 
in Annals of Medicine, Merck scientists reported that in the Advantage trial, five patients 
from the Vioxx group suffered heart attack or sudden cardiac death. But if common 
standards for identifying heart attack and sudden cardiac death would have been used 
in this study, then six or more cases would have been identified in the Vioxx group 
(Biddle 2007, p. 29). 
So in both studies, common standards for identifying cardiovascular problems were 
not respected. Since the use of alternative standards was in neither case communicated 
to the audience, the audience could legitimately assume that common standards for 
identifying cardiovascular problems were respected in the two studies. Thus, epistemic 
standards that the audience could legitimately assume to be met were in fact violated in 
both the VIGOR study and the Advantage study. This means that the epistemic integrity 
of the research process (as defined by EIR6) was compromised in both cases. 
The different ways in which the epistemic integrity of the research process was 
compromised in the Vioxx case, can be explained by Merck’s short-term commercial 
interests. By presenting the conclusion that Vioxx did not have dangerous 
cardiovascular side effects as confirmed by scientific evidence (while in fact the 
necessary evidence was not yet available), and by secretly violating common standards 
for identifying cardiovascular problems (in order to reduce the number of heart attacks 
or sudden cardiac deaths identified among patients taking Vioxx), Merck made Vioxx 
appear safer than it actually was. The latter promoted the sale of Vioxx in the short 
term. This may be the reason why the epistemically problematic practices occurred; 
Merck’s interest to promote the sale of Vioxx in the short term may have caused these 
practices. If we accept this explanation, as I think Biddle would, then the conclusion is 
that Merck’s short-term commercial interests compromised the epistemic integrity of 
the research process (as defined by EIR6) in the Vioxx case. This corresponds with 
Biddle’s claim that “the research was organized in such a way as to allow short-term 
commercial interests to compromise epistemic integrity” (Biddle 2007, p. 21). So the 
concept of epistemic integrity defined by EIR6 enables us to account for Biddle’s 
intuitions on epistemic integrity. 
Since my concept of epistemic integrity of the research process is in accordance with 
many common intuitions on epistemic integrity, I conclude that it is more or less 
similar to our common sense notion of epistemic integrity of the research process. Thus, 
my concept of epistemic integrity fulfils the first requirement of explication. 
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7.3 Exactness 
In the previous chapter, I have tried to make my concept of epistemic integrity of the 
research process as exact as possible. Ambiguities may remain, but I did my best to 
reduce such ambiguities as much as I could in this dissertation. I defined the degree of 
epistemic integrity of the research process as the degree to which the research process 
lives up to the epistemic standards that the audience can legitimately assume to be met 
in it. I have described what I mean by a research process in section 6.1. My notion of 
epistemic standards is clarified in section 6.5.1. Two sufficient conditions for an 
epistemic standard to be an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately 
assume to be met, are presented and explained in section 6.7.1. Section 6.7.1 also 
indicates what is meant by an audience, and how the definition should be applied in 
case there are multiple audiences, for whom different assumptions about epistemic 
standards are legitimate. I hope that these clarifications suffice for my concept of 
epistemic integrity to have an acceptable level of exactness. 
7.4 Fruitfulness 
As indicated in section 7.1, two kinds of fruitfulness can be distinguished: (1) general 
fruitfulness, i.e. usefulness for the development and justification of general norms for 
science, and (2) applied fruitfulness, i.e. usefulness for the analysis of particular cases 
from scientific practice. In chapters 8-10, my concept of epistemic integrity will be 
applied to particular cases from scientific practice, showing that this concept has 
applied fruitfulness. In the current section, the focus is on general fruitfulness. 
For my concept of epistemic integrity to be useful for the development and 
justification of general norms for science, having the highest degree of epistemic 
integrity should be something that we can regard as ideal for scientific research 
processes. So let me start by arguing that having the highest degree of epistemic 
integrity, as I defined it, is an acceptable ideal for science. 
If a research process does not live up to an epistemic standard that the audience can 
legitimately assume to be met in the research process, then a discrepancy arises 
between the epistemic standards that are actually met in the research process and those 
that the audience believes to be met in the research process. This implies that the 
audience has a distorted view on the justification of the research conclusions; it believes 
that these conclusions are supported by research meeting certain specific epistemic 
standards, while in fact it is not supported by such research (though it may be 
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supported by another kind of research, in which other epistemic standards are used). 
Because it is undesirable that scientific agents give the audience a distorted view on the 
justification of their research conclusions, scientific agents should try to make sure that 
there are no epistemic standards that (1) the audience can legitimately assume to be 
met in the research process, and (2) are actually violated in the research process. In 
other words, scientific agents should aim for the highest degree of epistemic integrity 
(as defined by EIR6). 
Furthermore, when a research process does not live up to the epistemic standards 
that the audience can legitimately assume to be met, it is always possible that someone 
discovers this and makes it public. This can undermine public trust in science. If people 
find out that certain epistemic standards, which the audience could legitimately assume 
to be met in the research process, are actually violated in the research process, then this 
can damage these people’s trust in the relevant research, and possibly even in science as 
a whole. This is an additional reason for scientific agents to ensure that the epistemic 
integrity of the research process remains untouched. 
These arguments indicate that having the highest degree of epistemic integrity (as 
defined by EIR6) can function as an ideal for science. Now, I can turn to the question 
whether it is a generally fruitful ideal; Does it enable us to formulate and justify general 
norms for science? As such norms have already been developed in earlier work (e.g., 
Committee on Assessing Integrity in Research Environments 2002; Resnik 1998; Shamoo 
& Resnik 2009; Shrader-Frechette 1994), I will not start from scratch here. I start from 
the principles for science developed in Resnik (1998). David Resnik proposes the 
following principles: 
 
Honesty: Scientists should not fabricate, falsify, or misrepresent data or results. They 
should be objective, unbiased, and truthful in all aspects of the research process. 
Carefulness: Scientists should avoid errors in research, especially in presenting results. 
They should minimize experimental, methodological, and human errors and avoid 
self-deception, bias, and conflicts of interest. 
Openness: Scientists should share data, results, methods, ideas, techniques, and tools. 
They should allow other scientists to review their work and be open to criticism and 
new ideas. 
Freedom: Scientists should be free to conduct research on any problem or hypothesis. 
They should be allowed to pursue new ideas and criticize old ones. 
Credit: Credit should be given where credit is due but not where it is not due. 
Education: Scientists should educate prospective scientists and insure that they learn 
how to conduct good science. Scientists should educate and inform the public about 
science. 
Social responsibility: Scientists should avoid causing harms to society and they should 
attempt to produce social benefits. Scientists should be responsible for the 
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consequences of their research and they should inform the public about those 
consequences. 
Legality: In the process of research, scientists should obey the laws pertaining to their 
work. 
Opportunity: Scientists should not be unfairly denied the opportunity to use scientific 
resources or advance in the scientific profession. 
Mutual respect: Scientists should treat colleagues with respect. 
Efficiency: Scientists should use resources efficiently. 
Respect for subjects: Scientists should not violate rights or dignity when using human 
subjects in experiments. Scientists should treat non-human, animal subjects with 
appropriate respect and care when using them in experiments. (Resnik 1998, Chap. 4) 
 
What I will try to show then is that the concept of epistemic integrity is useful to justify 
and refine some of these principles. 
Resnik uses different grounds to justify his principles. A first is that violating the 
principle hinders the achievement of the goals of science. Resnik distinguishes two 
kinds of goals: epistemic and practical. The epistemic goals are related to the 
advancement of human knowledge, and the practical goals concern solving problems in 
engineering, medicine, economics, agriculture, and other areas of applied research 
(Resnik 1998, p. 39). A second kind of justification is that adhering to the principle 
promotes cooperation and trust in science, and a third is that it promotes the public’s 
trust in science. Fourthly, most principles are also justified on moral grounds. I will here 
only focus on Resnik’s epistemological justification of principles, that is, the justification 
of a principle on the ground that adhering to it is important for the advancement of 
human knowledge. 
The problem with this kind of justification is that scientists should not always do 
what is best for the advancement of human knowledge. The research that is most useful 
for this purpose can have a very high cost, either in terms of the resources needed for 
the research or in terms of the harmful effects on the research subjects. Due to this cost, 
it may be better for scientists to pursue an alternative line of research, which makes a 
smaller contribution to the advancement of human knowledge, but which has a lower 
cost. So even though the former research line could be regarded as important for the 
advancement of human knowledge, it should not be pursued. This indicates that it is not 
because a certain behavior or practice is important for the advancement of human 
knowledge, that we should accept it as something that scientists should engage in. 
Accordingly, the assumption that adhering to a certain principle is important for the 
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advancement of human knowledge, is not a very compelling reason to endorse this 
principle.4 
On the basis of the ideal of epistemic integrity, principles for science can be 
supported in a more compelling way. This ideal is much less demanding than the ideal 
of contributing as much as possible to the advancement of human knowledge. The ideal 
of epistemic integrity allows scientists to pursue research that makes a relatively small 
contribution to the advancement of human knowledge. The only thing that is required 
is that the research lives up to those epistemic standards that the audience can 
legitimately assume to be met. This is a very minimal requirement, and I cannot think of 
any cases in science in which it is not desirable that this minimal requirement is 
fulfilled. Ideally, the requirement is always fulfilled in science, so that all research 
processes in science have the highest degree of epistemic integrity. Accordingly, if 
adhering to a certain principle can be shown to be important for epistemic integrity, in 
the sense that violating the principle threatens the epistemic integrity of the research 
process, then this is a very compelling reason to endorse the principle. 
Let me now show how some of Resnik’s principles can be justified and refined on the 
basis of the concept of epistemic integrity. Three kinds of principles can be 
distinguished: those that can be completely justified on the basis of epistemic integrity, 
those that can only partially be justified on the basis of epistemic integrity, and those 
that cannot be justified on the basis of epistemic integrity at all. The principles 
belonging to the latter category are social responsibility, legality, efficiency, and respect 
for subjects. Respecting these principles is important for moral reasons, not because 
respecting them promotes the epistemic integrity of scientific research processes. 
The principles that can be completely justified on the basis of the concept of 
epistemic integrity are honesty, carefulness, openness, and freedom. Firstly, take the 
principle of honesty: scientists should not fabricate, falsify, or misrepresent data or 
results, and they should be objective, unbiased, and truthful in all aspects of the 
research process. When scientists present certain data or results as obtained through 
scientific research, then it is common for the audience to assume that these data or 
results are not fabricated or falsified, and that these data or results are correctly 
represented, that is, in accordance with common standards for representing data and 
results. If the scientists do not explicitly state that this assumption is false, then this is a 
legitimate assumption for the audience to make. So in such contexts, the standards ‘data 
and results should not be fabricated’, ‘data and results should not be falsified’, and ‘data 
and results should be represented correctly’ are standards that the audience can 
 
                                                     
4 I am not contesting that this assumption can be a good reason to endorse a principle; I only claim that it is 
not a very compelling reason. 
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legitimately assume to be met in the research process. They are epistemic standards 
because adhering to them is thought to be crucial for the research to serve the 
epistemic interests that the research is supposed to serve. This means that if data or 
results are fabricated, falsified, or misrepresented in such contexts, then the research 
process does not live up to the epistemic standards that the audience can legitimately 
assume to be met, and so its epistemic integrity is damaged. Because we want research 
processes to have the highest degree of epistemic integrity, data and results should not 
be fabricated, falsified, or misrepresented in such contexts. 
There are, however, also contexts in which fabrication does not damage epistemic 
integrity, as we have seen. If a scientist fabricates data in order to establish certain 
statistical or conceptual problems, and he is clear about the fact that the data are 
fabricated, then the epistemic integrity of the research process is not damaged (see 
section 7.2). Note that the idea that fabrication is allowed in such contexts, conflicts 
with the principle of honesty as described by Resnik, which states that scientists should 
not fabricate data or results. Therefore, that principle needs to be refined. I suggest the 
following adjustment: scientists should not fabricate data or results and then present these 
data or results as the outcome of (ordinary) scientific research. 
The concept of epistemic integrity can also be used to explain why it is important 
that scientists are objective and unbiased in different aspects of the research process. To 
illustrate this, consider decisions on whether or not to publish certain results. In 
biomedical science, such decisions are sometimes biased; results that are unfavorable to 
a certain drug (e.g., results which indicate that the drug is ineffective or not safe) are 
not published, while favorable results are published, sometimes even more than once 
(Melander et al. 2003; Schott et al. 2010, pp. 296-298). This damages the epistemic 
integrity of the research process. Let me explain. 
Publication bias implies that the following standard is violated in the body of 
research on the relevant drug: when a clinical trial is finished, its results should be 
published, even if they are unfavorable to the drug. Call this standard s2. s2 is an 
epistemic standard because we believe that general adherence to s2 serves our epistemic 
interests; we want to know whether the drug is effective or safe (= epistemic interest), 
and the publication of all clinical trial results concerning the effectiveness/safety of the 
drug (and not just the favorable ones) is considered helpful for satisfying that epistemic 
interest. More specifically, s2 is an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately 
assume to be met in the relevant body of research. Let me show this on the basis of the 
second condition of legitimacy (see section 6.7.1). 
Violations of s2 are generally considered scientific malpractice (see, e.g., Chalmers 
1990; Schott et al. 2010). Today, there are even laws which require that the results of 
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clinical trials are made publicly available.5 So s2 is a common epistemic standard in 
biomedical science. Accordingly, when s2 is violated in a certain research process, those 
involved will not flaunt this violation, since they do not want to risk being accused of 
scientific malpractice. Moreover, if a pharmaceutical company publishes favorable 
results and suppresses unfavorable results in order to make one of its products appear 
more effective and/or safer than it actually is, then it is crucial that the audience does 
not know about this strategy. If the audience would know that unfavorable results are 
suppressed, then it would know that the published results say little about the actual 
effectiveness/safety of the relevant product, and so the company’s strategy would fail. 
This is a second reason why violations of s2 are kept secret by those involved in the 
research process. 
So in the case of publication bias, s2 is a standard which the audience can legitimately 
assume to be met in the body of research on the relevant drug, as the second condition 
of legitimacy is fulfilled: s2 is a common epistemic standard in the relevant field and 
violations of s2 are not clearly reported to the audience by those involved in the 
research process. Because publication bias implies that s2 is violated, it involves the 
violation of an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately assume to be met 
in the research process. This means that publication bias compromises the epistemic 
integrity of the research process. Therefore, publication bias ought to be avoided in 
biomedical science. 
Now consider the principle of carefulness: scientists should avoid errors in research, 
especially in presenting results, they should minimize experimental, methodological, 
and human errors, and avoid self-deception, bias, and conflicts of interest. Some errors 
are in themselves sufficient for the epistemic integrity of the research process to be 
compromised. Take the accidental use of a statistical method which is generally 
considered inappropriate for the relevant area of research (= methodological error). A 
common standard in science is that appropriate statistical methods should be used, that 
is, statistical methods which are generally considered appropriate for the relevant area 
of research. This standard, let us call it s3, is an epistemic standard because we believe 
that adherence to s3 serves our epistemic interests. When scientists decide to violate s3 
(e.g., because they disagree with generally accepted standards on which statistical 
methods should be used where), they should be clear about this. But if scientists 
erroneously violate s3, then they are not aware of it, and so they cannot openly 
communicate this violation to the audience. Thus, in case of an erroneous violation of s3, 
it is legitimate for the audience to assume that s3 is met, since s3 is a common epistemic 
 
                                                     
5 For Europe, see Official Journal of the European Union, 2012/C 302/03. For the U.S., see Section 801 of the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act. 
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standard, and those involved in the research process do not clearly report that s3 is 
violated (which means that the second condition of legitimacy (see section 6.7.1) is 
fulfilled). Because s3 is in fact violated, the epistemic integrity of the research process is 
damaged. 
There are also errors that do not imply that epistemic integrity is damaged. For 
instance, when a great amount of data are recorded by human observers, then a certain 
amount of erroneous recordings (= human error) is acceptable. The reason is that the 
audience cannot legitimately assume that not one error was made. In fact, it is common 
sense that human observers do make errors. What is required in such cases is that the 
research is characterized by a certain level of carefulness. This need not be the highest 
level of carefulness; e.g., each recording should not be double-checked by ten different 
observers. Research should be characterized by the level of carefulness that the audience 
can legitimately assume to be manifested in the research. For instance, it is usually legitimate 
for the audience to assume that scientific observers have made a well-considered 
judgment on how to record the data, instead of, say, a hasty judgment on the basis of 
rough estimations. It is then important that the research adheres to this epistemic 
standard. Otherwise, an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately assume 
to be met in the research process is violated, which means that the epistemic integrity 
of the research process is damaged. 
There may, however, also be contexts in which observers are bound to make hasty 
judgments, e.g., because of stringent time constraints. It is then mandatory that this is 
clearly communicated to the audience, so that the audience cannot legitimately assume 
that the observers’ judgments are as well-considered as they are in other contexts. In 
that way, the epistemic integrity of the research process is protected. 
The concept of epistemic integrity can also be used to explain why it is desirable that 
scientists avoid conflicts of interest. When scientists have conflicts of interest, this may 
have a negative impact on the quality of their research, and it becomes more likely that 
their research does not manifest the minimal level of carefulness that people expect to 
be manifested in scientific research. The ‘inadequate doses’ case (see section 6.3.2) can 
serve as an example here. In the ‘inadequate doses’ case, a conflict of interest leads to 
sloppiness in determining the dose of the comparator drug in an active-controlled trial. 
I have argued that this sloppiness involves the violation of an epistemic standard that 
the audience can legitimately assume to be met, and so the epistemic integrity of the 
research process is damaged (see section 6.7.2). This example shows that a conflict of 
interest can lead to compromised epistemic integrity. Accordingly, avoiding conflicts of 
interest is useful to protect the epistemic integrity of the research process. 
The third principle that can be completely justified on the basis of the concept of 
epistemic integrity is openness: scientists should share data, results, methods, ideas, 
techniques, and tools, and they should allow other scientists to review their work and 
be open to criticism and new ideas. Openness is important because it helps the audience 
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obtain a correct picture of the research process. If all aspects of the research process are 
shared with the audience, then it becomes less likely that the assumptions that audience 
members make about the epistemic standards that the research process lives up to, and 
which they can legitimately make on the basis of what is reported to them, are false. Put 
differently: if scientists are open about all aspects of the research process, then the 
research process is more likely to live up to the epistemic standards that the audience 
can legitimately assume to be met in it. This means that openness promotes the 
epistemic integrity of the research process. 
Furthermore, where an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately assume 
to be met in the research process is not adhered to, openness makes it more likely that 
this violation gets detected by an outsider. Suppose for example that in determining the 
dose of the comparator drug in an active-controlled clinical trial, one ignores the recent 
publications on the drug, resulting in the use of a dose which is considered inadequate 
by all experts on the matter. This violation is more likely to get discovered by an 
outsider if the doses used in the trial are shared with outsiders. 
Making it easier for outsiders to discover cases of compromised epistemic integrity is 
valuable for two reasons. Firstly, such discoveries can help those involved to restore 
epistemic integrity (e.g., by explicitly communicating that the research does not meet 
the relevant epistemic standard, or by adjusting the research so that it does meet this 
standard). Secondly, the more likely it is that compromised epistemic integrity will be 
detected by outsiders, the more important it is for scientists to make sure that the 
epistemic integrity of their research is not compromised, since such detections will 
damage their reputation. So by helping outsiders to detect damage to epistemic 
integrity, openness promotes the epistemic integrity of the research process. 
The concept of epistemic integrity can also be used to refine the principle of 
openness. As a specification to this principle, we can add that in articles in academic 
journals that require disclosure of conflicts of interest, the authors should disclose their 
financial interests, such as those that are due to industry ties (also see Schachman 2006, 
p. 6901); certain other interests, such as the interest to publish in high-impact journals 
in order to advance one’s career, should not be mentioned. The reason is that by not 
disclosing financial ties to industry in such articles, the authors imply that such ties 
were absent. The audience can then legitimately assume that the reported conclusions 
result from industry-independent research, so that financial ties to industry could not 
have distorted the research. Consequently, they may put more trust in the research, 
considering it more appropriate for serving their epistemic interests than when there 
would be financial ties to industry. Because actually the research is not industry-
independent, an epistemic standard that the audience can legitimately assume to be 
met is violated in the research process. This reveals that disclosing financial ties to 
industry is in such cases crucial to protect the epistemic integrity of the research 
process. 
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Things are different with respect to interests such as the interest to publish in high-
impact journals in order to advance one’s career. By not disclosing such interests, the 
authors do not imply that they were absent; on the contrary, the presence of such 
interests is taken for granted. The interest to publish in high-impact journals could 
distort research just as much as financial ties to industry, but the difference is that by 
not disclosing the former interest, one does not make it legitimate for the audience to 
assume that it wasn’t there. So even if interests such as the interest to publish in high-
impact journals are not disclosed in a declaration of conflicts of interest, the assumption 
that such interests were absent is not an assumption that the audience can legitimately 
make. Therefore, including taken-for-granted career interests in a declaration of 
conflicts of interest is not required to protect the epistemic integrity of the research 
process. 
Furthermore, the concept of epistemic integrity enables us to refine the norm that 
scientists should be open to new ideas (which is part of the principle of openness). 
Scientists should not be open to all ideas, but only to those ideas which the audience can 
legitimately assume to be taken seriously. The latter depends on the values that the 
audience can legitimately assume to be used in the relevant research process. Let me 
give an example. 
Simplicity is a common value in physics (Maxwell 1974, 2010). Therefore, physicists 
do not have to take into account overly complex theories or hypotheses (unless they 
explicitly mention that they do). Suppose, for instance, that physicists have developed a 
model m that describes the motion patterns of different planets, and that this model is 
consistent with a huge amount of empirical data (e.g., on the positions of these planets 
at different points in time). We can now easily come up with endless aberrant versions 
of m that are at least as empirically adequate as m; we just have to add absurd 
qualifications that have not been refuted yet. We could, for instance, say that planets 
move as described by m, but when an Asian boy with the Statue of Liberty tattooed on 
his forehead yells “God bless Europe” on top of Table Mountain, the planets stop moving 
and explode after 5 seconds. This is an aberrant version of m. The point is that physicists 
are allowed to ignore such aberrant hypotheses because, in light of common standards 
in physics, the audience cannot legitimately assume that they were taken into account. 
Therefore, ignoring such hypotheses does not compromise the epistemic integrity of 
the research process. 
If, on the other hand, a certain new hypothesis h on a phenomenon p in physics has 
the potential to score better on common values in physics (e.g., empirical adequacy, 
internal consistency, simplicity) than competing hypotheses on p, then physicists 
should either be open to h, or they should clearly report that they are not (e.g., because 
alternative values are used in the particular research process). The reason is that a 
commitment to common values in physics, which the audience can legitimately assume 
to be present in a research context in physics unless mentioned otherwise, involves 
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being open to new hypotheses which have the potential to score better on these values. 
Put differently: if those involved in research on p in the domain of physics do not make 
clear to the audience that hypotheses like h are ignored in this research, then the 
epistemic standard that they should be open to h is an epistemic standard which the 
audience can legitimately assume to be met in the relevant research process. So in such 
cases, the ideal of epistemic integrity requires the scientists involved to be open to h.  
Fourthly, consider the principle of freedom: scientists should be free to conduct 
research on any problem or hypothesis, and they should be allowed to pursue new ideas 
and criticize old ones. Strict adherence to this principle is, I think, not required in 
science. For instance, if one can show that a certain line of research is likely to have 
very harmful effects on society, then this can be a good reason to prohibit such 
research. There are, however, cases in which the suppression of certain lines of research 
or ideas compromises the epistemic integrity of the research process, and it is such 
cases that ought to be avoided. 
Suppose there are a couple of rival theories on a certain phenomenon. It would serve 
the government’s interests if the public would believe that scientific evidence 
unambiguously shows that one particular theory on this phenomenon is the best one. In 
order to produce that belief among the public, the government forbids scientists (1) to 
criticize the favored theory, and (2) to support one of its rivals. Scientists are only 
allowed to support the favored theory. The result is that all the scientists’ arguments 
point in the direction of the favored theory. 
Part of the government’s strategy is to make sure that the public does not know 
about the restrictions on the scientists’ freedom. Because it wants the audience to trust 
the scientists’ judgment, it gives the audience the impression that the scientists were 
free to develop criticisms on the favored theory, as well as to develop arguments in 
favor of its rivals. It is then legitimate for the audience to assume that the research 
process meets the following epistemic standard: during the process, scientists should be 
allowed to criticize the favored theory as well as to support its rivals. Because this 
standard is not met, the epistemic integrity of the research process is compromised. The 
ideal of epistemic integrity implies that cases such as this one ought to be avoided. 
There are also some principles that can only partially be justified on the basis of the 
concept of epistemic integrity: credit, education, opportunity, and mutual respect. 
Respecting these principles is important regardless of whether or not violating them 
compromises epistemic integrity. However, some behaviors that violate them 
compromise epistemic integrity, and this is a reason not to practice such behaviors. 
Take the principle of credit: credit should be given where credit is due but not where 
it is not due. The main reason why this standard should be respected is that all people, 
including scientists, should be given just rewards for their contributions and efforts 
(Resnik 1998, p. 62). But some aspects of the principle of credit can also be justified on 
the basis of the concept of epistemic integrity. An example is the use of guest authors 
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and ghostwriters in biomedical science. In biomedical science, persons who did not 
make a significant contribution to a paper – typically academically affiliated 
investigators that are not employed by the company that financed the research – are 
listed as authors (guest authors) (Ross et al. 2008), while company employees who did 
make a significant contribution are not (ghostwriters) (Gøtzsche et al. 2007). The 
audience can then legitimately assume that the research was performed more or less 
independently of the relevant company, so that possible biases linked to the company’s 
financial interests were avoided in the research. Because this epistemic standard was 
actually violated – the research was not performed independently of the relevant 
company – the epistemic integrity of the research process is compromised. Therefore, 
this practice ought to be avoided. 
A second principle that can be partly justified on the basis of the concept of epistemic 
integrity is the principle of education: scientists should educate prospective scientists 
and ensure that they learn how to conduct good science, and they should educate and 
inform the public about science. If we want scientific research to maintain a high degree 
of epistemic integrity in the future, it is crucial that prospective scientists learn how to 
adhere to epistemic standards that the audience can legitimately assume to be met in 
the research process. For instance, prospective scientists in fields in which statistics are 
used, should learn which statistical methods are appropriate for which purposes. In that 
way, they will be able to avoid methodological errors, which could, as we have seen, 
damage epistemic integrity. If scientists would not educate prospective scientists in this 
way, the epistemic integrity of future scientific research is threatened. Scientists should 
also educate and inform the public about how science works. In that way, it becomes 
less likely that the public can legitimately make false assumptions on the epistemic 
standards used in scientific research processes. Accordingly, scientific research 
processes will be more likely to live up to the epistemic standards that the audience can 
legitimately assume to be met in these processes, and so their epistemic integrity is 
promoted. This justification of the principle of education is, however, only partial, since 
scientists should teach prospective scientists more than just how to respect the 
epistemic standards that the audience can legitimately assume to be met. 
Thirdly, the ideal of epistemic integrity partly justifies the principle that scientists 
should not be unfairly denied the opportunity to use scientific resources or advance in 
the scientific profession (principle of opportunity). More specifically, the following 
violation of this principle compromises epistemic integrity. Suppose adherents of a 
certain theory are systematically denied the opportunity to advance in the scientific 
profession (e.g., because the government doesn’t like that theory), and that this is kept 
secret to the public. Consequently, all scientists reject the theory, and the audience 
legitimately assumes that this unanimous rejection is due to a fair debate between 
proponents and opponents of the theory. Because this epistemic standard is actually not 
met (there has not been a fair debate), the epistemic integrity of the research process is 
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compromised. Therefore, such violations of the principle of opportunity should be 
avoided. This is only a partial justification of the principle of opportunity because, even 
in cases in which unfairly denying someone the opportunity to use scientific resources 
or advance in the scientific profession (e.g., on the basis of his skin color) can be shown 
not to threaten the epistemic integrity of the research process in any way, it is still 
unacceptable (on moral grounds). 
A final principle is the principle of mutual respect, which implies that “scientists 
should not harm one another, either physically or psychologically, that they should 
respect personal privacy, that they should not tamper with each other’s experiments or 
results, and so forth” (Resnik 1998, p. 67). If there would not be mutual respect between 
scientists, scientists may be less inclined to honestly and openly communicate the 
epistemic standards that their research meets to other scientists. They would probably 
care less about the benefits of their research to other scientists, and they may put less 
effort in making sure that their research reports are as clear as possible to colleagues 
who might benefit from it. This could lead to more discrepancies between (1) the 
epistemic standards which are met in research, and (2) the epistemic standards which 
other scientists can legitimately assume to be met on the basis of what is reported to 
them. Because such discrepancies imply that the epistemic integrity of the research 
process is damaged, we can conclude that a lack of mutual respect between scientists 
could have a negative effect on the epistemic integrity of scientific research processes. 
Of course, even in cases in which one scientist can harm another without threatening 
epistemic integrity, scientists should not do so (on moral grounds). Therefore, this 
justification of the principle of mutual respect is only partial. 
7.5 Simplicity 
In order to show that my concept of epistemic integrity is as simple as the three 
other requirements of explication permit, I have to argue that no parts of EIR6 can be 
omitted without violating the other requirements. More specifically, I will argue that if 
certain parts are omitted, then the explicatum will be less exact or less similar to the 
explicandum. 
Suppose we omit ‘that the audience can legitimately assume to be met in the research 
process’ from EIR6. We then have: 
 
EIR7 The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the degree to 
which the research process lives up to epistemic standards. 
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But there are plenty of possible epistemic standards, and not all possible epistemic 
standards have to be met in each research process. Different epistemic standards apply 
to different fields of science and to different research contexts. Therefore, it has to be 
specified which epistemic standards the research process has to live up to in order to 
have the highest degree of epistemic integrity. Since EIR7 does not do that, it is not 
sufficiently exact. 
EIR6 does specify which epistemic standards the research process has to live up to in 
order to have the highest degree of epistemic integrity: those epistemic standards that 
the audience can legitimately assume to be met in the research process. But what if we would 
only omit ‘can legitimately’ from EIR6? We then have: 
 
EIR8 The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process =df the degree to 
which the research process lives up to the epistemic standards that the 
audience assumes to be met in the research process. 
 
This concept is less similar to our common sense notion of epistemic integrity of the 
research process than the concept defined by EIR6. This can be argued on the basis of 
the following scenario. Suppose a scientist thinks that a certain common epistemic 
standard is inappropriate for his research. Consequently, he deviates from this 
traditional standard. In order to avoid misunderstandings, he reports this to his 
audience. He clearly states that his research does not meet the traditional standard, and 
that he used an alternative standard instead. But the audience ignores this clear 
message and sticks to the assumption that the traditional standard is met in the 
scientist’s research. EIR8 implies that the epistemic integrity of the research process is 
then compromised. 
But this conflicts with common sense. It seems that in this case the problem does not 
lie with the research process, but with the audience; the audience should not have 
neglected the scientist’s clear statement that he deviated from the traditional standard. 
As the scientist is clear and open about the fact that his research does not meet the 
traditional standard, the epistemic integrity of the research process does not seem to be 
threatened. 
EIR6 can account for this common intuition. Because the scientist has clearly 
communicated to the audience that his research does not meet the traditional standard, 
it is not legitimate for the audience to make this assumption. Thus, the traditional 
standard is not a standard that the audience can legitimately assume to be met in the 
scientist’s research process. This implies that the violation of this standard does not 
threaten the epistemic integrity of the research process as defined by EIR6. 
This brief analysis shows that the concept defined by EIR6 is more similar to our 
common sense notion of epistemic integrity of the research process than the concept 
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defined by EIR8. Hence, the first requirement of explication does not permit the 
omission of ‘can legitimately’ from EIR6. 
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Chapter 8  
The Space Shuttle Program1 
The concept of epistemic integrity of the research process can be used to identify 
epistemically problematic interest influences in the sciences. This will be illustrated in 
chapters 8-10. In this chapter, the focus is on a case from aerospace science: the Space 
Shuttle Program. The Space Shuttle Program was the U.S. government’s program for the 
development and exploitation of reusable spacecrafts from 1981 to 2011, conducted by 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Five Space Shuttle orbiters 
were developed as part of this program – Columbia, Challenger, Discovery, Atlantis, and 
Endeavour – and in total there were 135 Space Shuttle missions – Columbia had 28 
flights, Challenger 10, Discovery 39, Atlantis 33, and Endeavour 25. What I will argue 
here is that the financial and career interests of those involved in the Space Shuttle 
Program compromised the epistemic integrity of different kinds of research processes. 
In that way, the influence of these interests is shown to be epistemically problematic. 
I proceed as follows. First, three different kinds of research processes in the Space 
Shuttle Program are distinguished (section 8.1). For each of these research processes, I 
offer some specific examples of compromised epistemic integrity (sections 8.2-8.4). 
Next, the fact that the epistemic integrity of the relevant research processes was 
damaged is explained on the basis of the financial and career interests of those involved 
(section 8.5). Finally, some important advantages of my analysis over earlier analyses of 
the Space Shuttle Program are discussed (section 8.6). 
 
                                                     
1 The examples used in this chapter also appear in De Winter & Kosolosky (2013a). But the analyses of these 
examples offered here are entirely new, since they are based on a concept of epistemic integrity that differs 
from the concept used in De Winter & Kosolosky (2013a). (Laszlo Kosolosky is not mentioned as a second 
author of this chapter because I have not only carried out the new analyses, but I have also collected the 
original examples.) 
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8.1 Three different kinds of research processes 
In the Space Shuttle Program, there were several different kinds of research activities 
and different channels to report the results of these activities. Together, a research 
activity and the communication of its results constitute a research process. At least 
three different kinds of research processes can be discerned in the Space Shuttle 
Program. 
A first kind of research process consists of research performed by working engineers 
and the communication of the results to other working engineers and to middle-level 
managers. This includes tests on shuttle components before launch, and post-flight 
analysis of shuttle components (checking whether it was damaged during flight, 
whether it had worked properly, etc.). Involved in research on a shuttle component 
were: (1) working engineers from the NASA contractor that developed this component, 
and (2) working engineers from the NASA center that was responsible for the 
management of this component. They reported their findings to each other and to 
middle-level managers. A formal channel for such communication were the Level IV and 
Level III meetings of Flight Readiness Review (FRR). FRR was a set of meetings 
(proceeding from Level IV to Level I) that preceded each launch, and at which the 
readiness of the shuttle to fly and to fly safely was determined. At Level IV meetings, 
contractor engineers presented their data analyses and conclusions to their own 
managers and to personnel from the relevant NASA center, and at Level III meetings, 
they informed NASA Project Managers of data and findings on risk acceptability 
(Vaughan 1996, p. 84). There was also a lot of communication between contractor 
engineers, NASA center engineers, and their managers outside FRR. For instance, during 
flight, there was daily communication between contractor engineers and NASA center 
engineers (Vaughan 1996, p. 85). 
A second kind of research process is the review of working engineers’ research 
results by middle-level managers (from NASA contractors and NASA centers). These 
middle-level managers checked whether data were consistent, whether conclusions 
were adequately supported by data, whether arguments met NASA standards of 
quantification, etc. They communicated their findings to the working engineers, and 
after the required adjustments were made in the engineering analysis (by themselves 
and/or the working engineers), they passed the results up the hierarchy, to top-level 
managers. The former kind of communication (feedback to working engineers) occurred 
at Level IV and Level III meetings, and the latter kind of communication (passing the 
results up the hierarchy) occurred at Level II and Level I meetings (Vaughan 1996, p. 84). 
A third kind of research process consists of the research and/or discussions that are 
the basis of NASA’s communication with the public. This communication includes the 
many press releases from NASA. For instance, in 1991, there were 203 press releases 
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from NASA. Of the 195 press releases from 1991 that I could consult on the website of 
NASA, 68 contained the word ‘shuttle’ (which means that they related to the Space 
Shuttle Program). But this is not the only way in which NASA informed the public. It 
also published technical reports on the Space Shuttle, FRR reports, messages between 
NASA employees, etc. Several of these documents were released as a response to 
requests from the Freedom of Information Act.2 
8.2 Research by working engineers 
In order to demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of working engineers’ research 
processes was sometimes damaged, I should show that certain epistemic standards 
which the audience could legitimately assume to be met, were violated in these research 
processes. Let me give an example from the eve of the Challenger disaster, i.e. the 
breakdown of Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986, which was caused by failure 
in the O-rings that were supposed to seal a joint on one of the shuttle’s solid rocket 
boosters. 
On January 27, 1986, the day before Challenger’s fatal mission, two teleconferences 
were held, in which engineers and managers associated with the Solid Rocket Booster 
(SRB) Project located at Morton Thiokol Corporation (NASA contractor that built the 
SRBs), Marshall Space Flight Center (NASA center that bore managerial responsibility 
for the SRBs), and Kennedy Space Center (NASA center that assembled and tested the 
shuttle components and conducted launches) discussed the effect of the expected cold 
temperatures on the O-rings that were supposed to seal certain joints on the SRBs. 
Before the teleconferences, launch time was set at 9:38 A.M., and at that time, 
temperature was predicted to be 26°F. During the first teleconference, Thiokol 
suggested to delay launch until noon or after, when temperatures would be higher. A 
second teleconference was arranged in which Thiokol would take an official position 
and in which it would support this position with engineering data (Vaughan 1996, Chap. 
8). 
 
                                                     
2 See http://www.nasa.gov/. 
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At the second teleconference, Thiokol initially recommended not to launch unless O-
ring temperature was at least 53°F. Several charts were presented to support that 
position. The charts revealed that at the Space Shuttle’s fifteenth mission, when the 
calculated O-ring temperature was 53°F, there was O-ring damage. Thiokol engineer 
Roger Boisjoly was asked what evidence Thiokol had that O-ring erosion on that mission 
was due to the cold. After all, there also was field joint blow-by on the Space Shuttle’s 
twenty-second mission, when calculated O-ring temperature was not that low. Boisjoly 
answered that he did not have the data to quantify the temperature concerns (Vaughan 
1996, pp. 303-304). 
But in fact, Thiokol did have such data. This was shown by two members of the 
investigative staff of the Presidential Commission that U.S. President Ronald Reagan 
established after the Challenger disaster to investigate the circumstances leading up to 
the accident. Alton Keel, the executive director of this investigative staff, and Randy 
Kehrli, a Department of Justice attorney, created a chart that included all missions, 
indicating for each mission the number of O-ring anomalies and calculated O-ring 
temperature (see figure 8.1). This chart showed a clear correlation between O-ring 
anomalies and temperature: while only 17.6 percent of the flights with O-ring 
temperature above 65°F had O-ring anomalies, 100 percent of the flights with O-ring 
temperature below 65°F had O-ring anomalies (Vaughan 1996, p. 382). 
Boisjoly could have found this correlation as well; he only had to apply basic 
statistical methods to the data available to Thiokol. But he did not do that, which led 
him to the conclusion that the temperature concerns could not be quantified on the 
basis of the available data. The fact that basic statistical methods had not been applied 
to the data available to Thiokol, entails that an epistemic standard which the audience 
Figure 8.1 Chart on the relation between incidents of O-ring thermal distress and temperature, created by 
Alton Keel and Randy Kehrli. (Reproduced from Presidential Commission 1986, Vol. 1, p. 146.) 
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could legitimately assume to be met was in fact not met in the research process. The 
audience could legitimately expect that Boisjoly had at least applied basic statistical 
methods to the data available to Thiokol before he concluded that he did not have the 
data to quantify the temperature concerns. Because this epistemic standard was not 
met, the epistemic integrity of the research process was compromised. 
It should be noted that not only Thiokol’s Boisjoly was involved in this research 
process; engineers from Marshall were involved as well. Take for instance Marshall S&E 
engineer (engineer from Marshall’s Science and Engineering Directorate) Ben Powers. 
The job of S&E engineers was to keep the contractor honest (Vaughan 1996, p. 86). 
Hence, if someone from Thiokol said that he/she did not have the data to quantify 
certain temperature concerns, then Powers should have checked whether this was 
indeed the case. He should have checked whether the temperature concerns could not 
be quantified by applying basic statistical methods to the available data, and if they 
could, he should have protested. This was his job. But Powers did not protest, not even 
when George Hardy, Marshall’s Deputy Director of Science and Engineering, asked at the 
end of the teleconference “Has anybody got anything to add to this?” (Vaughan 1996, p. 
368-369). Thus, not only Thiokol’s Boisjoly, but Marshall’s Powers too could be held 
responsible for the failure to apply basic statistical methods to the available data. This 
shows that the problem did not lie with Thiokol alone; Marshall too was partly 
responsible for the fact that the epistemic integrity of the research process was 
compromised. 
8.3 Review by middle-level managers 
The epistemic integrity of review by middle-level managers was sometimes damaged 
as well. Consider some examples from Lawrence Mulloy, SRB Project Manager at 
Marshall from 1982 to 1986. On June 25, 1985, it was found that both the primary and 
secondary O-ring of one of the SRB joints had eroded on the seventeenth mission of the 
Space Shuttle (Winsor 1988, p. 104). It was the first time that a primary O-ring had 
burned all the way through, allowing hot gases to erode a secondary O-ring. This finding 
resulted in a Launch Constraint, which meant that flight could only proceed if either the 
problem was resolved, or engineering analysis showed that the risk was acceptable 
(Vaughan 1996, pp. 163-164). 
But the Launch Constraint only included the SRB nozzle joints, and not the SRB field 
joints, as it was a nozzle joint that failed on the Space Shuttle’s seventeenth mission. 
The reason was that the nozzle joints were tested for leaks at 100 psi, while the other 
SRB joints were leak-tested at 200 psi, and Mulloy assumed that the damage in the 
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nozzle joint was due to the less rigorous leak test for the nozzle joints. He assumed that 
a defective O-ring escaped notice in the 100-psi leak test, and that this caused the 
damage. As leak check pressure for the nozzle joints was raised to 200 psi for the 
subsequent flights, Mulloy waived the Launch Constraint (Winsor 1988, p. 104). This was 
the result of Level IV and Level III meetings, and Mulloy reported a summary of the 
problem and its resolution to Levels II and I (Vaughan 1996, p. 169). 
It was legitimate for the audiences at Level II and Level I meetings to assume that 
Mulloy’s explanation of the damage found in the nozzle joint (i.e. the less rigorous leak 
test for the nozzle joints) was adequately supported by decent scientific reasoning. But 
this was actually not the case; the assumption that the damage was caused by a 
defective O-ring that escaped notice due to the 100-psi leak test, was an inadequately 
supported conjecture rather than an explanation which was backed by proper scientific 
arguments.3 Let me clarify this. 
An alternative explanation for the damage in the nozzle joint was that it was caused 
by defective design. This hypothesis was, however, dismissed. Wiley Bunn, Marshall 
Director of Reliability and Quality Assurance, justified the rejection of this hypothesis on 
the following grounds: 
 
We had six joints on that vehicle. If the design is that darn bad, all six of them should 
have leaked. We only had one leak. Therefore, if we only had one leak, it had to be a 
Quality escape. And so we just renewed our vigor to find that Quality escape. (Bunn, 
interview transcript, April 17, 1986, pp. 61-62, cited in Vaughan 1996, pp. 164-165) 
 
This is obviously a very weak argument: the fact that five out of six joints did not leak 
does not imply that the design was fully adequate – even a design that is not fully 
adequate can work most of the time. Hence, Mulloy’s assumption that the damage found 
was not due to defective design, but to the less rigorous leak test for the nozzle joints, 
was not backed by proper scientific arguments. 
This means that an epistemic standard which the audiences at Levels II and I could 
legitimately assume to be met in the research process, was violated. These audiences 
could legitimately assume that Mulloy’s review was based on proper scientific 
arguments rather than on an inadequately supported conjecture. Because Mulloy’s 
review did not meet this standard, its epistemic integrity was damaged. 
This was not the first time that the epistemic integrity of Mulloy’s work was 
compromised. When the Space Shuttle’s SRBs were examined after its fifteenth flight, 
 
                                                     
3 Thiokol’s Boisjoly seemed to be aware of this. In an internal memo he sent to Robert Lund on July 31, 1985, he 
stated that the same scenario that resulted in the failure of the nozzle joint, could also occur in a field joint 
(Presidential Commission 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 249-250). 
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Thiokol engineers found blow-by on two SRB field joints, which was ‘jet black’ and 
intermixed with the grease between the O-rings. This alarmed them, because it 
indicated that there were two destructive forces at work on the O-rings, impingement 
erosion and blow-by erosion. In explaining this, Thiokol engineers referred to the cold: 
the fifteenth mission was preceded by the three coldest days in Florida history and O-
ring temperature was 53°F, which was the lowest up to that time, and such low 
temperatures enhanced the probability of blow-by. This figured in their rationale for 
accepting risk: as Thiokol engineers did not expect to have the three coldest days in 
Florida history again, they accepted the risk for the next flight (Vaughan 1996, pp. 154-
163). 
However, as the rationale for accepting risk was reported up the hierarchy, 
temperature considerations were omitted. When the risk associated with O-ring erosion 
was assessed for the sixteenth shuttle mission, the temperature concerns of Thiokol 
engineers were considered at lower levels of FRR, but when Mulloy presented the 
rationale for accepting risk to Level I, he did not mention these concerns. He stated that 
the risk was acceptable because (1) the amount of primary erosion (0.038”) was within 
the experience base (the 0.053” erosion found after the Space Shuttle’s second mission), 
(2) the amount of erosion was within the 0.090” safety margin, and (3) the effect of hot 
gas flow on the O-rings – impingement erosion and blow-by – was self-limiting. No 
reference was made to the temperature concerns (Vaughan 1996, p. 161). 
The Level I audience could legitimately assume that Mulloy’s review met the 
following epistemic standard: all reasons for accepting the risk associated with O-ring 
erosion should be summed up, and reported to Level I. This standard was, however, 
violated. The expectation that the cold preceding the fifteenth mission would not recur 
was one of the reasons for accepting this risk, but Mulloy did not include it in his report. 
This implies that the epistemic integrity of his review was compromised. 
Besides the work of Marshall’s Mulloy, other reviews by middle-level managers were 
epistemically troublesome as well. Let me give an example from management at 
Thiokol. Richard Feynman, who was a member of the Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, has exposed a strange use of the term ‘safety factor’. 
When the risk associated with O-ring erosion was assessed for the Space Shuttle’s 
twenty-fifth mission, it was asserted that there was a safety factor of three to one. The 
idea was that on the Space Shuttle’s fifteenth mission, erosion depth was one-third of 
the radius, while it had to be at least one radius before the O-ring failed (Feynman 1986, 
pp. F1-F2). This use of the term ‘safety factor’ was adopted by Thiokol management, as 
the following quote from Allan McDonald, Director of the Solid Rocket Motor Project at 
Thiokol, indicates: 
 
If you took our worst measured erosion on the O-ring relative to what it took to really 
fail it, it was nearly a factor of three to one. Recognizing the fidelity of the math 
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model is not real good, we did not feel it was that bad at three to one, and as long as 
we could retain the secondary seal during a good portion of the erosion time period, 
we felt good. (Presidential Commission 1986, Vol. 5, p. 1591) 
 
But this use of the term ‘safety factor’ did not correspond with how this term was 
used in other engineering contexts, as Feynman showed on the basis of the following 
example: 
 
If a bridge is built to withstand a certain load without the beams permanently 
deforming, cracking, or breaking, it may be designed for the materials used to 
actually stand up under three times the load. This ‘safety factor’ is to allow for 
uncertain excesses of load, or unknown extra loads, or weaknesses in the material 
that might have unexpected flaws, etc. If now the expected load comes on to the new 
bridge and a crack appears in a beam, this is a failure of the design. There was no 
safety factor at all; even though the bridge did not actually collapse because the crack 
went only one-third of the way through the beam. The O-rings of the Solid Rocket 
Boosters were not designed to erode. Erosion was a clue that something was wrong. 
Erosion was not something from which safety can be inferred. (Feynman 1986, p. F2) 
 
This example demonstrates that the safety analysis of the O-rings by Thiokol 
management did not meet common standards for assessing safety. It was however 
legitimate for the audience to assume that common standards for calculating safety 
factors were met in this analysis, as the deviation from these standards was never clearly 
communicated. Since Thiokol management violated certain epistemic standards which 
the audience could legitimately assume to be met, the epistemic integrity of its work 
was compromised. 
8.4 Communication with the public 
The third kind of research process I identified is the research and/or discussions that 
are the basis of NASA’s communication with the public. An example is NASA’s decision 
to declare the Space Shuttle Program ‘operational’, which was publicly announced on 
July 4, 1982 (Vaughan 1996, p. 125). This announcement suggested that the Space 
Shuttle had attained an airline-like degree of routine operation (Presidential 
Commission 1986, Vol. 1, p. 5). It was then legitimate for the audience to assume that 
research had shown that the Space Shuttle was sufficiently safe for routine use. 
Furthermore, the audience could legitimately assume that this research met common 
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epistemic standards for judging a vehicle to be sufficiently safe for routine use. The 
latter was, however, not the case; NASA used much lower epistemic standards. 
When NASA publicly declared the Space Shuttle Program ‘operational’, the Space 
Shuttle was still a developmental craft with constantly changing technology and 
mysterious problems that were not predicted from design (Hall 2003, p. 240). In other 
areas of aviation, it would in such a situation definitely be too early to proceed to the 
operational phase. So in other areas of aviation, much higher standards were used to 
consider a vehicle sufficiently safe to proceed to the operational phase. This indicates 
that NASA’s research process did not live up to common epistemic standards for judging 
a vehicle to be sufficiently safe for routine use. Because the audience could legitimately 
assume that common standards were lived up to, the epistemic integrity of the research 
process was compromised. 
Another example is the estimation that the probability of mission failure was 1 in 
100,000, a figure that was published in ‘Space Shuttle Data for Planetary Mission 
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) Safety Analysis’ on February 15, 1985 
(Salmon 2005, p. 127). Let me show that the research process leading to this figure did 
not live up to the epistemic standards which the audience could legitimately assume to 
be met in it. 
An estimate of the reliability of the SRBs was made by the range safety officer on the 
basis of past performance. As 121 out of 2,900 flights failed, the probability of failure was 
approximately 1 in 25. But this included rockets that were flown for the first few times, 
and for the mature rockets, a figure of 1 in 50 might have been more reasonable. 
Furthermore, if parts would be carefully selected and inspected, even a figure of 1 in 100 
might have been achievable. A figure of 1 in 1,000 was probably not achievable at the 
time. But this conflicted with NASA management’s opinion on the matter. NASA officials 
estimated that the probability of failure with loss of vehicle and of human life was much 
lower than 1 in 100 – the lowest estimate being 1 in 100,000. They argued that the high 
figures were based on past performance of unmanned rockets, and that a distinction 
had to be made between manned space flight programs and unmanned programs. The 
argument was that because manned programs had an extremely high degree of mission 
success, standard statistical methods could not be used to determine the probability of 
mission failure, and therefore they had to rely on engineering judgment, and not on 
numerical probability usage (Feynman 1986, p. F1). 
As NASA claimed to rely on engineering judgment, it was legitimate for the audience 
to assume that the research process which led to the figure of 1 in 100,000 met the 
following epistemic standards: (1) working engineers judged the probability of mission 
failure, and (2) the figure of 1 in 100,000 was supported by their judgments. But the 
latter epistemic standard was not met; the figure of 1 in 100,000 was in fact not 
supported by working engineers’ judgments, as they estimated the probability of 
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mission failure much higher (Feynman 1986, p. F1). Therefore, the epistemic integrity of 
the research process was compromised. 
8.5 The role of non-epistemic interests 
So the epistemic integrity of different kinds of research processes in the Space 
Shuttle Program was compromised. In this section, I offer an explanation for this fact. 
More specifically, I will explain this fact on the basis of the financial and career interests 
of the different agents involved in the Space Shuttle Program. 
Let me start with a very brief sketch of the historical context in which this program 
was situated. It was a context of competition for scarce resources. The Space Shuttle 
Program was born in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, when spaceflight was no longer 
national priority and when NASA lost the budgetary certainty it had before. NASA 
personnel was reduced by 1,000 employees per year, and of the three projects that NASA 
planned – a mission to Mars, a space station in earth orbit, and a space shuttle to 
transport people and materials in space – it could only execute the space shuttle project, 
which aimed at the development of a reusable space shuttle that should reduce the cost 
of putting objects into orbit (Vaughan 1996, pp. 18-19). 
While the Apollo Program was justified by the desire to respond to the Soviet launch 
of Sputnik, the Space Shuttle Program became justified on the basis of cost-
effectiveness. The Space Shuttle Program gained approval on the basis of a study by 
Mathematica, Inc., a think tank that NASA called in in 1971 to assess the program’s cost-
effectiveness. Mathematica reported that, given the Space Shuttle’s payload capacity, it 
would pay for itself provided that there would be more than 30 flights each year. In light 
of this economic justification for the Space Shuttle Program, NASA had to maintain 
before Congress and the general public that the program was a good investment on 
economic grounds. But the estimates by Mathematica were overly optimistic – among 
others because it was based on data furnished by contractors hoping to receive shuttle 
contracts – and given workforce reductions at NASA, it became increasingly difficult for 
NASA to meet performance expectations. The gap between what NASA could do and 
what it was expected to do was widening, and this resulted in production pressure, i.e. 
the pressure to launch a certain amount of flights each year, more than was possible 
given NASA’s means (Vaughan 1996, pp. 19-32). NASA had to launch as much flights as 
possible in order to maintain government funding. Of course, this pressure also had an 
impact on NASA contractors, since they had to meet NASA requirements in order to 
maintain contracts. 
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These circumstances could explain why epistemic integrity was compromised in the 
Space Shuttle Program. Take for instance the three-factor rationale for accepting risk 
associated with O-ring erosion which Mulloy presented to Level I (see section 8.3). As we 
have seen, this rationale did not include Thiokol engineers’ temperature concerns, 
which means that the following epistemic standard was violated: all reasons for 
accepting the risk associated with O-ring erosion should be summed up, and reported to 
Level I. But before the temperature concerns could be communicated to Level I, 
systematic data on the association between temperature and O-ring erosion had to be 
collected, since only ‘solid engineering data’ were admissible in FRR presentation 
(Vaughan 1996, pp. 161-162). This would, however, have taken time, and a more time-
saving option was to simply omit these concerns. By omitting these concerns, the 
process of getting a shuttle ready for launch was accelerated. The latter served the 
financial interests of NASA and its centers, since the more shuttles would be launched 
per year, the more likely it was that the government would continue to support the 
Space Shuttle Program. Accordingly, it also served the financial and career interests of 
the people involved in this program. So these non-epistemic interests could explain why 
Mulloy violated the relevant epistemic standard: by violating the standard that all 
reasons for accepting the risk associated with O-ring erosion should be reported to Level 
I, he protected the financial and career interests of himself and his coworkers. 
It should be noted that these interests were only served if the Level I audience did 
not know that the relevant epistemic standard was violated. The Level I audience had to 
believe that this standard was met. Otherwise, Level I would have protested, and it 
would oblige Mulloy to present the complete rationale, which would mean that 
systematic data on the association between temperature and O-ring erosion would have 
to be collected after all. Hence, Mulloy’s violation would then have slowed down rather 
than accelerated the process of getting a shuttle ready for launch. So for Mulloy’s 
strategy to work it was crucial that the violation of the relevant epistemic standard was 
kept secret, so that the Level I audience could legitimately assume that it was met. In 
summary: to protect the financial and career interests of himself and his coworkers, 
Mulloy had to (1) violate an epistemic standard, and (2) let his audience assume that it 
was met. We can then conclude that these interests compromised the epistemic 
integrity of the research process. 
Financial and career interests could also explain why epistemic integrity was 
damaged in the other examples discussed above (sections 8.2-8.4). Consider, for 
instance, NASA’s public statement that the probability of mission failure was 1 in 
100,000, a figure which the audience could legitimately assume to be supported by the 
judgments of working engineers (see section 8.4). This statement gave the audience the 
impression that shuttle launches were extremely safe, which contributed to the public 
acceptability of the Space Shuttle Program, and of government funding of this program. 
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So indirectly it served the financial and career interests of those involved in the 
program. 
The figure of 1 in 100,000 could, however, not be obtained on the basis of the 
judgments of working engineers, since they estimated the probability of mission failure 
much higher. This explains why NASA violated the standard of relying on working 
engineers’ judgments: because violating this standard was necessary to arrive at a 
favorable figure, that is, a figure which would serve the financial and career interests of 
those involved in the Space Shuttle Program. So an epistemic standard which the 
audience could legitimately assume to be met was violated because this served the 
financial and career interests of those involved. These interests can then be said to have 
compromised the epistemic integrity of the research process. 
Note that it was important for NASA that the audience did not know that the relevant 
epistemic standard was violated. If the audience had known that the figure of 1 in 
100,000 was in fact not supported by working engineers’ judgments, then this figure 
would probably not have had the same impact on the audience’s opinion. The audience 
would then probably have been more skeptical towards the Space Shuttle Program and 
towards government funding of this program, so that the financial and career interests 
of those involved in the program would not have been served. 
Similar explanations can be constructed for the other examples of compromised 
epistemic integrity discussed above (sections 8.2-8.4). In each example, the financial and 
career interests of those involved in the research process were served by violating an 
epistemic standard which the audience could legitimately assume to be met. These 
interests could therefore explain why the epistemic integrity of the research process 
was compromised. This is not to say that in each case, an epistemic standard which the 
audience could legitimately assume to be met was intentionally violated, that is, with the 
explicit intention of serving one’s non-epistemic interests. It is also possible that such 
interests compromised the epistemic integrity of the research process without those 
involved being aware of this. To illustrate this, consider Roger Boisjoly’s failure to apply 
basic statistical methods to the data available to Thiokol on the eve of the Challenger 
disaster (see section 8.2). It seems that this was an inadvertent mistake on behalf of 
Boisjoly; he did not seem to be aware of his failure. Still, this failure could be explained 
on the basis of non-epistemic interests. Let me clarify how. 
Firstly, there was a certain time pressure at NASA and its contractors, since working 
too slowly could jeopardize future funding or contracts. Accordingly, employees had to 
proceed as quickly as possible in order to satisfy their financial and career interests. 
This made failures such as Boisjoly’s more likely. In the absence of the relevant financial 
and career interests, Boisjoly may have seen how applying basic statistical methods to 
the data available to Thiokol would deliver a clear quantitative argument for his 
temperature concerns. The epistemic integrity of the research process would then not 
have been damaged.  
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There is also a second way in which non-epistemic interests may have affected 
Boisjoly’s work. Due to the pressure to launch, NASA contractors and their employees 
did not want to be the organization/person that was responsible for postponing launch. 
This applied especially to Thiokol on the eve of the Challenger launch, since a 
teleconference to discuss Thiokol’s one-billion-dollar contract was scheduled for 
January 28, after the Challenger lift-off (Charles 1989, p. 118). So if Thiokol would be 
responsible for the Challenger launch to be postponed, the financial consequences for 
Thiokol could be terrible. 
Now, if Thiokol’s Boisjoly had applied basic statistical methods to the available data, 
then this would have resulted in a clear quantitative signal that cold temperatures could 
cause O-ring erosion, and launch would have probably been postponed. Boisjoly and 
Thiokol would then be responsible for launch delay, which would, as we have seen, 
threaten Thiokol’s financial interests, and thus also Boisjoly’s financial and career 
interests. Of course, being responsible for launch delay was still preferable to being 
responsible for mission failure. But this was not what was expected; even Boisjoly 
seemed to expect that the mission would return (even though he was aware of the risk 
involved) (Vaughan 1996, p. 380). Moreover, if the mission would fail, as it did, Boisjoly 
would not be seen as the person who was responsible for this, but rather as the hero 
who tried to prevent the tragedy.4 
So the failure to develop a clear quantitative argument for his temperature concerns 
was expected to serve Boisjoly’s non-epistemic interests. This may have inhibited his 
creativity in developing such an argument. If his interests were not expected to be 
served by the failure to develop a quantitative argument for his temperature concerns, 
then Boisjoly may have been more inventive in developing such an argument, and he 
would probably have at least checked whether such an argument could be produced by 
applying basic statistical methods to the available data. The epistemic integrity of the 
research process would then not have been damaged. So by demotivating him to 
develop a clear quantitative argument for his temperature concerns, Boisjoly’s non-
epistemic interests may have caused the epistemic integrity of the research process to 
be damaged in a way that Boisjoly himself was not aware of. 
I should remark that it is difficult to prove that the explanations developed in this 
section are correct. This is a question which requires more research. The main virtue of 
my analysis is then not that it provides evidence for the existence of certain interest 
 
                                                     
4 Also see the report of the U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology: 
 
[T]he present system permits [contractors] to ‘express concern’ without actually saying, ‘stop the flight, it 
is unsafe’. If the odds favor a successful flight they do not have to be responsible for cancelling, yet if the 
mission fails they are on record as having warned about potential dangers. (House Committee 1986, p. 152) 
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influences in the Space Shuttle Program. Its main virtue is that if we assume that 
research processes in the Space Shuttle Program were actually influenced by non-
epistemic interests in the ways described in this section, then my analysis shows why 
these influences were epistemically problematic. 
8.6 Advantages of my analysis 
In this last section of chapter 8, I want to sum up some advantages of my analysis 
over earlier analyses of the Space Shuttle Program. The practices that were 
characterized as problematic in this chapter have already been recognized as 
problematic in earlier work. But the justification I offered is new. Moreover, I think that 
my justification in terms of epistemic integrity outperforms earlier justifications. Take, 
for instance, Feynman’s criticism on NASA’s use of the term ‘safety factor’. He argues 
that the term ‘safety factor’ was used in a strange way. But it is not because something is 
strange that it is necessarily problematic. I was able to show why the strange use of the 
term ‘safety factor’ was problematic: because it implied that the epistemic integrity of 
the research process was compromised (see section 8.3). 
More generally, it seems that earlier justifications often start from certain traditional 
or common standards, which were violated in the relevant cases. They do, however, not 
clarify why adherence to these standards is crucial. In itself, deviating from traditional 
or common standards is not necessarily problematic (see section 6.5.2). My analysis 
reveals why it was problematic in the relevant cases: because it implied that the 
epistemic integrity of the research process was compromised. 
It should also be noted that most earlier analyses focus on a certain accident (the 
Challenger disaster or the Columbia disaster) and search for factors that contributed to 
this accident. These factors are then regarded as problematic partly on that ground. But 
things might have been different. If some environmental factors (e.g., temperature) 
were a bit different, the Challenger or Columbia disaster might not have occurred, even 
if NASA and its contractors would have proceeded exactly the same as they currently 
have. Perhaps NASA just had bad luck. The problem with accounts that evaluate 
practices in light of events such as the Challenger or Columbia disaster is then that the 
outcomes of such studies are heavily dependent upon contingent circumstances. If 
things had been different, and no accidents had occurred, such studies might have very 
different outcomes; they might conclude that NASA should be praised for its efficiency 
at getting shuttles in space and back on earth safely. What I did, is show that certain 
research processes in the Space Shuttle Program were problematic – their epistemic 
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integrity was damaged – in a way that is independent of whether or not these research 
processes resulted in certain accidents. 
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Chapter 9  
Controversies concerning the IPCC1 
(Co-author: Laszlo Kosolosky) 
The concept of epistemic integrity can also be used to analyze cases from other fields 
than aerospace science. This chapter concerns climate science. The focus is on the work 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is the leading 
international body for assessing climate change. It provides the world with a clear 
scientific view on the current state of knowledge on climate change and its potential 
environmental and socio-economic impacts. What it does exactly is review and assess 
the most recent scientific, technical, and socio-economic information produced 
worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate change.2 It publishes its analyses in 
what it calls Assessment Reports. 
There has been a lot of controversy around the IPCC’s Assessment Reports and how 
they were produced. It has been insinuated that political interests have corrupted the 
production of these reports. In this chapter, two particular examples of such 
controversy are presented (section 9.2) and analyzed in terms of epistemic integrity 
(section 9.3). We assess the epistemic integrity of the work by the IPCC which was the 
target of controversy, in order to see whether this work may have been influenced by 
political interests in epistemically unacceptable ways. But first, let us give some 
background information on the IPCC and its procedures. 
 
                                                     
1 Laszlo Kosolosky has collected the examples that are used in this chapter, and I have analyzed them on the 
basis of the new concept of epistemic integrity (as defined by EIR6; see section 6.7.1). 
2 See http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UtZ8xO0VGM8. 
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9.1 Inner workings of the IPCC 
The IPCC is a scientific body under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). It was 
established in 1988 by the United Nations Environment (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) with the purpose of providing a clear scientific 
view on the current state of knowledge on climate change and its potential 
environmental and socio-economic impacts. Its task is to review and assess the most 
recent scientific, technical, and socio-economic information produced worldwide 
relevant to the understanding of climate change. The results are bundled in Assessment 
Reports. The IPCC tries to ensure that these reports offer an objective and complete 
assessment of current information, which reflects a wide range of views and expertise. 
Thousands of scientists from all over the world contribute to the work of the IPCC on a 
voluntary basis. The IPCC does not conduct its own research nor does it monitor climate 
related data or parameters.3 
The IPCC is an intergovernmental body which is open to all member countries of the 
UN and the WMO. Currently 195 countries are members of the IPCC. Governments 
participate in the review process and the plenary Sessions, where main decisions about 
the IPCC work program are taken and reports are accepted, adopted, and approved. By 
endorsing the IPCC Assessment Reports, governments acknowledge the authority of 
their scientific content.4 
To divide the work of writing an Assessment Report, the organization divided itself 
into three Working Groups: 
 
(1) Working Group I assesses the physical scientific aspects of the climate system and 
climate change, including attribution of past change and projections of future 
change. 
(2) Working Group II assesses the vulnerability of socioeconomic and natural 
systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of climate 
change, and options for adapting to it. 
(3) Working Group III assesses policy and technology options for mitigating climate 
change through, for example, limiting and preventing greenhouse gas emissions 
and enhancing activities that remove them from the atmosphere. (InterAcademy 
Council 2010, p. 6) 
 
 
                                                     
3 See http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UtZ8xO0VGM8. 
4 See http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UtZ8xO0VGM8. 
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To ensure proper preparation and analysis, the IPCC devised a thorough peer review 
procedure that contains the following chronological steps: 
 
(1) Compilation of lists of potential Coordinating Lead Authors, Lead Authors, 
Contributing Authors, Expert Reviewers, Review Editors and Government Focal 
Points. 
(2) Selection of Coordinating Lead Authors, Lead Authors, and Review Editors. 
(3) Preparation of draft report. 
(4) Review: 
(a) First review (by experts). 
(b) Second review (by governments and experts). 
(5) Preparation of final draft report. 
(6) Acceptance of report at a Session of the Working Group(s). (IPCC 2013, pp. 3-9)5 
 
In step 1, potential Coordinating Lead Authors, Lead Authors, Contributing Authors, 
Expert Reviewers, Review Editors and Government Focal Points are identified. In step 2, 
a selection of Coordinating Lead Authors, Lead Authors, and Review Editors is made. 
These groups should reflect different scientific, technical, and socio-economic views, 
and different geographical backgrounds. In step 3, the Coordinating Lead Authors and 
Lead Authors make up a draft report. This procedure is governed by three principles. 
First, the best available scientific and technical advice has to be included in the report to 
assure that the report is up-to-date and as comprehensive as possible. Second, the 
procedures have to assure that participating countries are represented as much as 
possible. Third, the review process has to be objective, open, and transparent. In step 4, 
experts and governments analyze the draft report by investigating how well the authors 
have acted in accordance with the three principles spelled out above. There are two 
review circulations: the first by experts, and the second by experts and governments. 
The group of expert reviewers should represent, insofar as possible, a wide range of 
scientific, technical, and socio-economic views, expertise, and geographical 
backgrounds. In step 5, Coordinating Lead Authors and Lead Authors prepare the final 
version of the report in consultation with the Review Editors, taking into account 
possible criticisms resulting from step 4. The last step is the acceptance of the report at 
a Session of the Working Group(s) (IPCC 2013, pp. 3-9). 
Given the relevance of the IPCC’s work for policy, political interests may come into 
play in the review process. For instance, the governments involved in this process may 
 
                                                     
5 For a detailed description of the tasks and responsibilities for Lead Authors, Coordinating Lead Authors, 
Contributing Authors, Expert Reviewers, Review Editors and Government Focal Points, see IPCC (2013, pp. 14-
16). 
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take such interests into account in reviewing the report. When such interests affect the 
IPCC’s work, this is not necessarily a problem, but it can be. The concept of epistemic 
integrity enables us to determine whether or not a certain interest influence on the 
IPCC’s work is epistemically problematic (as will be illustrated in section 9.3). 
9.2 Two controversies 
Not everyone accepts the authority of the IPCC and its Assessment Reports. This 
section considers two controversies in which skeptics have tried to discredit the IPCC. 
The first relates to the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report (IPCC 1995), and the second to 
the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007). 
9.2.1 Second Assessment Report 
The focus of the first controversy was on chapter 8 of Working Group I’s contribution 
to the Second Assessment Report. That chapter summarizes the evidence concerning 
human influences on global climate, which suggests that climate change is partly caused 
by humans. Chapter 8 also indicates that there were still some large uncertainties 
remaining (Santer et al. 1995). 
The chapter under consideration, and more specifically Benjamin Santer, one of its 
Lead Authors, has been criticized by a group of physicists tied to the George C. Marshall 
Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. They accused Santer of 
‘scientific cleansing’, in the sense that he had removed unfavorable views from the final 
Assessment Report. Some of them linked this misconduct to political purposes. Such 
accusations were spread through reports in newspapers, and through letters to 
congressmen, to officials of the Department of Energy, and to editors of scientific 
journals. Santer responded that he had not done anything wrong, which plenty of 
scientists confirmed (Oreskes & Conway 2010, pp. 3-5). 
A question that arises is the following: Did political interests compromise the 
epistemic integrity of the review by the IPCC, and by Santer in particular? We address 
this question in section 9.3.1, arguing that the epistemic integrity of the IPCC’s work was 
not damaged. 
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9.2.2 Fourth Assessment Report 
More recent skeptic attacks were targeted against the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report. These critical voices reached a peak when the IPCC-board had to acknowledge 
that the report contained a false prognosis of the disappearance of the Himalayan 
glaciers (IPCC 2010; Kosolosky forthcoming). The disputed paragraph addressing the 
melting rates goes as follows:  
 
Glaciers in the Himalaya are receding faster than in any other part of the world (see 
Table 10.9) and, if the present rate continues, the likelihood of them disappearing by 
the year 2035 and perhaps sooner is very high if the Earth keeps warming at the 
current rate. Its total area will likely shrink from the present 500,000 to 100,000 km2 
by the year 2035 (WWF, 2005). (Cruz et al. 2007, p. 493) 
 
This paragraph is based on a source issued by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). 
In that source, the prediction that the Himalayan glaciers will vanish is supported by a 
1999 report by the Working Group on Himalayan Glaciology of the International 
Commission for Snow and Ice, and a 1999 article in popular science magazine New 
Scientist (WWF 2005, p. 29). Both are based on non-refereed findings by glaciologist 
Syed Hasnain, who later admitted that these findings were speculative (Schiermeier 
2010, p. 276). 
Moreover, “its total area will likely shrink from the present 500,000 to 100,000 km² by 
the year 2035” in the above paragraph cannot refer to the Himalayan glaciers, since the 
Himalayan glacier area was about 33,000 km² (Cogley et al. 2010). According to Cogley et 
al. (2010), that statement probably originates from a report published by UNESCO, which 
states that “its total area [of all glaciers worldwide] will shrink from 500,000 to 100,000 
km² by the year 2350” (Kotlyakov 1996, p. 66). 
Skeptics have used the Himalayan glacier flaw to cast doubt on the IPCC’s conclusions 
and on human-caused climate change. An example is Mark Steyn’s opinion piece 
‘Credibility is what’s really melting’, published in the Canadian news magazine 
Maclean’s. In that opinion piece, Steyn uses the fact that the above quote from the 
Fourth Assessment Report is ultimately based on idle speculation by Hasnain, to show 
that ‘climate change’ is not a story of climate change, but of the corruption of science. 
He also claims that the quote was included in the IPCC report for political reasons (Steyn 
2010). 
In light of Steyn’s opinion piece, it seems that political interests have compromised 
the integrity of the IPCC process. But is this correct? In section 9.3.2, we discuss the 
epistemic integrity of the IPCC process resulting in the Himalayan glacier flaw. We 
argue that epistemic integrity was indeed compromised (possibly by non-epistemic 
interests, including political interests), but that it was restored after a while. 
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9.3 Analysis in terms of epistemic integrity 
9.3.1 Second Assessment Report 
To recap: a group of physicists accused Benjamin Santer of ‘scientific cleansing’ (that 
is, expunging unfavorable views) in producing chapter 8 of Working Group I’s 
contribution to the Second Assessment Report. Perhaps the most famous of these 
attacks is Frederick Seitz’s op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, entitled ‘A major 
deception on ‘global warming’’. In that piece, Seitz claims that IPCC rules were violated 
in the process leading to the chapter under consideration. More specifically, certain 
passages were removed from this chapter after it was approved by the contributing 
scientists, which was according to Seitz not permitted by IPCC rules. Seitz maintains 
that the changes to the report “worked to remove hints of the skepticism with which 
many scientists regard claims that human activities are having a major impact on 
climate in general and on global warming in particular” (Seitz 1996). The effect was “to 
deceive policy makers and the public into believing that the scientific evidence shows 
human activities are causing global warming” (Seitz 1996). Although Seitz admits that 
he does not know who exactly made the relevant changes, he states that “the report’s 
lead author, Benjamin D. Santer, must presumably take the major responsibility” (Seitz 
1996). 
While Seitz does not explicitly state that the alleged misconduct by the IPCC is linked 
to political interests, Fred Singer does make such a link in an op-ed piece that appears a 
month later in the Wall Street Journal. Singer refers to Seitz as revealing “that a UN-
sponsored scientific report promoting global warming has been tampered with for 
political purposes”, and he insinuates that IPCC officials are on a “crusade to provide a 
scientific cover for political action”  (Singer 1996). 
If Seitz’s and Singer’s op-ed pieces are correct, then it seems that the influence of 
political interests on the IPCC process was epistemically problematic. If political 
interests caused a violation of IPCC rules of procedure, which are epistemic standards 
which the audience can legitimately assume to be met, then they have compromised the 
epistemic integrity of the IPCC process. But a closer look at the actual IPCC process 
reveals that this is not the case. What Santer actually did, was make adjustments to the 
report in response to comments from reviewers. Later, the adjusted report was accepted 
by the full IPCC Plenary (Edwards & Schneider 1997). This was completely in accordance 
with IPCC rules of procedure (cf. section 9.1 above; also see Edwards & Schneider 1997; 
Oreskes & Conway 2010, p. 4; Santer 1996). 
It should also be stressed that, contrary to what Seitz and Singer insinuate, remaining 
uncertainties or doubts about human-caused climate change were not suppressed in the 
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published version of the IPCC report. Consider, for instance, the following passage in the 
last section of chapter 8: 
 
Finally, we come to the difficult question of when the detection and attribution of 
human-induced climate change is likely to occur. The answer to this question must 
be subjective, particularly in the light of the large signal and noise uncertainties 
discussed in this chapter. Some scientists maintain that these uncertainties currently 
preclude any answer to the question posed above. (Santer et al. 1995, p. 439) 
 
This passage shows that Santer has not covered up uncertainties or doubts with respect 
to human-caused climate change. 
It seems then that Santer has not violated any epistemic standards which the 
audience can legitimately assume to be met in the IPCC process; neither IPCC rules of 
procedure, nor the common epistemic standard that remaining uncertainties should be 
honestly reported. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the epistemic integrity of his 
work was compromised. Accordingly, we have no reason to believe that political 
interests influenced the IPCC process in an epistemically problematic way. 
Note that this does not imply that political interests have not affected the IPCC 
process in any way. It is possible that some of the reviewers’ comments were partly 
politically motivated, and that the authors’ political interests had some influence on the 
content of the report, in the sense that some nuances would have been different if their 
political interests would have been different. The point is that as long as such interest 
influences do not involve violations of the epistemic standards which the audience can 
legitimately assume to be met in the process, they are not epistemically problematic. 
9.3.2 Fourth Assessment Report 
Now consider the IPCC process leading to the Himalayan glacier flaw in the Fourth 
Assessment Report. In this process, at least two different epistemic standards which the 
audience could legitimately assume to be met were violated. The first is the following: 
IPCC authors should critically assess any source that they wish to use, and if they find 
that the results of the source are not supported by genuine scientific evidence, then 
they should not include these results in the IPCC report. This standard, let us call it s1, 
was violated with respect to the prediction that the Himalayan glaciers will vanish by 
2035. This prediction was not based on genuine scientific evidence, but on speculation 
by Syed Hasnain (see section 9.2.2). If the IPCC authors had critically assessed the source 
of the prediction, and checked whether it was supported by genuine scientific evidence, 
then they would have discovered that it was not, and they should have decided not to  
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Comment 
number 
Comment Writing team notes 
E10-466 100,000? You just said it will disappear. (David Saltz, 
Desert Research Institute, Ben Gurion University) 
Missed to clarify 
this one 
E10-468 I am not sure that this is true for the very large 
Karakoram glaciers in the western Himalaya. Hewitt 
(2005) suggests from measurements that these are 
expanding – and this would certainly be explained 
by climatic change in precipitation and temperature 
trends seen in the Karakoram region (Fowler and 
Archer, J Climate in press; Archer and Fowler, 2004) 
You need to quote Barnett et al.’s 2005 Nature paper 
here—this seems very similar to what they said. 
(Hayley Fowler, Newcastle University) 
Was unable to get 
hold of the 
suggested 
references will 
consider in the final 
version (sic) 
Table 9.1 Reviewer comments concerning the erroneous estimation of the Himalayan glaciers’ melting rate in 
the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. (Reproduced from InterAcademy Council 2010, p. 22.) 
 
include the prediction in the IPCC report. That is what s1 required them to do. Because 
the Himalayan glacier prediction was included in the IPCC report, we can conclude that 
s1 was violated. 
The audience could, however, legitimately assume that s1 was met. A document 
issued by the IPCC on its procedures states that “[a]uthors who wish to include 
information from a non-published/non-peer-reviewed source are requested to […] 
[c]ritically assess any source that they wish to include” (IPCC 2008). The principle that 
they should not include the source’s results if they find that these results are not 
supported by genuine scientific evidence, corresponds with the IPCC’s aim “to provide 
the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate 
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts”.6 In light of these 
objectives of the IPCC, it was legitimate for the audience to assume that s1 was met in 
the IPCC process leading to the Fourth Assessment Report. Since s1 was actually not met 
in this process, the epistemic integrity of this process was damaged. 
There is also a second way in which epistemic integrity was compromised. The 
problem lay with the review of an earlier draft of the Fourth Assessment Report. This 
review consisted of two review circulations. Two of the comments in the second review 
concerned the erroneous estimation of the Himalayan glaciers’ melting rate (see table 
9.1). The first pointed at the contradiction between the statement that the Himalayan 
 
                                                     
6 http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.Utz6kO0VGM8, italics added. 
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glaciers are likely to disappear by 2035 and the statement that they are likely to shrink 
to 100,000 km² by 2035. The second reviewer doubted whether the Himalayan glaciers 
were likely to disappear and referred to some sources which supported his doubt 
(InterAcademy Council 2010, p. 23). 
The authors have not adequately dealt with these comments (Kosolosky 
forthcoming). They have not removed the contradiction revealed by comment E10-466 
(see table 9.1), and they have not followed comment E10-468’s (see table 9.1) suggestion 
to take into account Hewitt (2005). Hewitt (2005) mentions evidence against the claim 
that the Himalayan glaciers’ are likely to disappear: 
 
In the late 1990s widespread evidence of glacier expansion was found in the central 
Karakoram, in contrast to a worldwide decline of mountain glaciers. The expansions 
were almost exclusively in glacier basins from the highest parts of the range and 
developed quickly after decades of decline. Exceptional numbers of glacier surges 
were also reported. (Hewitt 2005, p. 332) 
 
The IPCC authors should not have neglected such evidence. Moreover, in light of this 
evidence, they should have deleted the prediction that the Himalayan glaciers are likely 
to disappear by 2035, since it was not supported by the available scientific evidence. 
So the following epistemic standard s2 was violated: IPCC authors should adequately 
deal with the comments of reviewers, in the sense that (1) if a reviewer points at a flaw 
(e.g., a contradiction) in the draft report, then this flaw should be removed from the 
report, and (2) if a reviewer points at evidence against a certain claim in the report, then 
the authors should take this evidence into account, and remove the claim if it turns out 
that this claim is not in accordance with the existing scientific evidence. The audience 
could legitimately assume that this standard was met because s2 is a common epistemic 
standard in the relevant field, and no violations of s2 were reported. Hence, the fact that 
s2 was violated in the process resulting in the Fourth Assessment Report implies that an 
epistemic standard which the audience could legitimately assume to be met was 
violated in this process. This is the second way in which the epistemic integrity of this 
process was compromised. 
It is possible that the violations of s1 and s2 were (perhaps partly) caused by certain 
non-epistemic interests. Consider two different non-epistemic interests that could have 
contributed to these violations. The first is the interest to save time. Most scientists 
work under time pressure, and this gives them an interest in saving time. This interest 
is served by skipping certain parts of the research process. This could explain why IPCC 
authors have not checked whether the prediction that the Himalayan glaciers will 
disappear by 2035 was supported by genuine scientific evidence, and why they simply 
adopted it from WWF (2005) without critically assessing this source. The interest to save 
time could also explain why the IPCC authors have not adequately dealt with the 
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reviewers’ comments. Because adhering to the epistemic standards of critically 
assessing one’s sources and adequately dealing with reviewers’ comments takes time, 
and because IPCC authors have an interest in saving time, these epistemic standards 
were not adhered to. 
But there is also a second non-epistemic interest that may have played in the 
violation of these standards. IPCC authors are, in light of their expertise, very well 
aware of climate change and its disastrous effects. At the same time, they are 
confronted with the lack of effective political action to mitigate climate change. As a 
consequence, they may have the non-epistemic interest to do something about this, that 
is, to stimulate such political action. This political interest is served by clear signals that 
climate change will have disastrous consequences in the near future. The claim that the 
Himalayan glaciers are likely to disappear by 2035 can function as such a signal. 
It is possible that this contributed to the fact that the IPCC authors were not eager to 
critically assess the source of the Himalayan glacier prediction, nor to look into 
evidence against it (as one of the reviewers suggested; see table 9.1). Such actions 
involved a risk, namely, the risk of finding that this prediction should actually not be in 
the report. But including it would serve the interest to promote effective political 
action, as we have just seen. This may be part of the reason why the epistemic standards 
of critically assessing one’s sources and adequately dealing with reviewers’ comments 
were not adhered to. 
In summary, we propose the following possible explanation: the IPCC process 
resulting in the Himalayan glacier flaw violated certain epistemic standards which the 
audience could legitimately assume to be met because these violations served the IPCC 
authors’ interests to save time and to stimulate effective political action. If this 
explanation is correct, then certain non-epistemic interests of the IPCC authors 
compromised the epistemic integrity of the research process. Such an influence of non-
epistemic interests on the research process is epistemically problematic. 
It should be mentioned that the IPCC restored the epistemic integrity of the process 
under consideration after a while. In January 2010, almost two and a half years after the 
publication of the Himalayan glacier flaw in Cruz et al. (2007), the IPCC publicly 
admitted that “the clear and well-established standards of evidence, required by the 
IPCC procedures, were not applied properly” (IPCC 2010) in the process leading to the 
Himalayan glacier flaw. This official apology made clear to the audience that standards 
like s1 and s2 were violated in the process under consideration. Accordingly, it was no 
longer legitimate for the audience to assume that s1 and s2 were met in this process. This 
means that the process that resulted in the Himalayan glacier flaw no longer violated an 
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epistemic standard which the audience could legitimately assume to be met in it. Hence, 
the epistemic integrity of this process was restored after the IPCC’s public apology.7 
9.4 Advantages of our analysis 
To conclude this chapter, let us point out some advantages of our analysis. What is 
new about this analysis is that existing controversies concerning the IPCC have been 
critically examined on the basis of the clearly explicated concept of epistemic integrity. 
This examination shows how the concept of epistemic integrity can be used to elaborate 
charges against the IPCC. Our discussion of the controversy about the Himalayan glacier 
flaw illustrates how critics of the IPCC can use this concept to work out arguments for 
the view that the IPCC process has been corrupted by non-epistemic interests. But the 
concept of epistemic integrity is also useful for countering the critics’ attacks. We have 
seen how it can be used to argue (1) that the IPCC process underlying the Second 
Assessment Report was not influenced by political interests in a way that is 
epistemically unacceptable, and (2) that the epistemic integrity of the process resulting 
in the Himalayan glacier flaw in the Fourth Assessment Report was restored after a 
while. 
The main virtue of using our concept of epistemic integrity in such discussions is that 
it enables us to make a clear distinction between interest influences which are 
epistemically acceptable and interest influences which are epistemically unacceptable. 
Given the political relevance of the IPCC’s work, it seems naïve to believe that the 
political interests of IPCC authors and reviewers do not affect this work in any way. The 
expected political consequences of different possible formulations of the same idea may 
for instance be considered in deciding which specific formulation to put in the IPCC 
report. This is not necessarily problematic. What is needed then, are criteria that enable 
us to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable interest influences. The 
concept of epistemic integrity can function as such a criterion, as has been illustrated in 
this chapter. Earlier discussions of the IPCC processes considered in this chapter8 do not 
 
                                                     
7 This does not imply that the process under consideration suddenly became genuinely scientific. One could 
still argue that the process was unscientific; we only claim that its epistemic integrity was restored. The 
question whether or not the process is worthy of the term ‘scientific’ is a different issue. 
8 See, e.g., Oreskes & Conway (2010) for a discussion of the controversy concerning the Second Assessment 
Report. For discussions of the process resulting in the Himalayan glacier flaw, see, e.g., Cogley et al. (2010), 
InterAcademy Council (2010), and Ravindranath (2010). 
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provide such a clear-cut criterion to distinguish epistemically acceptable interest 
influences from epistemically unacceptable interest influences. 
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Chapter 10  
Conclusion 
Let me now return to the two challenges for philosophy of science that were 
presented at the beginning of this dissertation: (1) to describe and analyze the different 
roles that different kinds of interests play in science, and (2) to distinguish acceptable 
interest influences in science from unacceptable interest influences in science (see 
section 1.3). The purpose of this dissertation was to address these challenges. In this 
concluding chapter, I recapitulate how I have exactly contributed to tackling the two 
challenges, and some lines of further research are proposed. 
10.1 The first challenge 
The first challenge was to study the various influences of interests in the scientific 
process. My contribution consisted of a discussion of the influences of different kinds of 
interests in reasoning processes within scientific research (see part 1). More specifically, 
I discussed interest influences on hypothesis acceptance, theory choice, and the 
scientific explanation of phenomena. The following interest influences were identified. 
Firstly, non-epistemic interests affect whether or not a certain hypothesis is accepted 
by influencing whether or not the evidence in favor of the hypothesis is considered 
sufficiently strong to accept the hypothesis. Secondly, non-epistemic interests can 
affect theory choice by influencing (1) which values are used to assess theories, (2) how 
these values are interpreted, and (3) how they are weighed against each other. Thirdly, 
epistemic and non-epistemic interests affect the construction and evaluation of 
scientific explanations. We have seen that the adequacy of an explanation depends on 
which particular interests (including non-epistemic interests) it has to serve. Because 
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scientists want to end up with the most adequate explanation, they take these interests 
into account in developing and evaluating explanations. 
On the basis of these interest influences, I attacked a view which many non-
philosophers seem to hold, and which, I think, still underlies the approach of many 
philosophers today (even though they may reject it in its original form): the ideal of 
purity. I distinguished two versions of this ideal: the full ideal of purity and the partial 
ideal of purity. The former states that scientific decisions such as hypothesis acceptance 
and theory choice should not be affected by non-epistemic interests. I attacked this 
view by arguing (1) that non-epistemic interests should be considered in decisions on 
whether or not to accept a hypothesis, and (2) that the requirement that theory choice 
is unaffected by non-epistemic interests may be too demanding. 
My discussion of interest influences in the construction and evaluation of scientific 
explanations served to undermine the partial ideal of purity, which consists of the 
following theses: 
 
(1) An interest indirectly influences a decision if it is used to determine whether the 
available evidence is sufficient to make that decision. 
(2) Indirect influences of non-epistemic interests on scientific decisions are harmless 
(and even desirable). 
(3) An interest directly influences a decision if it is used as a stand-alone reason to 
motivate the decision. 
(4) Direct influences of non-epistemic interests on decisions concerning the 
characterization of data, the interpretation of evidence, or theory acceptance are 
unacceptable in science. 
(5) Such influences can and must be eliminated. 
 
By arguing that direct influences (as characterized by (3)) of non-epistemic interests on 
the acceptance of explanations should be allowed in science, I challenged theses (4) and 
(5) of the partial ideal of purity. 
One of the main purposes of part 1 was to convince people to fully abandon the ideal 
of purity (rather than to try to save parts of it), and to accept that non-epistemic 
interests form an integral part of scientific reasoning. I hope that part 1 was sufficient 
for that, but if not, then further research on interest influences in science may be 
helpful. I wish to encourage researchers to find more examples of the different kinds of 
interest influences identified in this dissertation, as well as to spell out and document 
other kinds of interest influences in scientific research processes. This is not only useful 
to get more people to understand the ubiquity and importance of non-epistemic 
interests in scientific research, but also to acquire a more comprehensive view of 
interests in science. 
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10.2 The second challenge 
The fact that I reject the ideal of purity does not imply that all possible influences of 
non-epistemic interests on scientific research processes are therefore acceptable in my 
view. Sometimes, such influences are unacceptable. Since the ideal of purity does not 
enable us to adequately account for such problematic interest influences, new criteria 
are needed for this. That was the second challenge for philosophy of science I presented: 
to develop criteria that enable us to (1) identify problematic interest influences in 
science, and (2) explain why these interest influences are problematic. 
In part 2 of this dissertation, one such criterion was offered, namely, a criterion to 
account for epistemically problematic interest influences. More specifically, I introduced 
a new concept of epistemic integrity that can function as such a criterion. The 
underlying idea was that if an interest causes the epistemic integrity of the research 
process to be lower, then its particular influence on this research process is 
epistemically problematic. 
The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process was defined as the degree to 
which the research process lives up to the epistemic standards that the audience can 
legitimately assume to be met in it. This definition enables us to identify epistemically 
problematic interest influences. More specifically, it is the basis for the following 
algorithm for finding such interest influences. First, one checks, on the basis of what is 
reported to the audience, which epistemic standards the audience can legitimately 
assume to be met in the research process. The second step is to investigate whether the 
research process actually adhered to these epistemic standards. Where one discovers 
that this is not the case, one searches for an explanation, which is the third step. If it 
turns out that non-adherence to the epistemic standards identified in the first step is 
due to the influence of certain interests, then the conclusion is that these interests had 
an epistemically problematic influence on the research process. 
I have applied this algorithm to different research processes in aerospace science and 
climate science. For both areas, I was able to specify epistemically problematic interest 
influences on research processes. My analyses show that the concept of epistemic 
integrity is useful to (1) identify epistemically problematic interest influences in 
science, and (2) explain why these interest influences are epistemically problematic. 
Thus, the concept of epistemic integrity is a valuable tool for dealing with the second 
challenge for philosophy of science I presented. 
It should be noted that the concept is not only useful for philosophers of science, but 
also for scientists themselves, and for science policy-makers. Scientists can use it as an 
ideal that their research processes should live up to, in order to make sure that their 
work is not epistemically problematic. My advice to scientists is to communicate most 
clearly about which epistemic standards their research processes meet, and which not. 
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In that way, they avoid that the audience can legitimately hold false beliefs about the 
epistemic standards that are met. By avoiding this, the epistemic integrity of the 
research process is protected. Science policy-makers can use the concept of epistemic 
integrity to outline and assess different policy options. They can use it to detect 
epistemic problems, and where such problems occur, strategies to deal with these 
problems can be developed. Different strategies can be implemented, and the concept of 
epistemic integrity makes it possible to examine how each affects the epistemic 
integrity of the relevant research processes. The more a strategy promotes epistemic 
integrity, the better it is. 
A lot more research remains to be done from here on. Firstly, I wish to encourage 
research in the vein of chapters 8-9 of this dissertation. It is valuable to analyze research 
processes in a variety of scientific fields in terms of epistemic integrity. Such analyses 
help us to discover new epistemic problems, and to understand the exact nature of the 
epistemic problems that earlier analyses have hinted at. This is crucial to adequately 
deal with these problems. 
Secondly, part 2 of this dissertation focused on interest influences that are 
epistemically problematic, but interest influences can also be problematic for non-
epistemic reasons. An interesting article on this matter is De Winter & Kosolosky 
(forthcoming). In that article, different ethical theories (utilitarianism, John Rawls’s 
theory of justice, Thomas Pogge’s rights-based account of minimal justice, Philip 
Kitcher’s ethical theory, and classical liberalism) are used to argue that the research 
agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences are morally problematic, 
and these moral failures are explained by the influence of commercial interests on 
agenda-setting in these fields. Accordingly, the influence of these interests can be 
regarded as morally problematic. This shows that the concept of epistemic integrity is 
not the only criterion to identify problematic interest influences in science. Further 
research is needed to acquire a comprehensive picture of the different criteria that can 
be used to assess interest influences in science. Only if such research is carried out will 
we be able to develop a clear view on the distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable interest influences in science (=  the second challenge). 
A final topic for further research I wish to mention is the relation between the 
different kinds of scientific integrity. In chapter 6, four kinds of scientific integrity were 
distinguished: (1) the moral integrity of scientists and their institutions, (2) the moral 
integrity of the research process, (3) the epistemic integrity of scientists and their 
institutions, and (4) the epistemic integrity of the research process (see section 6.1). 
Only the latter kind of scientific integrity was defined in this dissertation. But I think it 
is interesting to also search for adequate definitions with respect to the three other 
kinds, and to clarify the relations between the four different kinds of scientific integrity 
on the basis of these definitions. This will result in a comprehensive account of scientific 
Conclusion 
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integrity which is, I think, most welcome in light of (1) the widely-shared concern for 
scientific integrity, and (2) the remaining confusion surrounding this concept. 
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Summary in English 
Interests and epistemic integrity in science 
A new framework to assess interest influences in scientific research processes 
This dissertation starts from three assumptions. The first is that science serves a 
variety of interests: epistemic interests (i.e. interests in knowing something), social 
interests, financial interests, career interests, etc. The second assumption is that 
interests influence science. The idea is that serving interests is not just an ad hoc aspect 
of science, but that, from the beginning of the scientific process, serving certain 
interests is anticipated. For instance, a scientist pursues a certain line of research 
because he expects it to serve his epistemic interests, his career interests, and/or 
certain social interests. The third assumption is that some interest influences in science 
are unacceptable; e.g., it is unacceptable for a pharmaceutical company to falsify clinical 
trial data in order to serve the company’s commercial interests. 
These assumptions present two challenges for philosophy of science. The first is to 
describe and analyze the different roles that different kinds of interests play in science. 
The second challenge is to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable interest influences 
in science. Part 1 of this dissertation contributes to tackling the first challenge, and part 
2 contributes to tackling the second challenge. 
1. The roles of interests within scientific research 
My contribution with respect to the first challenge consists of a discussion of the 
roles of different kinds of interests in reasoning processes within scientific research. 
More specifically, I discuss interest influences on hypothesis acceptance, theory choice, 
and the scientific explanation of phenomena. The following interest influences are 
 Summary in English 
170 
identified. Firstly, non-epistemic interests affect whether or not a certain hypothesis is 
accepted by influencing whether or not the evidence in favor of the hypothesis is 
considered sufficiently strong to accept the hypothesis. Secondly, non-epistemic 
interests can affect theory choice by influencing (1) which values are used to assess 
theories, (2) how these values are interpreted, and (3) how they are weighed against 
each other. Thirdly, epistemic and non-epistemic interests affect the construction and 
evaluation of scientific explanations. Because scientists want to end up with the most 
adequate explanation, and because the adequacy of an explanation depends on which 
particular interests (including non-epistemic interests) this explanation has to serve, 
scientists take these interests into account in developing and evaluating explanations. 
On the basis of these interest influences, I attack a view which many non-
philosophers seem to hold, and which, I think, still underlies the approach of many 
philosophers today (even though they may reject it in its original form): the ideal of 
purity. I distinguish two versions of this ideal: (1) the full ideal of purity, which states 
that ideally, non-epistemic interests do not play a role in scientific decisions such as 
hypothesis acceptance and theory choice, and (2) the partial ideal of purity, which 
states that ideally, non-epistemic interests do not play a direct role in such scientific 
decisions. I attack the full ideal of purity by arguing (1) that non-epistemic interests 
should be considered in decisions on whether or not to accept a hypothesis, and (2) that 
the requirement that theory choice is unaffected by non-epistemic interests may be too 
demanding. My discussion of interest influences in the construction and evaluation of 
scientific explanations serves to undermine the partial ideal of purity. I criticize this 
ideal by arguing that direct influences of non-epistemic interests on the acceptance of 
explanations should be allowed in science. The general conclusion is that non-epistemic 
interests form an integral part of reasoning processes within scientific research. 
2. Epistemic integrity 
But when is an interest influence in science problematic, then? Since the ideal of 
purity is not a good basis for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable interest 
influences in science, new criteria are needed for this. In part 2, one such criterion is 
offered, namely, a criterion to identify epistemically unacceptable interest influences. 
More specifically, I introduce a new concept of epistemic integrity that can function as 
such a criterion. The underlying idea is that if an interest compromises the epistemic 
integrity of the research process, then its particular influence on this research process 
is epistemically unacceptable. 
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The degree of epistemic integrity of the research process is defined as the degree to 
which the research process lives up to the epistemic standards that the audience can 
legitimately assume to be met in it. After explaining this definition, I show that it avoids 
the shortcomings of other definitions. Furthermore, it is argued that my concept of 
epistemic integrity meets Rudolf Carnap’s four requirements of explication: (1) it is 
similar to our common sense notion of epistemic integrity of the research process, (2) it 
is exact, (3) it is fruitful, that is, useful for the development and justification of norms 
for science and for the analysis of cases from scientific practice, and (4) it is as simple as 
requirements (1), (2), and (3) permit. 
To illustrate the usefulness of this concept for identifying epistemically unacceptable 
interest influences in science, it is applied to several cases from different areas of 
research. Firstly, I demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of different kinds of 
research processes in the U.S. Space Shuttle Program was damaged. This damage is 
explained by the financial and career interests of those involved in the research 
processes; these interests compromised epistemic integrity. Such an interest influence 
is epistemically unacceptable. Secondly, I discuss the epistemic integrity of research 
processes in climate science. The focus is on controversies concerning the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The epistemic integrity of the work 
by the IPCC that has been the target of criticism is assessed. Where epistemic integrity 
was compromised, this is explained on the basis of the non-epistemic interests of the 
person(s) involved. This suggests that these interests influenced the relevant research 
processes in epistemically unacceptable ways. 
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Summary in Dutch 
Belangen en epistemische integriteit in wetenschap 
Een nieuw kader voor het beoordelen van belangeninvloeden in wetenschappelijke onderzoeksprocessen 
Dit proefschrift vertrekt vanuit drie veronderstellingen. De eerste is dat wetenschap 
allerlei belangen dient: epistemische belangen (het verlangen om iets te weten), sociale 
belangen, financiële belangen, carrièrebelangen etc. De tweede veronderstelling is dat 
belangen wetenschap beïnvloeden. De onderliggende gedachte is dat het dienen van 
belangen geen ad hoc aspect van wetenschap is; het dienen van bepaalde belangen 
wordt geanticipeerd vanaf het begin van het wetenschappelijke proces. Een 
wetenschapper zal bijvoorbeeld voor een bepaalde onderzoekslijn kiezen omdat hij 
verwacht dat deze onderzoekslijn zijn epistemische belangen, zijn carrièrebelangen 
en/of bepaalde sociale belangen zal dienen. De derde veronderstelling is dat sommige 
belangeninvloeden in wetenschap onaanvaardbaar zijn. Het is bijvoorbeeld 
onaanvaardbaar voor een farmaceutisch bedrijf om data uit klinische studies te 
vervalsen om de commerciële belangen van het bedrijf te beschermen. 
Deze veronderstellingen leiden tot twee uitdagingen voor de wetenschapsfilosofie. De 
eerste is om de verschillende rollen die verschillende soorten belangen spelen in 
wetenschap, te beschrijven en te analyseren. De tweede uitdaging is om aanvaardbare 
van onaanvaardbare belangeninvloeden te onderscheiden. Deel 1 van dit proefschrift 
draagt bij tot het aanpakken van de eerste uitdaging. Deel 2 draagt bij tot het aanpakken 
van de tweede uitdaging. 
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1. De rollen van belangen binnen wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek 
Mijn bijdrage met betrekking tot de eerste uitdaging bestaat uit een bespreking van 
de rollen die verschillende soorten belangen spelen in redeneerprocessen binnen 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Meer bepaald bespreek ik belangeninvloeden op het 
aanvaarden van hypothesen, theoriekeuze, en het wetenschappelijk verklaren van 
fenomenen. De volgende belangeninvloeden worden geïdentificeerd. Ten eerste 
beïnvloeden niet-epistemische belangen of een hypothese al dan niet aanvaard wordt 
doordat ze meespelen in de beslissing of het ondersteunende bewijsmateriaal voldoende 
sterk is. Ten tweede, niet-epistemische belangen kunnen theoriekeuze beïnvloeden 
doordat ze mee bepalen (1) welke waarden gebruikt worden bij het beoordelen van 
theorieën, (2) hoe deze waarden geïnterpreteerd worden, en (3) hoe ze tegen elkaar 
worden afgewogen. Ten derde beïnvloeden epistemische en niet-epistemische belangen 
de constructie en evaluatie van wetenschappelijke verklaringen. Omdat wetenschappers 
willen dat hun verklaringen zo adequaat mogelijk zijn, en omdat de adequaatheid van 
een verklaring afhangt van de specifieke belangen (inclusief niet-epistemische 
belangen) die de verklaring hoort te dienen, gaan ze dergelijke belangen in rekening 
brengen bij het ontwikkelen en beoordelen van verklaringen. 
Deze belangeninvloeden vormen de basis voor een kritiek op een gedachte die bij 
veel niet-filosofen aanwezig is, en die ook in de filosofische gemeenschap nog in zekere 
mate leeft: het ideaal van puurheid. Ik maak een onderscheid tussen twee versies van dit 
ideaal: (1) het volle ideaal van puurheid, dat stelt dat niet-epistemische belangen 
idealiter geen rol spelen in wetenschappelijke beslissingen zoals de aanvaarding van 
hypothesen en theoriekeuze, en (2) het partiële ideaal van puurheid, dat stelt dat niet-
epistemische belangen idealiter geen directe rol spelen in dergelijke wetenschappelijke 
beslissingen. Ik bekritiseer het volle ideaal van puurheid door  te argumenteren (1) dat 
niet-epistemische belangen in rekening moeten gebracht worden bij beslissingen over 
het al dan niet aanvaarden van een hypothese, en (2) dat de verwachting dat 
theoriekeuze niet beïnvloed wordt door niet-epistemische belangen te veeleisend is. Het 
doel van mijn bespreking van belangeninvloeden in de constructie en beoordeling van 
wetenschappelijke verklaringen is om het partiële ideaal van puurheid te ondermijnen. 
Ik bekritiseer dit ideaal door te argumenteren dat directe invloeden van niet-
epistemische belangen op de aanvaarding van verklaringen moet toegelaten worden in 
wetenschap. De algemene conclusie is dat niet-epistemische belangen integraal deel 
uitmaken van redeneerprocessen binnen wetenschappelijk onderzoek. 
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2. Epistemische integriteit 
Maar wanneer is een belangeninvloed in wetenschap dan problematisch? Aangezien 
het ideaal van puurheid geen goede basis vormt voor het onderscheid tussen 
aanvaardbare en onaanvaardbare belangeninvloeden in wetenschap, is er nood aan 
nieuwe criteria om dit onderscheid te maken. In deel 2 wordt een dergelijk criterium 
ontwikkeld, namelijk een criterium om epistemisch onaanvaardbare belangeninvloeden 
te identificeren. Meer bepaald introduceer ik een nieuw concept van epistemische 
integriteit dat kan fungeren als een dergelijk criterium. De onderliggende gedachte is 
dat als een bepaald belang ertoe leidt dat de epistemische integriteit van het 
onderzoeksproces geschaad is, dan heeft dit belang een epistemisch onaanvaardbare 
invloed op het onderzoeksproces. 
De graad van epistemische integriteit van het onderzoeksproces wordt gedefinieerd 
als de mate waarin het onderzoeksproces voldoet aan bepaalde epistemische 
standaarden, namelijk die epistemische standaarden waarvan het publiek op legitieme 
wijze kan veronderstellen dat het onderzoeksproces eraan voldoet. Deze definitie wordt 
uitgebreid verduidelijkt, waarna ik aantoon dat ze de tekortkomingen van andere 
definities vermijdt. Verder argumenteer ik dat mijn concept van epistemische 
integriteit voldoet aan Rudolf Carnaps vier vereisten van explicatie: (1) het komt min of 
meer overeen met hoe de term ‘epistemische integriteit van het onderzoeksproces’ 
doorgaans gebruikt wordt, (2) het is exact, (3) het is vruchtbaar voor de ontwikkeling en 
rechtvaardiging van normen voor wetenschap en voor de analyse van cases uit de 
wetenschappelijke praktijk, en (4) het is zo simpel mogelijk (gegeven dat aan vereisten 
(1), (2) en (3) voldaan moet worden). 
Ter illustratie van het nut van dit concept voor het identificeren van epistemisch 
onaanvaardbare belangeninvloeden in wetenschap, wordt het toegepast op meerdere 
voorbeelden uit verschillende onderzoeksvelden. Eerst toon ik aan dat de epistemische 
integriteit van verschillende soorten onderzoeksprocessen in het Amerikaanse 
Spaceshuttleprogramma geschaad was. Deze schade wordt verklaard op basis van de 
financiële en carrièrebelangen van de betrokkenen; deze belangen hebben de 
epistemische integriteit van de betreffende onderzoeksprocessen aangetast. Een 
dergelijke belangeninvloed is epistemisch onaanvaardbaar. Ten tweede behandel ik 
onderzoeksprocessen in klimaatwetenschap. Ik richt mij op controverses met 
betrekking tot het Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). De epistemische 
integriteit van het IPCC-werk dat het mikpunt is geweest van kritiek, wordt beoordeeld. 
Waar epistemische integriteit werd aangetast, verklaar ik dit op basis van de niet-
epistemische belangen van de uitvoerder(s) van het betreffende onderzoeksproces. Dit 
geeft aan dat de specifieke invloeden die deze belangen op de betreffende 
onderzoeksprocessen hadden, epistemisch onaanvaardbaar zijn. 
